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Introduction and Motivation
Groundwater resources are essential to irrigated agriculture in many parts of the world. In gen-
eral, groundwater is private property and its extraction is thus unregulated. Since surface water
and groundwater are linked, groundwater pumping can reduce instream ﬂows leading to ecological
damages or economic losses to other water users. Recent litigation in response to reduced instream
ﬂows has caused groundwater regulation to be implemented in several interstate watersheds in the
western United States. Regulations have been implemented that restrict farmers’ pumping uniformly,
but because both instream impacts of pumping and farmers’ water application decisions vary across
space, such uniform restrictions are second best.
The Republican River ﬂows from eastern Colorado across southern Nebraska and becomes a trib-
utary to the Kansas River just over the Kansas-Nebraska border. The Nebraska portion of the
Republican River is called the Republican River Basin and is located in the southwest corner of Ne-
braska, primarily. Groundwater pumping in Nebraska has been linked to the reduction of instream
ﬂows in the Kansas portion of the Republican River Basin. Following litigation by Kansas and a
Supreme Court decision in 2002, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (DNR) required
each Natural Resource District (NRD) within the Nebraska portion of the Republican River Basin to
reduce the impacts of groundwater pumping on surface water ﬂows. Implemented regulations include
groundwater pumping limitations, well drilling moratoria, metering of all wells used for irrigation,
and irrigated acre certiﬁcation. All NRDs of the Nebraska portion of the Republican River Basin
(Upper Republican, Lower Republican, Middle Republican, and a portion of the Tri-Basin) have been
declared over- or fully-appropriated in their surface and groundwater allocation. As part of the eﬀort
to preserve instream ﬂows, the NRDs have limited pumping to certiﬁed irrigated acreage only and
have placed further restrictions on those lands (Table 1). Current water allocations are binding on
most individual water users.
In this M.S. thesis, I present and analyze a unique geospatial dataset of irrigation wells and as-
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sociated economic and hydrologic data in the Republican River Basin of Nebraska. My goal is to
model the welfare impacts of alternative spatial water management policies on individual farmers. I
use a geographic information system and numeric modeling to implement a spatial ﬁeld-level model
of irrigation for the Nebraska portion of the Republican River Basin. Next, I analyze how spatial
heterogeneity in ﬁeld-level characteristics (such as soil type, hydrologic properties, and climate) can
inﬂuence the distribution and magnitude of welfare gains from alternative market-based schemes for
the allocation of irrigation water. Results indicate that there are potential welfare gains in moving
from current groundwater management policy to a frictionless tradable permit policy. Speciﬁcally,
under a tradable permit policy the total cost of reducing water use to the current NRD allocation can
decrease by nearly 40 percent across the watershed. Below I describe the institutional background of
the study area and describe the data and modeling framework used.
The data I use are associated with all irrigation wells in the Nebraska portion of the Republican
River Basin reported to the Nebraska DNR (Figure 1). Each well in the database contains information
on variables including geographic coordinates, ownership information, year installed, use status (ac-
tive or inactive), well yield and depth to groundwater (when pumping). Overall I have 10,908 active
wells with certiﬁed irrigation acres, all of which are under the jurisdiction of the four NRDs of the
Republican River Basin. Other geospatial data merged with the well database include NRD-reported
certiﬁed acreage, annual acre-inches of water pumped for each well, soil type, distance to nearest
stream, distance to nearest neighboring well, and spatially interpolated evapotranspiration data and
crop yield for eight crop types in irrigated and dryland agriculture.
For the cropland associated with each irrigation well I estimate proﬁt-maximizing crop choice
and water use. To do this I extend a decision support tool called WaterOptimizer developed by the
Nebraska Cooperative Extension at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (Martin et al. 2005). Wa-
terOptimizer is a single-ﬁeld nonlinear optimization program that simultaneously chooses acreage,
cropping patterns, and applied water for each irrigated and dryland crop. My expansion of WaterOp-
timizer allows me to aggregate individual ﬁeld-level decision-making to a watershed scale using my
geospatial dataset as an input. In particular I generate ﬁeld-level marginal abatement cost curves for
water allocation reductions across the basin. My analysis shows that for the current NRD allocations,
the distribution of marginal abatement costs varies from $0 per inch per acre, for producers with
unconstrained water use below the NRD water use allocation to, $45 per inch per acre for produc-
ers with unconstrained water use well above the NRD water use allocation. This heterogeneity of
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marginal abatement costs suggests that a policy such as a tradable permit scheme that equalized
marginal abatement costs across users could generate a large reduction in basin-wide total abatement
cost given the current total water allocation.
Under a tradable permit scheme, farmers with lower marginal values at the NRD allocations sell
permits to buyers with higher marginal abatement costs. Policy options considered include trading
groundwater basin-wide, and limiting trades within an NRD, within a county, within a township, and
within a speciﬁed distance from streams. My results also illustrate the potential for abatement cost
reductions and environmental impacts from water use are sensitive to the trading rules implemented.
Basin-wide trading decreases abatement costs by 45 percent, NRD-scale trading decreases abatement
costs by 40 percent, county-scale trading decreases abatement costs by 33 percent, township-scale
trading decreases abatement costs by 30 percent and distance-from-stream trading decreases abate-
ment costs by 40 percent. The relative rankings of diﬀerent policies in terms of cost-eﬀectiveness are
intuitive, and reﬂect the extent to which basin-wide water user heterogeneity is reproduced at smaller
spatial trading scales.
This thesis is laid out as follows. The background and institutional history provide an overview
of previous relevant research studies and present the regulatory history of the study area. In the
following sections, I present a model of land allocation, crop choice, and water use for a farmer using
groundwater and explain how abatement cost for any water use restriction can be obtained. In the
data section, I present the climatic, hydrologic and physical, economic, and regulatory data used in
the model. An analysis of irrigation water use at the watershed level follows. Then I present and
discuss several alternative trading policies and their welfare eﬀects. Finally, a discussion of policy
implications and research extensions concludes.
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Background
In recent years drought, environmental concerns, and legal contracts have increasingly limited the
water available to farmers for irrigated production. To understand the basin-wide implications of re-
ductions in water use, it is necessary to aggregate from the ﬁeld level to the watershed scale. Typically
this involves one of a few approaches. The simplest approach is to assume all water users face the
same conditions and behave identically, and to use a representative producer to determine aggregate
water demand and the eﬀects of restrictions. Another approach is to use county or sub-basin level
water demand and to extrapolate for each county in the basin of interest (Sunding et al. 2002). The
most common approach is to use a sample of water users to determine water demand and the eﬀects
of restrictions for the sample, and then to extrapolate for the basin (e.g. Pujol et al. (2006) and one
of the case studies in Satti and Jacobs (2004)). Ideally one would use an entire population dataset
for determining the basin-wide water use. For example, one case study in Satti and Jacobs (2004)
included all 212 water users in one county. Unfortunately, population data for an entire watershed
are costly to collect or infrequently available, particularly for much larger basins. In this thesis, I
use a unique basin-wide population dataset of irrigation groundwater wells and associated economic
and hydrologic data. To the best of my knowledge, no other studies have determined irrigation water
demand and the welfare eﬀects of water restrictions at a watershed level using population data, as
this thesis does.
It is well understood that the diﬀerence in total proﬁts between dryland and irrigated agriculture
drives a farmer’s decision to irrigate (Lichtenberg 1989). This diﬀerence in proﬁts may be thought of
as an upper bound on the cost of reducing available water for irrigated agriculture. However, if the
sample is not representative, modeled policy impacts will be incorrect. However, when analyzing the
costs of constraining available irrigation water, total cost of abatement is not enough. In the pres-
ence of heterogeneous costs, production functions, and damage functions, diﬀerences in the marginal
abatement costs are ineﬃcient and drive the potential gains from trading. Thus, examination of the
value of water at the margin (or equivalently the marginal abatement cost of water reduction) are
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needed to measure the beneﬁts from trading. Below I discuss the implementation of the two most
common water markets, surface water quantity and water quality markets.
Water Quantity Markets
The most commonly discussed trading markets for water are surface water quantity markets. Agri-
cultural producers have deﬁned property rights to water diverted from streams or reservoirs and may
take delivery of water at speciﬁed times. Producers with rights to water are given permits equal to
their water allocation. Water markets allow permits to be bought or sold to other agricultural pro-
ducers or in some cases, to urban water municipalities or even for environmental purposes. Trading
is driven by heterogeneity in the value of the marginal product of water. When water for agricul-
ture is restricted but can be traded, it moves from less eﬃcient to more eﬃcient users (e.g. Chong
and Sunding (2006) and Anonymous (2009)). In many water quantity markets, trades occur be-
tween higher marginal value urban users and lower marginal value agricultural producers (Chong and
Sunding 2006). On the other hand, agriculture-to-agriculture trading makes up a signiﬁcant volume
of water trades, for example in California’s Drought Water Bank (20 percent of sales) and in the
Colorado-Big Thompson project area (26 percent of sales), suggesting that there is signiﬁcant hetero-
geneity in the marginal value of water even for agricultural producers (Chong and Sunding 2006, Pujol
et al. 2006, Hadjigeorgalis 2009, Gonzalez-Alvarez et al. 2006). It is worth nothing that even though
the marginal value of water for urban uses is higher than that for agricultural uses, recent droughts
and high commodity prices have lead to high prices even for agricultural water uses. For example, a
notable agriculture-only market, the Westlands Water Market, is facing high demand and low supply
in 2009, which has pushed the price of water for irrigation to almost $500 per acre foot, when prices
are usually around $170 per acre foot (Anonymous 2009). In other agricultural water markets in
California permanent sales are $1,239 per acre foot in 2003 dollars (Potter 2009).
The transaction costs associated with water quantity markets may be large. In particular if there
is no formal market, so that buyers and sellers must use a “coﬀee-shop market,” then search costs may
be high (Brozovic´ et al. 2002). Similarly, brokerage costs, as well as regulators’ cost of monitoring
and enforcing the transfer of the right to use water, may be very large. Producers can be unlikely to
trade, even if their welfare would increase, if they fear non-use or perpetual sales of the water right
will lead to a loss of the right. Some producers trade for reasons other than diﬀerences in the value
of the marginal product of water, such as for tax purposes, which overstates the true beneﬁts from
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trading (Brozovic´ et al. 2002). Finally, because the value of the water rights is capitalized into land
values, townships and counties may resist the transfer of water rights outside their tax jurisdiction,
even if it makes economic sense for both parties wanting to trade.
Finally, while water quantity trading markets can be welfare increasing, there are also several phys-
ical and environmental issues to be accounted for. Surface water quantity markets face the problem of
conveyance and the costs associated with delivering water (Young 1986). Third-party eﬀects such as
substitution of groundwater for sold surface water and the eﬀects of reduced return ﬂows negatively
aﬀect the environment as well as downstream users. Programs such as water trusts and tagged water
entitlements that incorporate environmental concerns associated with instream ﬂows have been used
to limit some third party eﬀects (Hadjigeorgalis 2009). Water trusts are non-proﬁt organizations that
buy water permits to protect environmentally crucial instream ﬂows (Hadjigeorgalis 2009). Tagging
water entitlements involves tying the source of the original right to water to the permit and restricting
where the permit can be used, eﬀectively limiting the return ﬂows issues associated with surface water
transfers.
Water Quality Markets
The opportunity for water quality markets arises from diﬀerential water pollution regulation be-
tween point and non-point sources. Water pollution from point sources is stringently regulated by the
Clean Water Act, while water pollution from non-point sources is unregulated, and costly to monitor.
Regulations on point sources require abatement of pollution, even if the marginal costs of abatement
are high. Since non-point sources do not face the same regulations their marginal cost of abatement
is may be relatively low. This diﬀerence in marginal abatement costs drives trading. In water quality
markets, point source producers will pay non-point sources to take measures, such as the introduction
of best management practices, to reduce pollution (Tietenberg and Lewis 2009). Payment is based on
a trading ratio, which is the rate at which non-point source abatement can be substituted for point
source abatement. Point-non-point trading is an important and cost-eﬀective solution if a reduction
in ambient water pollution is the goal rather than a reduction in total levels of pollution from point
sources.
Although water quality trading theoretically improves the welfare of both parties, we see few
transactions in water quality markets (Tietenberg and Lewis 2009, Hoag and Hughes-Popp 1997).
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In addition to the costs associated with brokerage, monitoring, and enforcement, the reluctance of
non-point source to accept payment for abatement may stem from a fear that it will encourage future
government regulation. Moreover, trading ratios greater than one discourage trading, even if they are
environmentally or theoretically desirable. Finally, water quality markets may face the problem of
free riding, as monitoring of non-point sources is by deﬁnition diﬃcult.
Groundwater Trading
Though historically tied to private property rights legally, groundwater pumping for agriculture
has recently been treated as a “correlative right,” allowing government intervention in the form of
limitations on pumping (Chong and Sunding 2006). Possible regulations for groundwater pumping
have included reducing irrigated water use to very low allocations or paying irrigators to not irrigate
on a temporary and permanent basis (Aiken 2008, Hadjigeorgalis 2009). The value of water, as a
function of the right to pump, can be 30 to 60 percent of the value of the land, in terms of land sales
(Torell et al. 1990). For example, payments in 1997 to suspend irrigation in Texas were $116-$300 per
acre (Hadjigeorgalis 2009). In Nebraska’s Central Platte Natural Resource District,(NRD), farmers
sold 1,000 acre feet of permanent irrigation to the NRD for $2,000-$2,500 per acre foot, although
annual leases can be obtained for about $50 per acre foot (Potter 2009).
Thompson and Supalla (2007) and Gonzalez-Alvarez et al. (2006) have shown that marginal values
of groundwater are not uniform. Furthermore, Thompson and Supalla (2007) show that the marginal
eﬀects of groundwater irrigation restrictions are not uniform. Limited water markets have been de-
veloped as a method to reduce the costs associated with pumping restrictions. In Nebraska, nascent
groundwater markets exist (Table 1). Although no formal markets and water brokerages exist, in-
formal trading has taken place. These markets are highly regulated and restrictive due to the legal
issues surrounding groundwater pumping in Nebraska. Using a two-ﬁeld analysis and synthetic, rep-
resentative well data, Thompson and Supalla (2007) found that trading water allocations could lead
to signiﬁcant welfare gains, which suggest that cap and trade programs should be considered if low
allocations become the standard regulation in Nebraska (Thompson and Supalla 2007). This thesis is
similar in spirit to the work of Thompson and Supalla (2007) although it uses real data on population
of wells and considers multiple trading options.
Importantly, some of the common criticisms of other water trading markets are expected to not
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be signiﬁcant issues in groundwater trading markets1. The groundwater-surface water interaction in
trading of is not expected to be a signiﬁcant issue in this study area since there are few surface water
rights in the basin and all certiﬁed acreage is irrigated by groundwater. Groundwater trading does not
involve the transfer of actual water, but only the right to pump water, and thus requires no diversion
or delivery system. Hence, unlike surface water quantity markets, conveyance is not an issue. At least
in my study area groundwater users have very clearly deﬁned property rights that are tied closely to
the right to irrigate. Finally, because of all wells are metered, monitoring and enforcement costs are
expected to be low.
1In this thesis, the issue of return ﬂows is not considered. While changes in the volume of water pumped aﬀect
return ﬂows, the movements of water considered in this analysis are expected to not signiﬁcantly change return ﬂow
patterns. This issue could be addressed more formally in extensions of this work.
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Model
In order to model the individual impacts of water use restrictions on agricultural groundwater
users, I begin by presenting a model of proﬁt-maximizing water use. Then I explain how reductions
in water allocations aﬀect individual users through the marginal costs of abatement at diﬀerent levels
of abatement.
In the model presented below, farmers with access to groundwater simultaneously choose optimal
crop choice, land allocation, and water use to maximize proﬁts from agricultural production. I assume
that there are K dryland crops, each with a per acre yield of Y dk , where the superscript d denotes dry-
land crop production. Dryland crop yields are location speciﬁc and depend on soil type and rainfall.
Similarly, there are J irrigated crops each with per acre yield Y ij (Ij), where Ij is the depth of applied
irrigation water per acre, where the superscript i denotes irrigated crop production. I assume that the
marginal returns from increasing applied water are increasing, ∂Y
i
j (Ij)
∂Ij
≥ 0, and that ∂
2Y ij (Ij)
∂I2j
≤ 0, so
that there is a maximum per acre yield possible corresponding to a maximum irrigation depth Imj . A
farmer’s optimal unconstrained water use is less than Imj since pumping water from the ground has
a cost, and water will only be applied until the marginal value equals the marginal cost of pumping
and applying it. Note that the irrigated yields for a crop are greater than the yields for the same
crop grown under dryland conditions. Additionally, I assume that farmers may be constrained in
their water availability. First I will present the farmer’s model for proﬁt maximization and then I will
present the model for determining the costs associated with applied water reduction.
The farmer’s maximization problem for a single ﬁeld that can be irrigated is
Max{I1,...,IJ ,Ai1,...,AiJ ,Ad1 ,...,AdK} π =
J∑
j=1
Aij
[
(pij − tij)Y ij (Ij)− cwj Ij − F ij
]
(1)
+
K∑
k=1
Adk
[
(pdk − tdk)Y dk − F dk
]
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The ﬁrst line on the right hand side of Equation 1 is the proﬁt from irrigated crop production,
where the proﬁt per acre for each crop is the term in the square brackets. The second line on the
right hand side is the proﬁt from dryland production, where the proﬁt per acre for each crop is again
the term in the square brackets. The proﬁt from the area in irrigated production AiJ is found by mul-
tiplying the yield Y ij and price p less transportation cost t, the crop-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of production
F ij , and the cost of irrigation c
w
j Ij . The cost of water is discussed further in the Appendix.
The dryland yield, Y dk , is the maximum yield possible when relying on rainfall alone, rather than
irrigation. Calculating Ij , the water applied that yields Y ij , depends on soil type, evapotranspiration,
and the technical eﬃciency of the irrigation system.2 The irrigated yield, Y ij , if water is unconstrained,
is the maximum irrigated yield, and is a function of dryland yield as well as applied water.
Farmers are constrained by the total land they have available for agricultural production. The land
used for the production of each crop (irrigated or dryland) must be non-negative (Equations 2 - 6).
Similarly, the total land in agricultural production cannot be greater than the total land available
(Equation 4).
0 ≤ Ai1, . . . , 0 ≤ AiJ (2)
0 ≤ Ad1, . . . , 0 ≤ AdK (3)
J∑
j=1
Aij +
K∑
k=1
Adk ≤ A¯ (4)
Farmers are also constrained by the water that they can apply. Total water applied must be
non-negative. For each crop the water applied must be less than or equal to the water required at the
maximum irrigated yield Imj , because applying more water than I
m
j would be ineﬃcient (Equation
5). The sum of total water applied on all crops cannot exceed the total water allocated A¯I¯, where A¯
2Not all water applied will be utilized due to the eﬃciency or ineﬃciency of the irrigation technology. A newer
technology such as center pivot irrigation which uses sprinkler and drip technology is more eﬃcient than traditional
methods such as ditch irrigation.
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is the total area available and I¯ is the total per acre water allocation (Equation 6).
0 ≤ I1 ≤ Im1 , . . . , 0 ≤ IJ ≤ ImJ (5)
J∑
j=1
AijIj ≤ A¯I¯ (6)
If π∗ represents maximized proﬁts given any set of input parameters and constraints (Equations 2 -
6), then proﬁts will be increasing in I¯ (Equation 7). Thus, if a farmer faces a reduction in water
allocation, his or her proﬁts will decrease if any land is irrigated initially.
∂π∗
∂I¯
≥ 0 (7)
Consider the case of agricultural producers that face mandatory reductions on inputs such as
water. The resulting loss in proﬁts is the cost of the input restriction.
c(a) = π∗(A¯I∗)− π∗(A¯Iˆ) (8)
where π∗(A¯I∗) is the proﬁt given optimal unconstrained water use and π∗(A¯Iˆ) is proﬁt given optimal
constrained water use, if Iˆ is the input constraint. The diﬀerence of (I∗ − Iˆ) is the reduction of
water allocation per acre. The marginal cost of abatement is positive and increasing. Note that at
some point the cost of abatement c(a), becomes prohibitive and the producer switches to dryland
agriculture only, so that an upper bound on abatement cost is π∗(I)− π∗(0).
If a farmer is unable to reallocate water between ﬁelds, then the farmer’s cost minimization prob-
lem is equivalent to the proﬁt maximization problem in Equation 1 together with the constraints in
Equations 2 - 6. If there are many farmers with yields and land allocations that vary, then marginal
abatement costs at any restriction I¯ will vary also. If trading of the constrained input is allowed,
equalizing marginal abatement costs across traders is a cost-eﬀective way of achieving any aggregate
reduction in input use (Montgomery 1972, Hanley et al. 2001).
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The solution to the optimization problem in Equation 1, with the constraints in Equations 2 - 6,
can be used to estimate proﬁts given any water allocation I. From the diﬀerence in proﬁts at various
water allocations, total and marginal abatement costs can be generated. For example, consider three
wells in the study area,3 (A, B, C) with diﬀerent initial unconstrained water use (I∗A, I
∗
B, I
∗
C). If the
water allocation is reduced to Iˆ for all users, the total acre inches of abatement will be A¯A(I∗A − Iˆ)
for well A, A¯B(I∗B − Iˆ) for well B, and A¯C(I∗C − Iˆ) for well C. Since each well starts at a diﬀerent
initial unconstrained water use, the abatement to reduce to Iˆ will be diﬀerent for each well. Figure 2
shows the marginal abatement cost curves for wells A, B andC.
The total acre inches abated when the allocation is reduced to Iˆ and corresponding marginal cost
of abatement at the allocation are shown as stars in Figure 2. Well C abates the least acre inches
because its unconstrained water use I∗C is the closest to the reduced allocation Iˆ, and it has the lowest
marginal abatement costs at an allocation of Iˆ. Well A abates the most acre inches and has the
highest marginal abatement costs. Well C has similar marginal abatement costs as well A, but abates
less acre inches when the allocation is Iˆ. Total abatement at the water allocation Iˆ is the sum of acre
inches abated by wells A,B, andC.
Assuming trading is frictionless, when A¯Iˆ permits are given to each well and trading of permits is
allowed, marginal abatement costs are equalized; the resulting permit price is indicated by the dark
dashed line 2. At the permit price, well A buys permits from well C and reduces abatement to A∗.
Well B buys permits from well C and reduces abatement to B∗. Well C sells permits to wells A andB
and increases abatement. Total abatement of acre inches is the same as the abatement at the water
allocation Iˆ without trading, but the marginal and total costs have been reduced. Wells A andB buy
permits at the permit price, but the increase in their water use increases their proﬁts (Equation 7).
Well C sells permits at the permit price and reduces water use, but since the permit price is equal to
marginal cost at the increased abatement and higher marginal cost for intra-marginal units, well C is
also better oﬀ at the increased level of abatement. Thus, trading water allocations has increased the
total welfare by reducing the total cost of abatement.
3Well IDs 299, 513, and 514
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Institutional History of the
Republican River Basin
The Republican River ﬂows from eastern Colorado across southern Nebraska and becomes a tribu-
tary to the Kansas River just over the Kansas-Nebraska border. The Nebraska portion of the Repub-
lican River is called the Republican River Basin and is located in the southwest corner of Nebraska. In
1942, all three states agreed to the Republican River Compact which determined how each state was
to share the Basin’s water resources. Each state was given speciﬁc allocations of water for “beneﬁcial
consumptive use” (Hinderlider et al. 1942). The compact deﬁned beneﬁcial consumptive use as “use
by which the water supply of the basin is consumed through the activities of man, and shall include
water consumed by evaporation from any reservoir, canal, ditch, or irrigated area” (Hinderlider et
al. 1942).
The compact guaranteed the “virgin water supply” of each sub-basin regardless of beneﬁcial use
consumption allocation. Virgin water supply was deﬁned as the “water supply within the Basin unde-
pleted by the activities of man” (Hinderlider et al. 1942). Speciﬁcally, if the virgin water supply of a
sub-basin varied more than ten percent, the allocation for the following year would be increased or de-
creased according to the original compact proportions. This provision attempted to solve the problem
of reduced instream ﬂows in one sub-basin as a result of over-extraction by water users in upstream
sub-basins. Since determining the virgin water supply was vital to each state’s allocation of water for
beneﬁcial consumptive use, the Republican River Compact Administration (RRCA) was established
in 1959 to determine the actual yearly virgin water supply. However, only surface water extractions
were linked to reductions in instream ﬂows at the time the compact was written. The volume of
groundwater extractions was never used in the calculation of beneﬁcial consumptive use, except for
the very small number of wells that pumped within the alluvium of the stream bed (Republican River
Compact Administration 1961).
Advances in irrigation technology such as center pivot and sprinkler systems made it possible for
farmers to irrigate land unsuitable for furrow or ditch irrigation. After 1942, the Nebraska portion
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of the Republican River Basin saw increases in well drilling and subsequent irrigation of millions of
acres. In 1990, Nebraska expanded the standards for calculating beneﬁcial consumptive use to include
the groundwater pumping volume from wells within one mile of a stream. Even though Nebraska
included more wells and therefore decreased the volume of water available from the beneﬁcial use
allocations for surface water, Kansas representatives argued that Nebraska was not including all wells
that were hydrologically connected to the surface waters of the Republican River Basin and was thus
exceeding the beneﬁcial use allocations set forth in the original compact (Republican River Compact
Administration 1991). In 1998, Kansas sued Nebraska and Colorado for breach of contract stating that
the groundwater extractions of wells in both states were reducing instream ﬂows and thus the virgin
water supply in Kansas sub-basins. The Supreme Court appointed a Special Master and mediations
between the states began. In 2002, the states agreed on a ﬁnal stipulation which declared well-drilling
moratoria in certain areas of Nebraska, and lead to the creation of a groundwater model for deter-
mining the hydrological connection between surface water of the river basin and water pumped from
wells. The ﬁnal stipulation also required metering on all wells in the basin, with pumping volumes to
be added yearly to the RRCA groundwater model. Pumping allocations were to be determined on a
ﬁve year rolling average (McKusick 2002).
Republican River Compact Administration Groundwater
Model
Before the 2002 agreement, groundwater models had been used to understand the eﬀects of ground-
water pumping on instream ﬂows of a watershed scale, but never before had a groundwater model
been used to manage and determine the water allocations for groundwater users of an entire wa-
tershed. Compact administration is based on a MODFLOW model of the Republican River Basin.
MODFLOW4 is a simulation program designed by the U.S. Geological Survey to understand ground-
water ﬂow. The MODFLOW model includes groundwater and surface water irrigation, pumping for
municipal and industrial uses, water recharge from precipitation, canals, and irrigation, and evapo-
transpiration from non-agricultural plants (such as forests and marshes) in its calculation of water
use for the entire basin. The Republican River Basin model is cell-based with each model cell being
one square mile in size. The model calculates the impact of groundwater pumping on instream ﬂows.
Well-speciﬁc volumes of pumping, collected by the Nebraska DNR, are aggregated to the county level
4United States Geological Survey. “MODFLOW and Related Programs.” Water Resources Ground Water Software.
2008. United States Department of the Interior. 13 Nov. 2008
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and then divided by the total certiﬁed acreage in the county. This estimate of pumping per acre is
then attached to the irrigated acreage in each square-mile cell.
Nebraska Portion of the Republican River Basin
The Supreme Court decision and resulting changes to the RRCA dramatically aﬀected the Ne-
braska portion of the basin. Stretching across thirteen counties and four Natural Resource Districts,
the basin contains around 11,000 active wells used for irrigation. Irrigation wells fall under the jurisdic-
tions of the Nebraska Legislature, the Nebraska DNR, and the local Natural Resource District (NRD).
In 1969 the Nebraska Legislature passed L.B 1357, which established NRDs to provide local sup-
port for managing resources such as surface and groundwater. Rather than using established political
boundaries, NRDs followed river basin boundaries where issues of natural resources are similar and
often span several counties. The NRDs located in the Republican River Basin are the Upper Repub-
lican, Lower Republican, Middle Republican and a portion of the Tri-Basin NRDs (Figure 3).
The Nebraska legislature passed L.B 962 in 2004, which required over or fully appropriated NRDs
to develop an integrated water management plan. To preserve instream ﬂows, the integrated man-
agement plans of the NRDs have declared well drilling moratoria, required metering of wells used for
irrigation, set groundwater pumping limitations, and certiﬁed irrigated acreage. The Middle Repub-
lican, Lower Republican, and Tri-Basin NRDs completed the irrigated acreage certiﬁcation and well
metering between 2003 and 2004, though the Upper Republican NRD completed both metering of
wells and certiﬁcation of acreage before the litigation began. The Upper Republican NRD certiﬁed
irrigated acreage in 1977 and has metered all irrigation wells since 1982. The setting of irrigation
allocations followed the metering of wells in the Upper Republican NRD in 1983. In the past 25 years,
irrigation allocations have been reduced from 20 inches per acre per year to the current allocation of
13 inches per acre per year.
The westernmost NRD, the Upper Republican NRD, has the greatest allocation of 13 inches per
acre per year since there is less rainfall (Nebraska Department of Natural Resources and Upper Re-
publican Natural Resource District 2008). The easternmost NRD, the Lower Republican NRD, has
the smallest allocation of 9 inches per acre per year since there is more rainfall (Nebraska Department
of Natural Resources and Lower Republican Natural Resource District 2008). The Middle Republi-
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can NRD, located between the Upper and Lower Republican NRDs, allocates 12 inches per acre per
year to certiﬁed acres (Nebraska Department of Natural Resources and Middle Republican Natural
Resource District 2008). The Tri-Basin NRD, located north of the Lower Republican NRD, sets irri-
gation allocations by county: 11 inches per acre per year for Gosper County, 10 inches per acre per
year for Phelps County, and 9 inches per acre for Kearney County (Nebraska Department of Natural
Resources and Tr-Basin Natural Resource District 2007). Note that these water allocations are bind-
ing on most individual water users.
The most recent updates to the integrated management plans for three of the NRDs allow for some
trading of groundwater rights. Table 1 shows the details of the groundwater trading process. Trading
of groundwater rights is not allowed in the Lower Republican NRD, but in the Upper and Middle
Republican and Tri-Basin NRDs, groundwater trading is allowed with some restrictions. In the Upper
Republican NRD trades must be made within township boundaries. In the Middle Republican NRD,
trading is limited to groundwater users within certain distances from streams. In the Tri-Basin NRD,
trading must be approved by the board of directors if traders are separated by more than a mile,
though for trading within a mile board approval is not necessary (Nebraska Department of Natural
Resources and Tr-Basin Natural Resource District 2007). There are no formal markets or brokers for
groundwater in the basin and in each NRD allowing trading, trades must be approved by the NRD
Board of Directors. Even though trading is restricted, at least forty trades occurred in the period
January-November 2008 (Table 1).
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Data Description
For this study, I collected and synthesized several diﬀerent types of georeferenced data: information
on groundwater wells, soil type coverages, evapotranspiration estimates, and irrigated and dryland
crop yields. Since the dataset contains all of the wells in the basin and the regulation is explicitly tied
to wells, the basic decision making unit for the model is one well irrigating one ﬁeld. For data with
observations and coverages with a larger scale, I disaggregated the data to be well-speciﬁc.
WaterOptimizer is a single ﬁeld irrigation decision support tool created by University of Nebraska-
Lincoln Extension (Martin et al. 2005). Based in Microsoft Excel, WaterOptimizer ﬁnds the optimal
land allocation, crop choice, and water use based on information provided by the user, such as water
allocation, acres irrigated, soil type, pumping water level, well yield, and energy costs. Most input
and output prices as well as crop evapotranspiration requirements and crop yields for county centroids
are borrowed from WaterOptimizer.
Below, I present and summarize four kinds of data: regulatory, economic, climatic, and hydrolog-
ic/physical.
Regulatory Data
Pumping Wells
The Nebraska DNR maintains a registry of all active and inactive groundwater wells in Nebraska
(currently almost 180,000 wells). Well information is based on mandatory self-reporting and well-
drilling contractor reporting. Only wells with certiﬁed irrigation acres were used in this analysis but
the database includes wells used for livestock, aquaculture, industrial, domestic and public water
supply use5. Each well in the database contains geographic coordinates, ownership information, year
installed, use status (active or inactive), acres irrigated, well yield and depth to groundwater (when
5Irrigated agriculture represents the majority of water use in the Republican River Basin.
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pumping). The dataset analyzed for the Republican River Basin contains 10,908 active registered
wells with certiﬁed irrigated acreage, all of which are under the jurisdiction of the four NRDs of the
Republican River Basin. Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of wells between the NRDs.
Certiﬁed Irrigated Acreage
Certiﬁed irrigated acreage (A¯ in my model) is an important parameter to the RRCA model as
well as any analysis since it determines the total water available to a well when an allocation Iˆ is set,
namely A¯Iˆ.
Note that the irrigated acres reported in the NRD wells database were not used in this analysis,
since the irrigated acreage is self-reported and could be the intended irrigated acres or the acreage
irrigated at installation, which may not accurately measure the acres actually irrigated currently. Well
owners are required to ﬁle notices with the Nebraska DNR about changes to wells including reduction
in acres irrigated or change of ownership, though it is not strictly enforced. Moreover, as acres are
self-reported, there may be some strategic reporting by users concerned by future water allocations
or mandatory retirement of irrigated acreage.
Instead, I used the certiﬁed acres associated with each irrigation well as reported to the Republican
River Compact Administration groundwater model. As a result of the interstate litigation, Nebraska
required its NRDs to certify the irrigated acreage for all wells irrigating in the Republican River
Basin. To complete the certiﬁcation process, farmers had to show a history of irrigated production
and in some cases tax assessments were required to determine the actual irrigated acreage. Certiﬁed
acreage is viewed as an accurate representation of farmers’ historical irrigation,6 and is the basis for
determining the current total allocation per well. All wells with certiﬁed irrigated acres according to
the RRCA model were included in the analysis regardless of the volume of pumping, since well users
have a ﬁve-year allocation and may choose to pool their allocation across ﬁve years (McKusick 2002).
A comparison of certiﬁed irrigated acreages with irrigated acreage estimates from other sources as
well as a description of minor changes made to certiﬁed irrigated acreage data, are reported in the
Appendix.
The Upper Republican NRD has jurisdiction over 36 percent of irrigated acreage and 28 percent of
the wells in the basin, followed closely by the Lower Republican NRD with 25 percent of the irrigated
6Ray Supalla, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. personal communication, 2008.
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acreage and 30 percent of the wells in the basin. The total acreage is smaller in the Lower Republican
NRD, while the number of wells is larger than the Upper Republican NRD because wells in the Lower
NRD irrigate less acreage than Upper Republican NRD wells on average (Table 2).
Economic Data
Input and Output Prices
The model includes output prices for eight crops in both dryland and irrigated production. Input
and output prices follow the December 2007 version of WaterOptimizer. Input prices include energy,
labor, fertilizer, and transportation costs. For the prices used in this analysis, the proﬁt maximization
crop choices were almost always irrigated corn and dryland wheat.
Climatic Data
Evapotranspiration and Crop Yield
I used Nebraska Cooperative Extension evapotranspiration (ET) and crop yield data for eight
crops in dryland and irrigated production to ﬁnd well-speciﬁc data. The dryland crop yields Y dj
are a function of the climatic ET requirements. The maximum per acre irrigated crop yield Yj(Ij)
corresponding to a maximum irrigation depth Imj , is calculated as follows:
Yj(Ij) = Y dj + (Y
m
j − Y dj )
⎛
⎝1−
(
1− Ij
Imj
)1/Bj⎞⎠ (9)
where Y ij irrigated yield for crop j
Ij irrigation water applied
Y dj dryland yield for crop j
Y mj maximum irrigated yield for crop j
Imj water applied that yields Y
m
j
B technical eﬃciency ∈ (0, 1]
I interpolated the county-centroid ET and yield data across the Nebraska portion of the Republican
River Basin using a cubic spline. Using the latitude, longitude and soil type speciﬁc to each well, I
determined the ET and crop yield speciﬁc to each well in the database.
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Hydrologic/Physical Data
Soil Type
To ﬁnd the soil type of the land surrounding a well I used the State Soils Geographic (STATSGO)
database for Nebraska7. The STATSGO database is a geospatial map of soil types for Nebraska. I
related soil type to each well in the dataset by overlaying the groundwater wells on the soils map in
ArcMap. I used the nearest soil type for wells that fell in areas with no referenced soil type.8 The
soil types used in this analysis were sandy, loamy, and silty, which were referenced in the dataset as
coarse, medium, and ﬁne, respectively. Most wells in the basin (69 percent) are located on ﬁne soil,
followed by medium soil (18 percent), and then coarse soil (13 percent).
Pumping Water Level and Well Yield
Measured pumping water level and well yield were used in calculating of the cost of irrigation.
Reported well yield and pumping water levels in the Nebraska DNR wells database were used in
this analysis. The mean pumping water level and well yield varied across watersheds and within
NRDs. Some of the lowest-yielding wells are located near streams, but the distribution of well yields
is heterogeneous throughout the basin. More information, including ﬁgures of the distribution of
well yields and minor changes made to the pumping water level and well yields can be found in the
appendix.
Distance of Wells to the Nearest Stream
The eﬀect of groundwater pumping a well has on instream ﬂows is a function of the distance of
that well to the nearest stream. The closer a well is to a stream, the greater the proportion of water
that its pumping extracts from that stream. The well database does not collect this information.
Using ArcMap, I calculated the distance to the nearest stream for each well using the groundwater
well and stream coverages from the Nebraska DNR. The stream networks within each NRD can be
seen clearly in Figure 3.
7Accessed the Nebraska DNR Relational and Tabular Databases website in March 2008
8The Appendix contains more information on the soil distribution across the basin, as well as details of the wells
that were changed from no soil type to the soil type of the nearest neighbor.
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Irrigation Water Use in Republican
River Basin
In this section, I analyze the dataset described in the previous sections with the model for optimal
land allocation, crop choice and water use described in the model section. First, I present an analysis
of proﬁts and water use if there is no regulatory constraint on each well’s water use. Then I present
an analysis of the current water use and proﬁts at the current NRD allocations. Since unconstrained
water use is greater than NRD allocations for almost all farmers, I then discuss the distribution of
the acre inches of abatement and associated costs.
Analysis of Unconstrained Water Use
The ﬁrst analysis consists of determining each well’s unconstrained water use, equivalent to run-
ning proﬁt maximization without the allocation constraint on I. For each well in the watershed, the
optimal unconstrained water use is determined by increasing the water allocation in the constraint
(Equation 6) until it no longer binds. Note that even though water use is not constrained, the water
use for each well will be less than Im (the yield-maximizing water use), since what determines wa-
ter use is the value of the marginal product of water, which includes the costs associated with pumping.
The model determines optimal crop choice, land allocation, and water use simultaneously. As dis-
cussed previously, the optimization model is based on WaterOptimizer, a single ﬁeld decision support
tool developed by the University of Nebraska Cooperative Extension Service to help determine optimal
irrigation amounts and crop choices when water allocations are limited. At the input and output prices
used in the model, irrigated corn is the proﬁt-maximizing crop choice for irrigated production and
dryland wheat is the proﬁt-maximizing crop choice for dryland production (See Appendix). For some
wells, the model estimates the optimal water use to be zero at any allocation, suggesting that the cost
of applying water for irrigation is greater than the revenue from irrigated production. In the basin,
nearly 10 percent of the wells fall into this category. In the Middle Republican and Lower Republican
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NRDs the proportion of wells the model suggests should be in dryland production is signiﬁcantly
higher than in the Upper Republican NRD. One possible explanation for this is that producers have
faced extensive monitoring, enforcement, and constrained water use over the last 25 years, and less
eﬃcient producers in the Upper Republican NRD may have already moved to dryland production.
Conversely, monitoring, enforcement and constrained water use have only been introduced relatively
recently for the Middle and Lower Republican NRDs (See Appendix).
The mean well yield for wells estimated to be in dryland production is less than 350 gallons per
minute, while the mean well yield for wells in irrigated production is over 1,135 gallons per minute.
Results from t-tests suggest the mean well yield for wells in dryland and wells in irrigated production
are diﬀerent at a 1 percent conﬁdence interval. A likely explanation is that low well yields increase
the cost of pumping since low yield pumps have to run longer to pump the same amount of water as
high yield pumps, which makes irrigation at current energy prices too costly for wells with very low
yield.
Unconstrained water use varies across each NRD, but water use generally increases from east to
west, due to the relative decrease in rainfall in the westernmost NRD relative to the easternmost
NRD. Compared to Central and Eastern Nebraska, Western Nebraska gets less rainfall, which means
more irrigation is required for agricultural production. The model estimates that the total water use
across all wells in the Nebraska portion of the Republican River Basin when pumping is unconstrained
is 17,584,252 acre inches annually. Details, including summary statistics of the estimates of uncon-
strained water use, can be found in the Appendix.
Upper Republican NRD: As the most western NRD, the Upper Republican NRD requires the
most acre inches of irrigation to meet crop water requirements: 43 percent of the basin’s total acre
inches applied. The model estimates that the Upper Republican NRD would apply almost 7.6 million
acre inches of water annually if each producer could apply the optimal amount of irrigation water on
all their certiﬁed acres. In this case, the mean water applied is 16.57 inches per acre, although the
unconstrained water use varies across the NRD from 10.47 to 18.69 inches per acre.
Middle Republican NRD: Located between the Upper and Lower Republican NRDs, the Mid-
dle Republican NRD requires the second-most acre inches of irrigation, more than 24 percent of the
basin’s total inches applied. The ﬁeld-scale distribution of the 4.3 million acre inches applied varies
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from 10.48 to 18.02 inches per acre.
Lower Republican NRD: As the most eastern NRD, the Lower Republican NRD requires only
20 percent of the basin’s unconstrained acre inches. Wells in the Lower Republican NRD require on
average 10.22 inches per acre, though the model estimates unconstrained water use varies across the
NRD from 9.48 to 17.53 inches per acre.
Tri-Basin NRD: Wells in the Tri-Basin require 13 percent of the basin’s total unconstrained acre
inches. The distribution of the 2.1 millions acre inches of applied water user varies from 10.34 to 18.50
inches per acre.
Generally, the variability of water use across the NRDs suggests that the gradient of decreasing
rainfall aﬀects average total water applied. However, the variability within NRDs suggests that other
factors such as the cost of pumping and soil type also signiﬁcantly aﬀect a farmer’s decision to irrigate
and how much water to apply.
Proﬁt at Unconstrained Water Use
The average unconstrained water use varies within and between NRDs across the basin, but the
average per acre proﬁts across the basin vary much less between NRDs. The average water use in
the Upper Republican is about 60 percent greater than average water use in the Lower Republican
NRD, but the average per acre proﬁts are only 12 percent higher in the Upper Republican. Across
the basin, the lowest proﬁts per acre are for wells estimated to be in dryland production, while wells
in irrigated production enjoy the highest per acre proﬁts. The total proﬁts from wells in the Upper
Republican NRD account for 38 percent of the proﬁt from certiﬁed irrigated acreage in the basin.
The observation that the highest per acre proﬁts occur in the NRD with the highest irrigation water
use is somewhat surprising, as pumping is costly. This result is explained by the higher crop yields
and well yields found in the Upper Republican NRD than in other NRDs. Alternatively, the higher
mean proﬁts per well for the Upper Republican could reﬂect the lengthy history of regulation and
constrained water use unique to the Upper Republican, which may have encouraged only the most
proﬁtable groundwater users to certify acreage and continue to irrigate.
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Analysis of Current NRD Allocations
Limiting water use to the current NRD allocations is equivalent to setting I equal to Iˆ for all
producers (Equation 8). When the ground water allocations set by each NRD are applied to users
in irrigated production, 99 percent of producers are estimated to be constrained. In the Lower Re-
publican and Tri-Basin NRDs, 100 percent of wells are estimated to constrained by the current NRD
allocations.
Since the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources monitors and enforces the NRD pumping
allocations, wells with unconstrained water use above the NRD allocations must reduce their input
use to meet the NRD allocation. For each well the diﬀerence between its unconstrained water use
and the water use it needs to meet the NRD allocation is its abatement. If a well continues to be
unconstrained at a lower allocation its abatement is zero. The NRDs’ water allocations reduce basin-
wide irrigation water use than 3.9 million acre inches, or about 23 percent of the acre inches at the
unconstrained water use.
Upper Republican NRD: With an allocation of 13 inches per year for certiﬁed acres, wells in
the Upper Republican NRD have the highest average abatement per well and per acre when compared
to the other NRDs. These allocations constrain 98 percent of wells (Table 3). The reduction in water
use by wells in the Upper Republican accounts for 44 percent of total abatement in the basin. Within
the NRD, water use is estimated to be reduced by 23 percent when producers are restricted in their
water use to the current NRD water allocation.
Middle Republican NRD: With an allocation of 12 inches per acre, wells in the Middle Re-
publican NRD have the second-highest average abatement per well and the second-lowest average
abatement per acre when compared to the other NRDs; 98 percent of wells are estimated to be con-
strained (Table 3). The water use reduction of wells in the NRD accounts for 22 percent of the total
abatement for the basin. Within the NRD, water use is estimated to be reduced by 21 percent.
Lower Republican NRD: An NRD allocation of 9 inches per acre constrain 100 percent of wells
and within the Lower Republican NRD is estimated to reduce water use by 26 percent. Even though
this is the highest reduction in water use within an NRD, the total reduction in water use for wells
in the Lower Republican NRD only accounts for 23 percent of the total basin abatement (Table 3).
When compared to the other NRDs, wells in the Lower Republican NRD have the second-highest
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average abatement per acre and second-lowest average abatement per well.
Tri-Basin NRD: The reduction in water use by wells in the Tri-Basin NRD isestimated to ac-
count for 10 percent of total abatement in the basin. Even though 100 percent of the wells are
constrained by the county speciﬁc NRD allocations, wells in the Tri-Basin have the lowest average
per well abatement and per acre abatement in the basin (Table 3). Within the Tri-Basin NRD, wells
in Kearney county have the highest abatement per acre and per well, wells in Phelps county have the
second highest abatement per acre and per well, and wells in Gopser county have the lowest abatement
per acre and per well. Kearney county, where the NRD allocates 9 inches per acre for each well, is
estimated to reduces water use by 25 percent of the total acre inches applied. Phelps county, where
the NRD allocates 10 inches per acre for each well, reduces water use by 19 percent of the total acre
inches applied. Gosper county, where the NRD allocates 11 inches per acre for each well, reduces
water use by 15 percent of the total acre inches applied. Reducing water use to the NRD allocations
reduces the total water use in the Tri-Basin NRD by 19 percent, overall.
Total Cost of Abatement at NRD Allocations
The total cost of abatement is the loss in proﬁts from reducing water to the NRD allocations rather
than the optimal unconstrained water use (Equation 8). Note that when producers face irrigation
restrictions, the model suggests that the optimal deﬁcit irrigation strategy is to irrigate less acreage
but continue to apply the same amount of water per irrigated acre. For example, if reducing water
use to the NRD allocation requires a producer to cut unconstrained water use in half, the producer
will irrigate half of the acreage with the optimal unconstrained water use and put the other half into
dryland production.
Even though losses in proﬁt from abatement of water used for irrigation are mitigated by dryland
production, production at current NRD requirements across the basin is estimated to cost more than
$36 million in foregone proﬁts annually.
Upper Republican NRD: More than half of the total cost of abatement in the basin is realized
by the producers in the Upper Republican NRD. The Upper Republican NRD has the highest average
abatement costs per acre and per well. Using water use and proﬁt estimates, meeting the current
NRD allocation costs producers in the Upper Republican almost $20 million annually (Table 4).
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Middle Republican NRD: The average per well and per acre abatement costs in the Middle
Republican NRD are higher than in the Lower and most of the Tri-Basin NRDs. Producers in the
Middle Republican NRD bear 21 percent of the total cost of abatement in the basin (Table 4). Meet-
ing the NRD allocation is estimated to cost producers nearly $8 million annually.
Lower Republican NRD: Nearly 18 percent of the total cost of abatement in the basin comes
from producers in the Lower Republican NRD. Using the NRD allocation of 9 inches per acre per
year is estimated to cost producers in the Lower Republican more than $6 million annually. Although
wells in Kearney county and wells in the Lower Republican NRD have the same allocation, average
per acre and per well abatement costs are higher in Kearney county (Table 4).
Tri-Basin NRD: Eight percent of total cost of abatement for the basin comes from producers in
the Tri-Basin. Gosper and Phelps county have the lowest per acre and per well abatement costs in the
basin, but Kearney county has the second average highest per acre abatement costs and third highest
average abatement costs per well. This suggests that setting such a low county-speciﬁc allocation
is costly for producers in Kearney county, on average. The water allocations in the Tri-Basin are
estimated to cost producers $3 million annually (Table 4).
Analysis of Marginal Abatement Costs
The unconstrained water use and water use at the current allocation may be thought of as two
points on the marginal abatement cost curve for a given well. When water use is unconstrained the
marginal cost of abatement is zero; this is the initial point on the marginal abatement cost curve. Us-
ing the constrained proﬁt maximization model, the marginal cost of abatement at the NRD allocation
can be determined for each well (Figure 4). This is equivalent to the value of the marginal product of
water at the NRD allocation. For wells with positive water use but an unconstrained water use below
the NRD allocation, the marginal abatement costs and the marginal value of the product of water are
zero, since the allocation is greater than the optimal applied water use.
For wells with low (high) marginal abatement costs, the value of the marginal product of water at
that level of abatement is also low (high). Note that there can be signiﬁcant variability in marginal
abatement costs between wells (see Figure 2 for a simple example). For example, the marginal abate-
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ment costs can be low at the NRD-required abatement because a well’s unconstrained water use is
close to the NRD allocation, but at increased levels of abatement the marginal abatement costs can
increase dramatically. Alternatively, low well yields can explain why marginal abatement costs are
low at the NRD required abatement and remain low at increased levels of abatement, since water is
costly to pump if the well yield is low, which makes the value of the marginal product of water low.
The distribution of high and low marginal abatement costs within NRDs indicates that the value
of the marginal product of water also varies within NRDs (Figure 4). This variation suggests there
could be welfare gains from allowing trading, since it is the diﬀerences in the value of the marginal
product of water that drive trading.
A ﬁrst-best solution for reducing aggregate water use while also minimizing the cost of abatement
for producers would be to set well-speciﬁc water allocations. This would not be practical at a watershed
scale and therefore I look at alternative solutions to achieve aggregate water use reduction while
reducing the costs of abatement to producers through allowing alternative trading schemes.
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Policy Analysis
Policy Options
I have shown that marginal abatement costs vary for users within the basin (Figure 4). If farmers
are allowed to trade their allocations between each other, then trading is driven by relative water
scarcity and the distribution of heterogeneous marginal abatement costs. Therefore, the highest gains
from trading will be realized between users with high marginal abatement costs and users with low
marginal abatement costs. For this thesis, several trading schemes were analyzed to compare alterna-
tive politically and economically feasible solutions. The assumptions common to each trading scheme
are summarized below (ﬁgures of the trading units for each trading scheme can be found in the Ap-
pendix):
First, permits are given free of cost to users. The number of permits given to each user is equal to
the user’s certiﬁed acreage multiplied by the inches per acre per year allocated by each NRD for only
those wells currently irrigating, regardless of current inches per acre applied A¯Iˆ. This includes wells
with optimal unconstrained water use below the NRD allocation. For wells estimated to be dryland
production at any water allocation, no permits are given9. Second, transaction and search costs in the
permit market are assumed to be zero. Third, all permits in a trading unit are bought and sold for the
same permit price. These assumptions are reasonable given the current institutional framework and
regulations in place. In particular, all wells in the basin face monitoring and enforcement of pumping,
so buying and selling of permits and the increase or decrease in the volume of water pumped by each
well can be recorded and veriﬁed easily.
9Current regulations allow certiﬁed acreage on on land that is irrigated, and land that switches to permanent dryland
production currently loses its certiﬁcation
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Trading Basin-wide
Trading basin-wide should be the least-cost way to achieve any aggregate water use reduction.
However, it would be infeasible politically since the current adversarial relationships between NRDs
would make selling groundwater between NRDs unlikely to be approved by any NRD Board of Di-
rectors. I provide this analysis as a useful comparison. Participants in this trading scheme would be
granted the number of permits equal to their NRD allocation of inches per certiﬁed acre per year, and
then allowed to trade this allocation.
Trading by NRD
In this trading policy option, farmers with certiﬁed acres are allowed to trade with any farmer
within the same Natural Resource District10 (Figure 3). Currently, well meters are monitored by the
NRD and leases and permanent transfers of groundwater must be approved by the Board of Directors
for each NRD, making this scheme easy to administer. The initial number of permits for each user in
a trading unit is the same per certiﬁed acre since all wells in the same NRD face the same allocation
(with the exception of the Tri-Basin which sets allocation by county). As a useful comparison, a
NRD-wide trading analysis is provided for the Tri-Basin NRD, which each well receiving permits
equal to the county allocation of inches per certiﬁed acre per year. On average, there are many users
in each trading unit (Table 2).
Trading by County
In this trading policy option, trading is limited within county boundaries. This trading scheme
was developed to avoid the possible political problems associated with reductions in the county tax
bases if trade resulted in movement of water out of counties. Limiting trade to county boundaries
ensures that county groundwater use will not increase. There are between 400 and 1,000 users in
each trading unit, with the smallest number of users in a trading unit being located in the Tri-Basin
NRD and the largest number of users in a trading unit being located in the Upper Republican NRD
(Table 6).
Trading by Township
In this trading policy option, trading is limited to within township boundaries. This trading
scheme is the current trading policy for the Upper Republican NRD and essentially the current policy
10I follow current regulations and to not allow the transfer of permits onto land that is not currently irrigated with
certiﬁed acres.
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for the Tri-Basin NRD (Table 1). On average, there are the fewer than 40 users in each trading unit
making this the most restrictive trading scheme.
Trading by Distance to Nearest Stream within NRD
The externality on instream ﬂows from pumping grounwater decreases with distance between the
pumping well and the nearest stream. Limiting trading water movements to zones based on a distance
ensures that trading does not increase the damages to instream ﬂows. In this trading policy option,
trading is limited to “distance from stream” zones. All wells are grouped into zones determined by each
well’s distance to the nearest stream. The four zone boundaries are: less than one mile from a stream,
between one mile and two miles from a stream, between two and four miles from a stream, and more
than four miles from a stream. Essentially, this trading scheme is the trading policy for the Middle
Republican NRD (Table 1). The “quick response” area is deﬁned as a buﬀer zone of approximately
2.5 miles on each side of the main stem and tributaries of the Republican River (Nebraska Department
of Natural Resources 2005). The trading scheme for this analysis does not allow for trading from the
zones nearest to streams with wells in zones farther from the stream. On average, there are around
700 users in each trading zone.
Welfare Eﬀects of Policy Options
If users are allowed to increase their abatement and sell part or all of their water allocation or
decrease abatement and buy additional water, total costs to achieve any aggregate reduction in water
use can be reduced relative to a policy with no trading11. Reducing the total cost of abatement can be
considered a gain in welfare. For users selling permits and increasing their abatement,the costs from
increased abatement are more than oﬀset by the income from permit sales, thus improving welfare.
For users buying permits and decreasing their abatement, buying permits allows producers to increase
irrigated production, which increases proﬁts and improves welfare by more than the cost of permits
(Equation 7). For buyers (sellers), the permit price is lower (higher) than the value of the marginal
product of water, making decreases (increases) in abatement welfare improving. The distribution of
welfare gains, permit prices, and trades for each trading scheme are summarized below and in Table 6.
The Appendix contains more information about welfare gains, permit prices, and trading patterns for
each speciﬁc trading scheme.
11I consider the current policy a “no trading” policy, even though a few trades have taken place in some NRDs, as
transactions costs are high and the volume of trades is very low.
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Trading by Basin
If trading were unrestricted throughout the basin, the total cost of reducing water would be
decreased $16 million, a reduction in abatement costs of nearly 45 percent12.
Trading by NRD
Recall that the total cost of abatement is the loss in proﬁts from constraining water use below
the optimal level. Less eﬃcient producers trade permits with more eﬃcient producers, who increase
their proﬁts by applying more water. The total cost of abatement curve for an entire NRD can be
generated by aggregating the total cost of abatement for individual users at given levels of abatement.
When trading is allowed the curve can be generated again, where the total cost of abatement for users
incorporate the gains from trading. Figure 5 shows the aggregate total cost of abatement curves for
the Upper Republican NRD with and without trading. The upper solid line is the total cost to all pro-
ducers of reducing individual water use as a function of abatement. Each red dot represents the total
cost of abatement and total abatement in acre inches that would be necessary to meet a speciﬁc NRD
allocation of inches per acre. The dashed black line shows the total cost to all producers of reducing
aggregate water use when trading is allowed between any wells in the NRD. Each black dot represents
the total cost of abatement and total acre inches abated that meet the aggregate water reduction
required by a range of speciﬁc NRD allocations. The dotted lines connect the total cost of abatement
and acre inches abated for the same NRD allocations. The slope of the dotted line indicates the pres-
ence of slack permits being trading in the market. The diamond on upper solid line shows the current
acre inches of water abated and the estimated total cost of current abatement in dollars per year.
The total aggregate abatement cost curves for the Middle and Lower Republican NRD can be found
in the Appendix, but are qualitatively similar to the curves for the Upper Republican NRD (Figure 5).
If a well’s unconstrained water use is below its initial the allocation (Iˆ > I∗), then the extra per-
mits will be sold into the market, representing slippage of the trading scheme. On Figure 5, slippage
is shown by the thin dotted line connecting the abatement achieved by setting an allocation without
trading (upper dot) and the abatement achieved by setting an allocation and allowing trading (lower
dot). As a result of slippage, the total acre inches abated under trading schemes is less than when
no trading is allowed for small reductions in allocation. At very low levels of abatement, slippage is
important since most of the acre inches abated are from producers unconstrained by the allocation.
12As mentioned, this trading may not be politically feasible. Rather, trading NRD-wide is trading scheme to which
other schemes are compared
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At higher levels of abatement, representing low water allocations, all wells become constrained and
there are no slack permits in the market.
For the NRD level trading scheme, there are six important results:
1. Farmers participating in the market will choose among three basic strategies:
(a) Buying permits to increase pumping above the NRD allocation, but not to the uncon-
strained water use and optimal acreage in production.
(b) Reducing pumping below NRD allocation and selling a portion of permits in the market.
(c) Selling the full NRD allocation of permits and moving completely into dryland production.
2. There is signiﬁcant market asymmetry. In each NRD, the market for permits is made up of a
large number of buyers and a relatively small number of sellers (Table 5). Even though there
are a small number of sellers in each market, generally the transactions in acre inches are much
larger for sellers. In the Lower Republican NRD, 98 percent of sellers sell their entire allocation
(86 percent in the Middle and 93 percent Upper Republican). For these sellers the market
permit price is greater than the marginal value of the product of water for all amounts of water.
The revenue from selling the entire allocation of permits is greater than the cost of moving
from irrigated production to dryland production. Acre-inches sold by sellers selling their entire
allocation of permits in the market account for at least 98 percent of the acre-inches sold in each
NRD.
3. The permit prices for the markets in each NRD vary. Permit prices can be interpreted as
the NRD’s area-weighted mean marginal value of the product of water (Table 6). The Upper
Republican NRD has the highest permit price, suggesting that water is most valuable to users on
the margin and to achieve the NRD desired total abatement, sellers must be compensated with
higher permit income. The relatively low permit prices in the Middle and Lower Republican
NRDs suggest that for some producers water has little value and abatement can be achieved
with relatively lower payments to sellers.
4. In each NRD, wells with unconstrained water use below the NRD allocation sell their extra
(slack) permits into the market. The diﬀerence in the desired acre inches of abatement and
the actual acre inches of abatement that occur when slack permits are sold in the market is
the slippage of the trading policy. The total slippage accounts for less than 0.5 percent of the
acre-inches traded in all three NRDs. In the Upper Republican NRD where 98 percent of wells
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are constrained by the NRD allocation, less than 1 percent of the acre-inches sold are slippage
(Table 5). There is no slippage in the Lower Republican NRD.
5. In general, wells going into dryland have low well yields.
(a) Upper Republican NRD: Wells that trade their entire allocation of permits (93 percent
of the sellers in market) account for 98 percent of acres sold. Well yield is likely an important
determinant of this move to dryland production, since the average yield of wells going into
dryland production is 840 gpm and the average yield of wells buying acre inches is 1676
gpm (t-tests are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent conﬁdence interval).
(b) Middle Republican NRD: Wells that trade their entire allocation (86 percent of the
sellers in market) account for 98 percent of acres sold. Once again, well yield is likely to be
important as the average yield of wells going into dryland production is 506 gpm and the
average yield of wells buying acre inches is 1086 gpm (t-tests are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
conﬁdence interval).
(c) Lower Republican NRD: Wells that trade their entire allocation (98 percent of the
sellers in market) account for 99.8 percent of acres sold. The average yield of wells going
into dryland production is 489 gpm, the average yield of wells selling a portion of permits is
691 gpm, and the average yield of wells buying acre inches is 938 gpm (t-tests are signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent conﬁdence interval).
6. The welfare gains in terms of the reduction of the cost of reducing water use vary among buyers
and sellers in each NRD (see the Appendix for more details).
(a) In the Upper and Lower Republican NRDs, on average the sellers of permits enjoy the
highest per acre and per well gains from trading, while in the Middle Republican buyers of
permits gain the most from trading.
(b) In the Lower and Middle Republican NRDs, the per acre gains from trading are highest
for wells selling their entire allocation and moving completely into dryland production,
followed by buyers and then by wells selling a portion of their allocation. Similarly, the
total gains per well are highest for wells selling their entire allocation and moving completely
into dryland production, followed by buyers and then by wells selling only part of their
allocation.
(c) In the Upper Republican NRD, the per acre gains from trading are highest for wells selling
their entire allocation and moving completely into dryland production, followed by wells
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selling a portion of their allocation, and then by wells buying acre inches. Similarly, the
total gains per well are highest for wells selling their entire allocation and moving completely
into dryland production, followed by wells selling a portion of their allocation, and then by
wells buying acre inches. The permit price is relatively high in the Upper Republican NRD,
and for wells that are unconstrained by the NRD allocations this results in signiﬁcant gains
from trading The mean unconstrained water use for wells selling permits while continuing
to irrigate is 11.85 inches per acre. Of the 49 wells that were unconstrained by the NRD
allocations, only 19 sell their entire allocation, while the remaining 30 wells sell only a
portion of their wells.
The Tri-Basin NRD currently sets allocations for each county in the NRD, but if trading were
allowed NRD-wide and the county speciﬁc allocations determined the permits given to each
producer, the total cost of reducing water use to the desired allocation would decrease by
32 percent.
Trading by County
1. The relative size, shape, location, and number of counties in an NRD has an eﬀect on the welfare
gains from this trading scheme.
(a) Since there are only three counties in the Upper Republican NRD, on average there are
more wells in each trading unit as compared to the Middle and Lower Republican NRDs
which have ﬁve counties (Table 6). This has an eﬀect on the distribution of marginal
abatement costs in each county.
(b) In the Tri-Basin NRD, the river basin and county boundaries limit the size and number of
wells in each unit, making these trading units quite small.
(c) The east to west gradient of rainfall is an important determinant of the optimal applied
inches of irrigation water and the value of the marginal product of water. Other well char-
acteristics such as well yield and depth to groundwater may be related spatially, aﬀecting
the distribution of marginal abatement costs when county boundaries are imposed in the
trading rules. For example, an NRD divided horizontally, such as the Lower Republican
NRD, might ﬁnd that wells with the highest marginal abatement costs are not able to trade
with wells with the lowest marginal abatement costs.
2. County permit prices vary within an NRD suggesting that the distribution of values of the
marginal product of water also varies between counties (Table 6). However, in general per-
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mit prices are higher in the westernmost counties of the basin, possibly reﬂecting the rela-
tive scarcity of rainfall in these counties. In the Upper Republican NRD, permit prices vary
from $10.27-$13.38 per acre inch. In the Middle Republican NRD, permit prices vary from
$2.52-$13.54 per acre inch. In the Lower Republican NRD, permit prices vary from $1.97-
$8.47 per acre inch. In the Tri-Basin NRD, permit prices vary from $5.75-$11.35 per acre inch.
3. As expected, the total cost of reducing water use does increase for each county in the Upper,
Middle, Lower, and Tri-Basin NRDs when trading is limited to county boundaries instead of
NRD boundaries. Although the goal of limiting trading to counties is to ensure that the welfare
eﬀects of cost reduction are internalized within a county for tax purposes, all counties are
estimated to have higher welfare gains in terms of total abatement cost reduction if trading
were expanded to NRD boundaries rather than limited to counties.
(a) Upper Republican NRD: The gains from trading (in terms of reduction in abatement
costs) are reduced by 9 percent when trading is limited to county boundaries instead of
NRD boundaries.
(b) Middle Republican NRD: The gains from trading decrease by 38 percent when trading
is limited to county boundaries instead of NRD boundaries.
(c) Lower Republican NRD: The gains from trading decrease by 6 percent when trading is
limited to county boundaries instead of NRD boundaries.
(d) Tri-Basin NRD: The gains from trading decrease by 26 percent when trading is limited
to county boundaries instead of NRD boundaries.
Trading by Township
For this analysis, the Upper, Middle and Lower Republican NRDs were divided into trading units
by township boundaries. The Tri-Basin NRD was not included in this analysis since there are only
a few townships in the Republican River Basin portion of the Tri-Basin NRD, but the main results
from the other NRDs should also be applicable.
1. The welfare gains from trading are lowest when trading is limited to township boundaries when
compared to trading with any other restrictions considered. Trading by township boundaries
is the current trading policy for the Upper Republican NRD and essentially the trading policy
for the Tri-Basin NRD. One possible goal of limiting trading to this scale is to ensure that
trading does not dramatically change agricultural production anywhere in the basin. While
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township-level trading still yields cost savings to achieve any total abatement level, the imposed
boundaries and and large number of trading zones limit the eﬀectiveness of trading.
(a) Upper Republican NRD: When trading is limited to township boundaries instead of
NRD boundaries, the welfare gains from trading are reduced by 30 percent. The highest
losses occur in areas with either high or low permit prices (Figure 6). Under township-
level trading, townships with low permit prices have producers with relatively low values
of the marginal product of water at the current NRD allocations, while townships with
relatively high permit prices have producers with high values of the marginal product of
water at the current NRD allocation. In a less restrictive trading setting, these producers
would trade with each other but the imposed township boundaries limit the ability to re-
duce abatement costs across traders. In addition, reduced gains could be due to the thin
market in some townships, as the average number of wells in each township is only 37 wells.
(b) Middle Republican NRD: When trading is limited to township boundaries instead of
NRD boundaries, the welfare gains from trading in the NRD are reduced by 68 percent.
As with the Upper Republican NRD, the highest losses occur in areas with either high or
low permit prices. The average number of wells is 23 in each township.
(c) Lower Republican NRD: When trading is limited to township boundaries instead of
NRD boundaries, the welfare gains from trading in the NRD are reduced by 30 percent.
The highest losses are distributed as in the other NRDs. The average number of wells is
41 in each township.
(d) The analysis presented so far does not take into account that multiple wells can be owned
by one owner. It is quite common for a farmer to own several contiguous parcels and their
associated certiﬁed acres. However, allocations are explicitly linked to speciﬁc wells and
not their owners, and in general, pooling of allocations is not allowed. If there is very high
variability in marginal abatement costs between adjacent ﬁelds, the large reductions in
total abatement cost would be be realized by owners trading allocations between their own
wells. Analyzing trading at a township scale is an estimate of what a trading scheme would
look like if farm-level reallocation were allowed. The irrigated acreage in each township
is greater than the USDA FRIS estimates of farm irrigated acreage, around 1,000 acres
(National Agricultural Statistics Service 2002). Because my results suggest that township-
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level trading is much more costly than county- or NRD-level trading, it is likely that
allowing farm-level reallocation of water would generate smaller gains than any broader
trading scheme.
Trading by Distance to Nearest Stream within NRD
For this analysis, wells in the Upper, Middle, and Lower Republican NRDs were divided into zones
based on the distance from the nearest stream. The Tri-Basin NRD was not included in this analysis
since very few streams run through the Republican River Basin portion of the NRD.
1. Reductions in the costs of abatement for “distance from streams zones” is nearly identical
to the reductions in abatement costs for NRD based trading (Table 6). This suggests that
the distribution of heterogeneity of marginal abatement costs between wells in each zone can
replicate the NRD-wide distribution.
2. Since the stream networks vary in each NRD, the distribution of wells in each zone varies between
NRDs. However the diﬀerence in reduction of abatement costs between NRDs remains similar
(see Appendix).
3. Since trading is limited to wells within a zone, all permits traded must remain within the same
distance zone. The goal of limiting trading is to keep constant the possible damages from
pumping within a group and not allow permits and increased pumping to move toward streams.
Interestingly, if trading is limited by only NRD boundaries, then on average, acre inches are
traded away from the streams. This is not the case for the Lower Republican NRD, where
under NRD trading, on average, pumped water moves closer to the stream by one tenth of a
mile; the average pumped water moves more than half a mile further from the stream in the
Upper Republican NRD and almost one mile further in the Middle Republican NRD. Thus
my analysis presents a counterintuitive result: Although limiting trading by distance to stream
zones ensures that trading does not increase damages to instream ﬂows, allowing trading across
a broader region (NRD-wide) is estimated to reduce damages to instream ﬂows. Note that this
is not a general result that can be applied broadly outside of this study. The explanation for
the observed result is that there are a relatively large number of low yield wells close the river
in the Republican River Basin.
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Implications and Conclusion
Groundwater extractions, while historically unregulated, have been linked to reduced instream
ﬂows. Increasingly, regulations have been imposed on groundwater users to address the linkage be-
tween surface water and groundwater. In this thesis, I presented a unique geospatial dataset of irri-
gation wells and associated economic and hydrologic data in the Republican River Basin of Nebraska.
Using a geographic information system and numeric modeling, I implemented a spatial ﬁeld-level
model of irrigation for the Nebraska portion of the Republican River Basin. Then, I analyzed how
spatial heterogeneity in ﬁeld-level characteristics (such as soil type, hydrologic properties, and climate)
can inﬂuence the distribution and magnitude of welfare gains from alternative market-based schemes
for the allocation of irrigation water. The use of a population data set, along with the optimization
model, allows calculation of the spatial variability in the value of the marginal product of water as well
as estimation of permit prices for various trading schemes which would not be possible with limited
or random sampling.
Unequivocally, when faced with input restrictions that reduce output and proﬁts, the ability to
trade allocated water reduces the total cost of abatement for individual producers as well as in ag-
gregate. While expected, the size of cost savings in the study area makes a strong case for trading
groundwater permits as a cost-minimizing solution to water use restrictions. Not surprisingly, the
gains in welfare from trading are reduced as the size of trading zones is reduced. Across all the
NRDs, some farmers with low marginal values at the NRD allocations move into dryland production
and sell their entire allocation of permits to buyers with high marginal abatement costs. The acre
inches sold by sellers moving into dryland production account for 98 percent of the acre inches traded
in the market. Another unexpected result is that under NRD-wide trading, irrigation water moves
further from streams on average. This implies that for this case study, a broader trading scheme may
simultaneously reduce both abatement costs to farmers and damages to instream ﬂows.
If basin-wide trading were allowed, the costs associated with abatement to the current aggregate
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water allocation are estimated to decrease by nearly 45 percent. For an NRD-wide trading scheme,
reducing almost 4 million acre inches in estimated optimal water use to meet the water use reduction
goals set by the NRDs is estimated to reduce abatement costs by nearly 40 percent annually.
Possible extensions of this research include comparing optimal unconstrained water use and re-
ductions to actual pumping data (available for a few years in the RRCA model), evaluating the
eﬀectiveness of sampling strategies in reproducing the policy results using population data and sensi-
tivity analysis for input and output prices.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Current Water Allocations and Regulations of Groundwater Rights Transfers
NRD Current Transfer Requirements Transfer Types No. of
Allocation1 (January 2008- Transfers
November 2008)
Lower 9 No Transfers Allowed — —
Middle 12 Permit Application Temporary 34
No Net Increase of Acres Permanent
Board Approval Transfer of Acres
Transfer within “sub-areas”2 Transfer of Inches
Upper 13 Permit Application Temporary 6
No Net Increase of Acres Permanent
Board Approval Transfer of Acres
Transfers within Township Transfer of Inches
or Floating Township3
Tri-Basin 9-114 Permit Application for > 1 mile Unavailable Unavailable
Tax assessor notiﬁcation
Board Approval
1 Inches per acre for certiﬁed irrigated Acreage
2 MRNRD Integrated Management Plan: Within “Quick response” sub-area, within “Upland” sub-area, or from “Quick
response” sub-area to “Upland sub-area” (Nebraska Department of Natural Resources and Middle Republican Natural
Resource District 2008).
3 URNRD Integrated Management Plan: “Floating township” described as a set of 36 quarter sections lying in a
contiguous block; 6 blocks east to west and 6 blocks north to south (Nebraska Department of Natural Resources and
Upper Republican Natural Resource District 2008).
4 Kearney County: 9, Phelps County: 10, Gosper County: 11 (Nebraska Department of Natural Resources and Tr-Basin
Natural Resource District 2007)
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: NRD Certiﬁed Irrigated Acreage
NRD Number of Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Total
Wells (per well) (per well) (per well) (per well) (per well) (all wells)
Upper 3,183 142.1 130.0 54.4 8.4 557.4 452,395
Middle 2,876 106.9 109.5 66.6 2.3 520.0 307,505
Lower 3,320 94.4 88.5 48.8 1.0 431.0 313,514
T.B: Kearney 353 110.3 130.0 45.5 4.0 225.00 38,935
T.B: Phelps 731 114.5 129.6 43.3 4.0 330.00 53,249
T.B: Gosper 445 119.7 127.7 46.0 10.0 367.00 83,723
Basin 10,908 114.53 126.00 58.25 1.00 557.40 1,249,322
Note that an irrigated area of 130 acres corresponds to the area irrigated by a center pivot on a quarter section of land
(160 acres).
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Water Use Abatement Under NRD Allocations
NRD Allocation Percent of Wells Mean Std. Dev. Max Total
(inches) Constrained1 (per acre) (per acre) (per acre) (all wells)
Upper 13 98% 3.89 0.96 5.69 1,751,336
Middle 12 98% 2.99 1.15 6.10 893,993
Lower 9 100% 3.24 1.11 8.52 923,254
T.B: Gosper 11 100% 1.93 0.46 5.83 98,656
T.B: Phelps 10 100% 2.37 0.81 8.50 201,417
T.B: Kearney 9 100% 2.96 0.87 8.61 115,287
Republican River Basin 99% 3.25 1.16 8.61 3,982,944
Units of the last four columns are inches 1 Does not include wells estimated to go directly into dryland when
proﬁt-maximizing with no water use constraint.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Total Cost of Abatement Under NRD Allocations
NRD Mean Std. Dev. Max Total
(per acre) (per acre) (per acre) (all wells)
Total Cost ($)
Upper Republican 42.19 17.49 85.98 19,279,278
Middle Republican 23.12 18.47 82.40 7,713,933
Lower Republican 21.24 13.03 108.16 6,383,799
Tri-Basin: Gosper 10.31 6.45 69.40 548,365
Tri-Basin: Phelps 16.83 9.88 105.42 1,471,664
Tri-Basin: Kearney 25.29 12.43 99.03 1,002,385
Republican River Basin 27.73 18.69 108.16 36,399,425
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Table 5: Groundwater Trading by NRD: Buyers and Sellers
Sellers1 Buyers1 Permit Total Acre-Inches Proportion of Acre-Inches
Price Traded Traded that are Slack
Upper 571 (18%) 2555 (82%) $12.16 896,824 0.0080
Middle 643 (27%) 1742 (73%) $7.17 495,033 0.0045
Lower 705 (25%) 2070 (75%) $7.66 453,315 0
1 Number of Wells (Percent of Participants).
Table 6: Welfare Eﬀects of Various Trading Schemes
NRD-wide Distance from County Township
Trading Stream Zones Trading Trading
Upper Republican
Permit Price $12.16 $12.08 $12.231 $11.911
($10.27-$13.37) ($1.68-$17.03)
Welfare Gain2 $5,884,440 $5,859,000 $5,340,357 $4,138,615
Buyers 571 572 573 589
Sellers 2,555 2,554 2,537 2,537
Wells in each unit 3,126 782 1,042 37
Middle Republican
Permit Price $7.17 $7.60 $7.251 $8.041
($2.51-$13.54) (undeﬁned-$17.10)
Welfare Gain2 $4,521,375 $4,310,963 $2,793,219 $1,917,350
Buyers 643 596 509 512
Sellers 1,742 1,789 1,695 1,837
Wells in each unit 2,385 596 477 23
Lower Republican
Permit Price $7.66 $7.18 $6.391 $6.381
($1.97-$8.47) (undeﬁned-$10.03)
Welfare Gain1 $2,769,854 $2,756,419 $2,605,135 $2,205,590
Buyers 705 705 673 627
Sellers 2,070 2,070 2,102 2,148
Wells in each unit 2,775 694 555 41
1 Mean (Range).
2 Welfare gain is the total beneﬁt from trading for all wells compared to an NRD allocation that does not allow trading,
or equivalently the reduction in abatement costs to achieve a total NRD allocation when trading is allowed. The
undeﬁned permit prices for the township trading in the Middle and Lower Republican NRDs occur in a few townships
where the number of slack permits available is equal to or greater than the aggregate water use reduction. Since water
use reduction can be achieved by trading slack permits, the price of the permits are undeﬁned.
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Figure 5: Total Abatement Cost: Upper Republican NRD
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The upper solid, red line is the total cost to all producers of reducing individual water use at all levels of abatement.
Each red dot represents the total cost of abatement and total abatement in acre inches would be necessary to meet a
speciﬁc NRD allocation of inches per acre. The total cost of abatement is the loss in proﬁts from constraining water
use below the optimal level. The dashed black line shows the total cost to all producers of reducing aggregate water
use to the all levels of abatement when trading is allowed. Each black dot represents the total cost of abatement and
total acre-inches abated that meet the aggregate water reduction required by the NRD allocations. The dotted lines
connect the total cost of abatement and acre-inches abated for the same NRD allocation. The slope of the dotted line
indicates the presence of slack permits being trading in the market. The diﬀerence in the total cost with trading and
without trading at the same NRD allocation comes from allowing trading. The less eﬃcient producers trade permits
with the more eﬃcient producers, who increase their proﬁts by applying more water.
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Figure 6: Upper Republican Welfare Gains and Permit Prices: Trading by Township
Legend
Trading by Township
Difference in Cost Reduction
-$167,912  -  -$42,397
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Legend
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The ﬁgure on the left shows the diﬀerence in welfare gains for each township when the trading unit is restricted from the
NRD scale to the township scale. Negative values suggest that trading at an NRD scale reduces the cost of abatement
for producers in each township more than trading at the township scale. The ﬁgure on the right shows the permit price
for a one year lease of one acre inch of water when trading is restricted to township boundaries.
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Appendix A: Supplemental Tables
and Figures
Table A-1: Certiﬁed Irrigated Acreages and Groundwater Pumping Allocations
NRD Certiﬁcation of Irrigated Acreage Metering of Wells
(year completed) (year completed)
Upper Republican 1977 1982
Middle Republican 2003 2004
Lower Republican 2004 2004
Tri-Basin 2004 2003
Table A-2: NRD Certiﬁed Irrigated Acreages versus Wells Database Reported Irrigated Acres
NRD 2006 RRCA model1 2008 NRD Fact Sheets 2008 Wells Database
Upper Republican 452,395 435,337 495,996
Middle Republican 307,505 313,000 383,429
Lower Republican 313,514 325,876 406,016
Tri-Basin 175,907 189,436 204,759
Nebraska Portion of Basin 1,249,322 1,263,649 1,490,200
1 Measure of certiﬁed acres used in analysis.
Note that in general, the wells database, which is self-reported) shows higher irrigated acreages than the certiﬁed
irrigated acreages in the RRCA model, which are validated by NRDs.
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Table A-4: Descriptive Statistics: Well Pumping Water Level, Well Pumping Yield
NRD Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
(per well) (per well) (per well) (per well) (per well)
Pumping Water Level (feet)
Upper Republican 135.09 119.00 72.39 8.00 440.00
Middle Republican 161.76 160.00 111.00 4.00 1990
Lower Republican 131.46 135.00 78.58 5.00 390.00
Tri-Basin 179.52 184.00 55.55 41.00 330.00
Republican River Basin 147.25 145.00 86.07 4.00 1990.00
Well Yield (gallons per minute)
Upper Republican 1,509.49 1,253.00 750.08 15.00 3,600.00
Middle Republican 869.28 800.00 501.43 10.00 3,006
Lower Republican 758.39 800.00 362.59 30.00 2,500
Tri-Basin 1,028.03 1,000.00 329.98 100.00 2,332.00
Republican River Basin 1,044.59 900.00 617.92 10.00 3,600.00
Table A-5: Input and Output Prices
Input Price
Energy (Diesel) $2.70 per gallon
Labor $10.00 per hour
Output
Corn $4.07 per bushel
Wheat $7.39 per bushel
Table A-6: Descriptive Statistics: Wells by Soil Type
NRD Coarse Medium Fine
Upper Republican 1,009 1,078 1,096
Middle Republican 423 310 2,143
Lower Republican 4 529 2,787
Tri-Basin 4 53 1,476
Republican River Basin 1,440 1,967 7,501
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Table A-7: Descriptive Statistics: Wells in Dryland Production
NRD Wells in Dryland Proportion of Wells Estimated to be in Dryland Production
Upper Republican 57 0.0179
Middle Republican 491 0.1707
Lower Republican 545 0.1642
Tri-Basin 26 0.0170
Republican River Basin 1,048
Table A-8: Descriptive Statistics: NRD Water Use and Proﬁt (Unconstrained)
NRD Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Total
(per acre) (per acre) (per acre) (per acre) (per acre) (all wells)
Water Use (inches per acre)
Upper Republican 16.57 16.87 2.47 0 18.69 7,567,250
Middle Republican 12.42 14.73 5.74 0 18.10 4,330,967
Lower Republican 10.22 11.91 4.64 0 17.53 3,523,237
Tri-Basin: Gosper 12.29 12.83 2.84 0 16.83 660,690
Tri-Basin: Phelps 12.33 12.24 1.03 0 18.50 1,037,743
Tri-Basin: Kearney 11.90 11.72 1.25 0 17.61 464,365
Republican River Basin 12.94 13.68 4.87 0 18.69 17,584,252
Profit ($)
Upper Republican 597.08 602.01 57.40 299.75 683.18 272,901,848
Middle Republican 527.91 548.45 68.10 300.39 661.52 170,390,841
Lower Republican 531.91 552.29 56.46 296.70 630.99 172,087,281
Tri-Basin: Gosper 557.38 569.26 50.60 426.30 641.53 22,857,623
Tri-Basin: Phelps 581.46 585.61 26.09 435.14 628.00 30,070,238
Tri-Basin: Kearney 584.02 586.57 24.88 399.91 631.01 48,969,888
Republican River Basin 555.92 568.96 65.34 296.70 683.18 717,277,718
Table A-9: Descriptive Statistics: Total Cost of Abatement Under NRD Allocations (per well)
NRD Mean Std. Dev. Max Total
(per well) (per well) (per well) (all wells)
Total Cost ($)
Upper Republican 6,167 3,723 43,849 19,279,278
Middle Republican 3,234 3,721 33,793 7,713,933
Lower Republican 2,300 1,891 19,019 6,383,799
Tri-Basin: Gosper 1,296 945 8,328 548,365
Tri-Basin: Phelps 2,018 1637 23,423 1,471,664
Tri-Basin: Kearney 2,856 1,887 14,756 1,002,385
Republican River Basin 3,329 3,120 38,640 36,399,425
52
Table A-10: Welfare Diﬀerences Between Sellers and Buyers of Pumping Permits
Mean Welfare Total Welfare
Gains Gains
Sellers Buyers Sellers Buyers
(per well) (per acre) (per well) (per acre) (all wells) (all wells)
Upper $4,216 $37.23 $1,361 $9.04 $2,407,460 $3,476,980
Middle $2,263 $32.75 $1,760 $11.49 $1,455,408 $3,065,968
Lower $1,883 $26.89 $697 $6.05 $1,327,587 $1,442,267
Table A-11: Number of Participants in “Distance from Stream” Zone Trading
Upper Middle Lower
≤ 1 mile 557 995 1698
1-2 miles 504 442 593
2-4 miles 1018 566 444
≥ 4 miles 1047 402 40
Table A-12: Welfare Eﬀects of “Distance from Stream” Zone Trading
NRD-wide Trading Distance from Stream Trading Ratio
Upper $5,884,440 $5,859,000 0.9957
Middle $4,521,375 $4,310,963 0.9534
Lower $2,769,854 $2,756,419 0.9951
Table A-13: Permit Prices
By NRD ($) By County ($) By Distance to Stream ($) By Township1 ($)
Chase: 13.05 ≤ 1 mi: 11.79
Upper 12.16 Dundy: 10.27 1-2 mi: 12.04 11.91
Perkins: 13.38 2-4 mi: 11.88
≥ 4 mi: 12.59
Frontier: 5.44 ≤ 1 mi: 5.33
Hayes: 10.01 1-2 mi: 7.28
Middle 7.17 Hitchcock: 4.75 2-4 mi: 8.21 8.12
Lincoln: 13.54 ≥ 4 mi: 9.58
Red Willow: 2.51
Harlan: 8.28 ≤ 1 mi: 7.92
Furnas: 5.83 1-2 mi: 7.54
Lower 7.66 Franklin:8.47 2-4 mi: 7.38 6.48
Webster: 7.37 ≥ 4 mi: 5.87
Nuckolls: 1.97
1 Average of all deﬁned township permit prices
53
F
ig
ur
e
A
-1
:
W
el
l
Y
ie
ld
0
20
40
60
80
10
M
ile
s
Le
ge
nd
W
el
l Y
ie
ld
G
al
lo
ns
/M
in
ut
e
10
 - 
42
5
42
6 
- 7
45
74
6 
- 1
11
0
11
11
 - 
16
40
16
41
 - 
23
68
23
69
 - 
36
00
T
h
is
ﬁ
g
u
re
sh
ow
s
th
e
p
u
m
p
y
ie
ld
fo
r
ea
ch
w
el
l
a
s
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
th
e
N
eb
ra
sk
a
D
N
R
w
el
ls
d
a
ta
b
a
se
.
T
h
e
u
n
it
s
a
re
g
a
ll
o
n
s
p
er
m
in
u
te
.
T
h
e
li
g
h
t
y
el
lo
w
d
o
ts
re
p
re
se
n
t
th
e
w
el
ls
w
it
h
th
e
lo
w
es
t
w
el
l
y
ie
ld
s.
T
h
es
e
w
el
ls
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
n
ea
r
th
e
m
a
in
st
em
o
f
th
e
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
iv
er
b
u
t
st
il
l
th
ro
u
g
h
o
u
t
th
e
b
a
si
n
.
T
h
e
g
re
en
a
n
d
li
g
h
t
b
lu
e
d
o
ts
re
p
re
se
n
t
w
el
ls
w
it
h
w
it
h
h
ig
h
er
w
el
l
y
ie
ld
s
a
n
d
th
e
d
a
rk
b
lu
e
d
o
ts
re
p
re
se
n
t
w
el
ls
w
it
h
th
e
h
ig
h
es
t
w
el
l
y
ie
ld
s.
W
el
l
y
ie
ld
is
a
n
p
a
ra
m
et
er
in
d
et
er
m
in
in
g
th
e
co
st
o
f
p
u
m
p
in
g
,
si
n
ce
w
el
ls
w
it
h
lo
w
er
y
ie
ld
s
h
av
e
to
o
p
er
a
te
p
u
m
p
s
lo
n
g
er
th
a
n
w
el
ls
w
it
h
h
ig
h
er
y
ie
ld
s
p
u
m
p
in
g
th
e
sa
m
e
v
o
lu
m
e.
T
h
e
co
st
to
ir
ri
g
a
te
is
d
ir
ec
tl
y
re
la
te
d
to
th
e
va
lu
e
o
f
th
e
m
a
rg
in
a
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
o
f
w
a
te
r.
Ir
ri
g
a
to
rs
w
it
h
h
ig
h
ir
ri
g
a
ti
o
n
co
st
s
w
il
l
va
lu
e
th
e
m
a
rg
in
a
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
o
f
w
a
te
r
le
ss
th
a
n
ir
ri
g
a
to
rs
w
it
h
lo
w
ir
ri
g
a
ti
o
n
co
st
s.
54
F
ig
ur
e
A
-2
:
N
eb
ra
sk
a
So
il
T
yp
es
(S
T
A
T
SG
O
)
0
20
40
60
80
10
M
ile
s
Le
ge
nd Fin
e 
S
oi
l (
si
lty
)
M
ed
iu
m
 S
oi
l (
lo
am
y)
C
oa
rs
e 
S
oi
l (
sa
nd
y)
T
h
is
ﬁ
g
u
re
sh
ow
s
th
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
so
il
ty
p
es
a
s
re
p
o
rt
ed
b
y
th
e
S
ta
te
S
o
il
s
G
eo
d
a
ta
b
a
se
(S
T
A
T
S
G
O
).
S
o
il
ty
p
e
is
a
n
im
p
o
rt
a
n
t
p
a
ra
m
et
er
in
d
et
er
m
in
in
g
th
e
ev
a
p
o
tr
a
n
sp
ir
a
ti
o
n
re
q
u
ir
em
en
ts
a
n
d
cr
o
p
y
ie
ld
ir
ri
g
a
te
d
a
n
d
d
ry
la
n
d
cr
o
p
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
.
T
h
e
so
il
ty
p
es
va
ry
w
it
h
in
th
e
b
a
si
n
b
u
t,
in
g
en
er
a
l,
m
o
st
w
el
ls
a
re
lo
ca
te
d
o
n
ﬁ
n
e/
si
lt
y
so
il
.
T
h
e
U
p
p
er
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
R
iv
er
B
a
si
n
h
a
s
th
e
m
o
st
h
et
er
o
g
en
eo
u
s
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
so
il
ty
p
es
in
th
e
b
a
si
n
.
55
Figure A-3: Unconstrained Water Use (inches per acre)
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These histograms shows the frequency of estimated unconstrained water use in inches per acre for each NRD. The
dotted line in the Upper Republican shows the NRD allocation of 13 inches per acre. Wells to the left of the dotted
line are estimated to be unconstrained by the NRD allocation while wells on the right must reduce their water use
from the estimated unconstrained water use to the NRD allocation. The dotted line in the Upper Republican shows
the NRD allocation of 12 inches per acre. Wells to the left of the dotted line are estimated to be unconstrained by
the NRD allocation while wells on the right must reduce their water use from the estimated unconstrained water use
to the NRD allocation. The dotted line in the Upper Republican shows the NRD allocation of 9 inches per acre. All
wells are to the right of the dotted line and must reduce their water use from the estimated unconstrained water use to
the NRD allocation. The dark solid in the Tri-Basin NRD is allocation for Kearney County of 9 inches per acre. All
wells in Kearney County are to the right of the line and must reduce their water use from the estimated unconstrained
water use to the NRD allocation. The dark dashed in the Tri-Basin NRD is allocation for Phelps County of 11 inches
per acre. All wells in Phelps County are to the right of the line and must reduce their water use from the estimated
unconstrained water use to the NRD allocation. The dotted line in the Tri-Basin NRD is allocation for Gosper County
of 11 inches per acre. All wells in Gosper County are to the right of the line and must reduce their water use from the
estimated unconstrained water use to the NRD allocation.
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Figure A-4: Total Abatement Cost: Middle Republican NRD
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The red line is the total cost to all producers of reducing individual water use at all levels of abatement. Each red dot
represents the total cost of abatement and total abatement in acre inches would be necessary to meet a speciﬁc NRD
allocation of inches per acre. The total cost of abatement is the loss in proﬁts from constraining water use below the
optimal level. The black line shows the total cost to all producers of reducing aggregate water use to the all levels of
abatement when trading is allowed. Each black dot represents the total cost of abatement and total acre-inches abated
that meet the aggregate water reduction required by the NRD allocations. The dotted lines connect the total cost of
abatement and acre-inches abated for the same NRD allocation. The slope of the dotted line indicates the presence of
slack permits being trading in the market. The diﬀerence in the total cost with trading and without trading at the
same NRD allocation comes from allowing trading. The less eﬃcient producers trade permits with the more eﬃcient
producers, who increase their proﬁts by applying more water.
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Figure A-5: Total Abatement Cost: Lower Republican NRD
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
x 106
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
x 107
Acre−inches of Abatement
To
ta
l A
ba
te
m
en
t C
os
t (d
oll
ars
 pe
r y
ea
r):
 Lo
we
r R
ep
ub
lic
an
 N
RD
The red line is the total cost to all producers of reducing individual water use at all levels of abatement. Each red dot
represents the total cost of abatement and total abatement in acre inches would be necessary to meet a speciﬁc NRD
allocation of inches per acre. The total cost of abatement is the loss in proﬁts from constraining water use below the
optimal level. The black line shows the total cost to all producers of reducing aggregate water use to the all levels of
abatement when trading is allowed. Each black dot represents the total cost of abatement and total acre-inches abated
that meet the aggregate water reduction required by the NRD allocations. The dotted lines connect the total cost of
abatement and acre-inches abated for the same NRD allocation. The slope of the dotted line indicates the presence of
slack permits being trading in the market. The diﬀerence in the total cost with trading and without trading at the
same NRD allocation comes from allowing trading. The less eﬃcient producers trade permits with the more eﬃcient
producers, who increase their proﬁts by applying more water.
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Figure A-9: Results: Histograms of Trading by NRD
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This ﬁgure is a histogram of the acre inches bought and sold in the market. The horizontal axis is acre inches traded
and the vertical axis is the frequency. Negative acre inches are inches bought and positive acre inches are inches sold.
The frequency of buyers in each NRD is greater than the frequencey of sellers. The mean acre inches traded by sellers
is larger than the mean acre inches traded by buyers for all NRDs, which means that in general, there are more buyers
buying small amounts of acre inches and there are fewer sellers selling large amounts of acre inches.
62
Figure A-10: Results: Welfare Gains by Inches per Acre Traded
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This ﬁgure shows the distribution gains from trading of buyers and sellers by inches per acre. Buyers are represented by
black dots and sellers are represented by red dots. The horizontal axis is the trades in inches per acre and the vertical
axis is the trading gains per acre. This ﬁgure shows the kinds of trades each well makes in the market and the value of
each inch per acre traded. For each NRD the overwhelming types of trade are sales of the entire allocation of permits.
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Figure A-11: Results: Welfare Gains by Acre Inches Traded
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This ﬁgure shows the distribution gains from trading of buyers and sellers. Buyers are represented by black dots and
sellers are represented by red dots. The horizontal axis is the trades in acre inches traded per well and the vertical axis
is the gains from trading per well. This ﬁgure shows the total market for acre inches traded and the size of trades and
welfare gains in the form of reduced cost for buyers and sellers.
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Figure A-14: Middle Republican Welfare Gains and Permit Prices: Trading by Township
Legend
Trading by Township
Difference in Cost Reduction
-$159,926 - -$77,029
-$77,028 - -$28,326
-$28,325 - -$17,576
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Permit Prices
undefined
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$10.60 - $13.30
$13.31 - $17.10
The ﬁgure on the left shows the diﬀerence in welfare gains for each township when the trading unit is restricted from the
NRD scale to the township scale. Negative values suggest that trading at an NRD scale reduces the cost of abatement
for producers in each township more than trading at the township scale. The ﬁgure on the right shows the permit price
for a one year lease of one acre inch of water when trading is restricted to township boundaries.
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Appendix B: Changes Made to
Data
Wells Removed and Included in the Model
Below are the wells removed by the RRCA model, but still considered active by the 2008 wells
database. These wells have not been included in the analysis.
Table B-1: Wells Removed from Dataset by RRCA
Well ID Reason Removed Well ID Reason Removed
79 Inactive Abandoned 23951 Inactive Abandoned
109 Inactive Abandoned 24100 Inactive Abandoned
161 Inactive Abandoned 24397 Inactive Abandoned
208 Inactive Abandoned 24980 Inactive Abandoned
257 Replaced by G-021238 (#27530) 26326 Replaced by G-002254 (#5816)
638 Dawson County Well Not URNRD 26461 Replaced by G-062866
750 Inactive Measured by NRD 26609 Inactive Abandoned
840 Replaced by G-025425 (#31964) 26861 Replaced by G-043337
2192 Inactive Abandoned 26978 CRP
2214 Reported under G-031222 27530 replaced by G-043920
2248 Replaced by G-045789 28268 Replaced by G-044051
2490 Replaced by G-037616 28353 Inactive
3649 Replaced by G-042428 28731 Inactive Abandoned
3850 Replaced by G-003659 (#7415) 29568 Inactive Abandoned
3874 Replaced by G-029883 29581 Replaced by G-047259
4579 Inactive Abandoned 29846 Replaced by G-045696
4884 Artesian Cox Ponds 29948 Inactive Abandoned
4885 Artesian Cox Ponds 30013 Replaced by G-057286
4886 Artesian Cox Ponds 30251 Replaced by G-072601
6128 Replaced by G-024162 (#0637 31361 Inactive Abandoned
6223 Replaced by G-024694 31882 Reported under G-030605
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Table B-1 continued: Wells Removed from Dataset by RRCA
Well ID Reason Removed Well ID Reason Removed
9047 Replaced by G-022368 (#28730) 32741 Replaced by G-057287
9054 Inactive Measured by NRD 32907 Inactive Abandoned
12466 Replaced by G-00820B-H 32970 Inactive Measured by NRD
12467 Inactive Abandoned 33671 Replaced by G-067738
12468 Inactive Abandoned 34872 Replaced by G-040741
12469 Inactive Abandoned 36253 Inactive Measured by NRD
12470 Inactive Abandoned 36752 Inactive Abandoned
12471 Inactive Abandoned 37290 Inactive Abandoned
12472 Inactive Abandoned 37348 Inactive Abandoned
12473 Inactive Abandoned 37349 Inactive Abandoned
12869 Replaced by G-062798 37480 Inactive Abandoned
12888 Inactive Abandoned 37496 Reported under G-025348
12890 Inactive Abandoned 37797 Inactive Abandoned
12891 Inactive Abandoned 38091 Inactive
14136 Inactive Abandoned 38137 Replaced by G-031192
14137 Inactive Abandoned 38172 Inactive Abandoned
15320 Replaced by G-039476 38274 Inactive
16138 Inactive 38301 Inactive Abandoned
16139 Inactive 39068 Inactive Abandoned
18360 Replaced by G-058066 39188 Inactive Abandoned
19577 Inactive Abandoned 39232 Inactive Abandoned
20134 Replaced by G-067543 39261 Inactive Abandoned
20140 Inactive Abandoned 39462 Inactive Abandoned
20333 Inactive Abandoned 40853 Inactive Abandoned
20334 Inactive Abandoned 43246 Reported under G-030605
20335 Inactive Abandoned 43446 Reported Under G-036321A
20350 Inactive 43447 Reported under G-036321A
21954 Inactive Abandoned 44458 Inactive Abandoned
23318 Inactive Abandoned 44634 Replaced by G-102529
44994 Inactive 63515 Reported under G-031222
45852 Inactive Abandoned 63724 Inactive Abandoned
45898 Inactive Abandoned 64908 Inactive Abandoned
46153 Inactive Abandoned 65802 Inactive Abandoned
46910 Inactive Abandoned 65873 Inactive Abandoned
47225 Inactive 65874 Inactive Abandoned
47993 Duplicate of G-043231 65875 Inactive Abandoned
48148 Inactive Abandoned 67676 Inactive Abandoned
48690 Inactive Abandoned 68705 Inactive Abandoned
49269 Inactive Abandoned 69381 Inactive
49270 Inactive Abandoned 70037 Inactive
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Table B-1 continued: Wells Removed from Dataset by RRCA
Well ID Reason Removed Well ID Reason Removed
49363 Inactive Abandoned 70115 Inactive
50350 Inactive Abandoned 70310 Inactive Abandoned
50351 Inactive 70999 Inactive Abandoned
50915 Inactive Abandoned 71000 Inactive Abandoned
51004 Inactive Abandoned 71003 Replaced by G-063108A
51259 Abandoned Capped 71324 Duplicate should be G-061787
51608 Inactive Abandoned 71355 Inactive
52344 Replaced by G-044989 71356 Inactive Abandoned
52917 No Use 71569 Inactive Abandoned
53026 Inactive Abandoned 71746 Inactive
53255 Industrial Municipal 71747 Inactive
53396 Reported under G-050021 71748 Inactive
53480 Replaced by G-062811 72317 Inactive Abandoned
53621 Inactive Abandoned 72498 Inactive Abandoned
53665 Inactive Abandoned 74762 Industrial Municipal
53750 Inactive Abandoned 76596 Inactive Abandoned
53751 Inactive Abandoned 77231 Inactive Abandoned
53757 Inactive Abandoned 77482 Inactive Abandoned
54043 Replaced by G-063970 77736 Inactive Measured by NRD
54648 Well is in Colorado 77749 Inactive Abandoned
54649 Well is in Colorado 77830 Inactive Abandoned
54651 Replaced by G-043582 78402 Reported under G-002065
54886 Replaced by G-047450 78563 Inactive Abandoned
55166 Reported under G-047714 79693 Inactive Abandoned
56192 Inactive 108477 Industrial Municipal
56580 Inactive Abandoned 115256 Reported under G-032282A
56617 Replaced by G-059847 120293 Industrial Municipal
57523 Reported under G-050021 133524 Replaced by A-008193 (#2848)
59026 CRP 133763 Inactive Abandoned
59240 Reported under G-051701 136584 Replaced by G-072366
59800 No Use 140894 Inactive Abandoned
63376 Inactive Abandoned 168296 No Use
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Below is a list of wells that have been removed from the dataset and analysis and the reason for
not including the well.
Table B-2: Wells Removed from Dataset and Reason Removed
Well ID Reason Removed from Dataset
16305 commercial well
32511 commercial well
36448 livestock well
37137 livestock well
47706 inactive livestock well
57200 livestock well
59250 pit(excavation) well
59251 pit(excavation) well
60865 livestock well
63502 livestock well
68348 livestock well
68349 livestock well
68350 livestock well
69959 livestock well
73876 located in Twin Platte NRD
87738 domestic use well
99718 livestock well
106098 located in Twin Platte NRD
113637 livestock well
133709 located in Twin Platte NRD
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Below are wells reported in the RRCA Model as having zero pumping. These were included in the
analysis since water pooling is allowed and zero pumping does not indicate an abandoned well.
Table B-3: Wells Reported with Zero Pumping
Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID
646 38022 53753 65405
2115 38103 53758 65707
2174 38175 54667 65708
8377 38461 54692 65821
11729 38484 54866 66013
12465 38554 54888 66014
19081 39132 54891 66106
20667 40005 55167 67535
26677 40875 56369 68343
26845 41558 56876 68344
27440 43445 57266 68372
28128 44187 57522 69037
28638 44285 57942 69280
28667 44574 58379 70133
29042 45114 59173 75216
29605 45233 59249 76562
29680 48330 61289 76912
30636 48734 61290 76979
30830 48737 61800 77435
32496 50293 62170 77930
33537 50829 62698 78698
35434 52111 62929 82984
36409 52112 62931 83947
36644 52552 62934 87738
36751 52918 62935 94587
37339 52984 63054 118737
37773 53151 65024
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Changes Made to the Certiﬁed Irrigated Acreage from the
RRCA Model
In some cases the certiﬁed irrigated acreage from the RRCA model was changed when it was clear
that the data had be incorrectly entered. Wells with certiﬁed irrigated acreage were removed if the
Nebraska DNR labeled the well as something other than an well used for irrigation. In most cases the
certiﬁed acreage for several wells on a quarter-section were all reported as acreages over 700 acres.
It was clear after looking at aerial photos that the reported acreage for each well was describing the
irrigated acreage of the entire section and not each well. For these wells the reported acreage was
divided equally between each well. Other changes made to the certiﬁed acreage data included multiple
reported for a quarter-section. For instance if the sum of the acreages of all wells on a quarter section
was greater than 700 acres, two wells on the same quarter section reported the same exact same
certiﬁed acreage and one of the wells reported zero pumping wells then that well was removed. Below
are wells with certiﬁed irrigated acreage that was changed from the acreage in the RRCA Model.
Original and changed acreages are included in the table.
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Table B-4: Certiﬁed Irrigated Acreage Changed
Well ID RRCA Acreage Acreage Used Well ID RRCA Acreage Acreage Used
610 79 0 47357 177.9 88.95
6146 618.8 206.27 49656 518.1 172.7
7144 149.4 0 49657 611.4 203.8
8377 344.1 0 50461 177.9 88.95
12866 96 0 50678 12.8 0
19214 45.2 0 51039 12.8 0
27985 551.7 130 51271 301 150.5
28354 60.8 0 52596 165.3 169.7
29042 344.1 169.7 53365 315.6 137.4
29291 603.6 134.27 53433 140.2 0
29396 460 153.3 53785 285.6 137.4
30456 564.6 141.15 54866 371.4 0
30482 564.6 141.15 54939 613.8 204.6
30782 302.4 134.27 54940 613.8 204.6
31059 79 0 56369 613.8 0
31086 432.9 216.45 57354 504 320
33536 642.2 214.07 58062 613.5 313.5
33537 642.2 0 60352 64.2 0
35427 618.8 206.27 60353 64.2 0
35433 309.4 206.27 61943 564.6 141.15
35434 618.8 0 62116 518.1 172.7
36255 702.9 234.3 62170 611.4 0
36409 702.9 0 62171 611.4 203.8
36820 642.2 214.07 62508 213.95 106.5
37277 302.4 134.27 63541 517 257
38022 371.4 0 63827 702.9 234.3
38170 460 153.3 64188 213.95 106.5
38585 611.4 203.8 66105 613.8 204.6
39127 642.2 214.07 67376 531.6 131.6
40875 344.1 169.7 70640 96.6 0
41636 551.7 160 70641 96.6 0
41901 432.9 216.45 78181 460 153.3
42411 64.2 0 78994 66 0
42513 12 0 100126 41.3 0
45111 612.4 204.13 118106 71.5 0
45112 612.4 204.13 126084 96.6 0
45113 612.4 204.13 129424 64.2 0
45114 612.4 0 131888 518.1 172.7
45233 702.9 234.3 139380 130 195
45406 12.8 0 141384 85.6 0
45407 12.8 0 148878 141 47
45883 141 47 157604 301 150.5
45884 141 47 176542 96.6 137.4
46690 564.6 141.15
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Changes to Pumping Water Level and Pump Yield
The reported pumping water level was zero for 689 wells in the basin. Zero values in the dataset
could reﬂect the actual pumping water level, but more likely the values reﬂect non-reported pumping
water levels. Since increases in pumping water level aﬀect the cost of water only slightly and zero
values cannot be used in the cost of irrigation analysis, the zero values were changed to the pumping
water level of the nearest neighboring well.
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Table B-5: Wells with Pumping Water Levels Reported as Zero
Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID
12 863 1902 2379 3323 4049 5196 6140 28914
13 864 1905 2380 3399 4094 5197 6146 30269
14 905 1935 2386 3400 4118 5201 6156 38233
34 924 1947 2393 3408 4125 5224 6231 38234
154 929 1948 2422 3409 4132 5227 6323 38236
156 952 1956 2462 3437 4171 5228 6367 40238
162 988 1984 2478 3446 4191 5236 6422 40612
164 1001 1988 2481 3447 4201 5249 6480 40613
165 1005 1999 2486 3461 4208 5271 6550 42546
166 1008 2010 2499 3470 4301 5272 7273 42569
192 1027 2044 2503 3538 4304 5275 7438 43248
193 1068 2045 2518 3545 4310 5299 7439 43445
194 1112 2115 2540 3625 4316 5301 7805 45800
197 1123 2139 2558 3638 4375 5329 8219 45801
207 1167 2140 2591 3639 4389 5333 8272 48357
209 1215 2144 2617 3658 4491 5366 8312 48705
212 1220 2145 2632 3673 4548 5367 8591 48882
214 1232 2161 2636 3678 4559 5368 8642 49528
294 1235 2163 2665 3688 4567 5396 10509 49701
295 1236 2164 2729 3691 4587 5398 11729 51076
299 1313 2171 2731 3713 4614 5410 12024 51838
399 1327 2173 2740 3725 4621 5411 14051 52323
451 1380 2174 2748 3726 4666 5563 14689 52395
514 1386 2176 2749 3764 4668 5620 14945 52397
515 1391 2188 2755 3770 4693 5623 18432 53431
538 1398 2189 2772 3776 4701 5651 18701 53432
591 1409 2191 2787 3777 4742 5652 19109 53433
610 1437 2200 2789 3820 4744 5728 19114 54044
624 1470 2202 2793 3833 4749 5730 19757 54706
633 1474 2209 2794 3840 4762 5781 20482 55499
637 1510 2210 2806 3851 4787 5782 21492 55502
642 1512 2221 2810 3852 4795 5815 22265 55503
643 1528 2222 2824 3861 4798 5862 22266 58981
644 1532 2263 2825 3884 4806 5906 22267 60414
646 1579 2265 2827 3897 4853 5913 22711 60418
694 1649 2271 2838 3898 4870 5939 23434 61201
704 1659 2288 2847 3921 4872 5941 23567 61237
707 1700 2297 2848 3925 4889 5975 23681 61238
712 1733 2304 2867 3930 4926 5976 24982 61239
713 1766 2313 2868 3948 4927 6017 25229 61240
738 1776 2320 3215 3969 4943 6056 25402 61241
743 1783 2321 3216 3972 4955 6059 25403 61242
754 1789 2334 3217 3977 4987 6064 25478 61984
763 1803 2349 3265 3986 5002 6073 25865 62305
770 1810 2351 3268 3990 5067 6074 26096 62307
771 1812 2354 3279 4005 5068 6083 26722 62308
782 1817 2360 3280 4007 5133 6084 26845 62655
793 1818 2365 3288 4013 5144 6089 28224 62926
813 1855 2369 3289 4014 5178 6105 28340 63226
837 1868 2370 3311 4045 5192 6127 28830 63400
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Table B-5 continued: Wells with Pumping Water Levels Reported as Zero
Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID
63401 79497 82598 91035 102809 118644 129027 139303 146032
64235 80155 82712 92905 103254 118737 129127 139304 146646
64275 80250 82713 93076 103794 120016 129167 139305 147060
64687 80473 82806 93867 105999 120506 129169 139306 147539
64709 80790 82916 94227 106320 122507 129170 143047 147705
64710 80956 82920 94588 106321 122588 129173 144534 147743
64936 81005 82921 95225 109584 122743 130270 144893 148046
65519 81019 82922 95251 109585 123773 130902 144894 148262
66266 81143 83549 95255 109586 124303 131681 145351 148263
67219 81574 83947 95700 109587 124570 132498 145425 149353
67384 81575 85083 96923 109588 124581 132595 159037 149354
67385 81576 85084 96925 109674 125352 133131 159062 150038
68741 81577 85085 97282 111129 125353 133217 159064 152049
69967 81618 85371 97888 111960 125355 133408 159133 152324
70973 81632 85372 97897 112756 125917 133413 159305 153723
72435 81838 85458 98057 112757 126249 133414 159408 155823
72436 82079 86256 98058 112772 126426 133425 160372 156121
72437 82131 86279 98059 113431 126427 133470 160373 157598
73355 82133 86865 98515 113728 128053 133544 160374 157818
73356 82472 87926 99175 113779 128090 134036 160375 158048
73357 82482 88577 99176 117290 128309 134351 160529 158212
73358 82483 89729 99254 117572 128321 134353 160530 158213
73359 82492 89772 99349 117784 128604 137535 162189 158423
78891 89183 89839 99411 118368 128605 138329 163571
79042 89184 89878 100228 118398 128825 139051 174855
79043 88704 90077 100589 118399 128931 139052 145427
79052 88760 90120 100700 118405 128932 139302 145574
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The reported well yield was zero for 185 wells in the basin. Zero values in the dataset could reﬂect
the actual pump yield, but more likely the values reﬂect non-reported well yields. Since wells with a
yield of zero likely would not operate and zero values cannot be used in the cost of irrigation analysis,
the zero values were changed to the well yield of the nearest neighboring well.
Table B-6: Wells with Well Yields Reported as Zero
Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID Well ID
14 2163 2827 4171 6084 54532 84280 144304
154 2176 2848 4191 6089 54692 87722 144305
156 2188 2868 4375 6140 62294 87724 144306
294 2202 3216 4587 6231 64687 87926 144307
299 2263 3217 4668 6480 64936 88577 144309
591 2297 3265 4749 7264 68989 88760 144310
610 2304 3323 4795 7273 69967 89185 144311
624 2313 3409 4806 7439 71749 92263 144312
707 2334 3461 4870 7805 73355 93075 144313
712 2360 3470 4872 8219 73356 93076 144314
713 2369 3625 4926 10509 73357 97282 144534
813 2393 3658 5067 11092 73358 99421 156141
821 2462 3713 5068 14689 73359 105775 160372
924 2478 3776 5367 21492 79722 106320 160373
1005 2481 3777 5651 21597 80584 106321 160374
1167 2540 3820 5652 25402 80616 113727 160375
1313 2558 3833 5781 25403 81618 120016 174855
1510 2591 3840 5782 25781 82133 123773
1579 2636 3851 5862 26883 82713 125917
1821 2729 3852 5906 30292 82806 133342
1935 2787 3884 5913 30576 82920 137535
1948 2789 3930 5941 49701 82921 138587
1956 2824 3977 6073 51076 82922 144299
2045 2825 3986 6083 53431 83947 144300
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Changes Made to Soil Type
To ﬁnd the soil type of the land surrounding a well I used the State Soils Geographic (STATSGO)
database for Nebraska. The STATSGO database is a geospatial map of soil types for Nebraska. I
related soil type to each well in the dataset by overlaying the groundwater wells on the soils map in
ArcMap. I used the nearest soil type for wells that fell in areas with no referenced soil type. Below
is a list of the wells and the soil type added to the model.
Table B-7: Wells with No Referenced Soil Type
Well ID Soil Type Used in Model
50 ﬁne
146 ﬁne
147 ﬁne
148 ﬁne
1834 ﬁne
1948 ﬁne
2035 ﬁne
27048 ﬁne
32776 ﬁne
37923 ﬁne
38144 coarse
40926 ﬁne
44553 ﬁne
46071 ﬁne
53537 ﬁne
54648 coarse
54649 coarse
56780 ﬁne
59277 ﬁne
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Appendix C: Computer Code
Water use, Acreage and Proﬁts at any Allocation
Use this code to generate the optimal water use in inches per acre, the optimal irrigated acreage
and proﬁts at any allocation.
1 % First set for Mac/R2008a
2 %options = optimset('LargeScale','off','GradObj','on','TolFun',1e−8,'Display','off',...
3 %'Algorithm','active−set');
4 options = optimset('LargeScale','off','GradObj','on','TolFun',1e−8,'Display','off');
5
6 %read in data
7 fid=fopen('well meters information 3 24 09.csv');
8 wells = textscan(fid,...
9 '%d %f %f %s %s %f %f %d %d %d %*s %*s %*s %s %s %d %s %s %s %d %s %d %*s...
10 %f %f %d %s %s %s %d %*s %*s %f %f %d %d %*d %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f...
11 %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %*f %*f %*f
12 %*f %f %f %*[ˆ\n]', 'delimiter',',','HeaderLines',1);
13 fclose(fid);
14
15 num wells = size(wells{1},1);% number of wells to iterate over
16
17 % columns in well meters information
18 % 1 well id
19 % 2 cert acres
20 % 3 volume acre feet
21 % 4 irr type
22 % 5 nrd
23 % 6 latdd
24 % 7 longdd
25 % 8 section
26 % 9 township
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27 % 10 rangenum
28 % 11 soil type
29 % 12 regnum
30 % 13 replacemen
31 % 14 status
32 % 15 useid
33 % 16 nrdname
34 % 17 nrddwrnum
35 % 18 countyname
36 % 19 countynum
37 % 20 acres
38 % 21 gpm
39 % 22 ownernumbe
40 % 23 compname
41 % 24 city
42 % 25 st
43 % 26 zip
44 % 27 distance to nearest stream
45 % 28 distance to nearest well
46 % 29 well id nearest well
47 % 30 cmpldyear
48 % 31 et alfalfa
49 % 32 et corn
50 % 33 et beans
51 % 34 et sorghum
52 % 35 et soybeans
53 % 36 et beets
54 % 37 et wheat
55 % 38 yd ym alfalfa
56 % 39 yd ym corn
57 % 40 yd ym beans
58 % 41 yd ym sorghum
59 % 42 yd ym soybeans
60 % 43 yd ym beets
61 % 44 yd ym wheat
62 % 45 yd default corn
63 % 46 yd default sorghum
64 % 47 yd default soybeans
65 % 48 yd default wheat
66 % 49 ym default corn
67 % 50 ym default sorghum
68 % 51 ym default soybeans
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69 % 52 ym default wheat
70 % 53 pumping water level
71 % 54 current NRD allocation
72
73
74 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
75
76 allocation.min = 1;
77 allocation.max = 20;
78 allocation.step = .5;
79 allocation.scale = (allocation.max−allocation.min)./allocation.step;
80
81 value = zeros(num wells,allocation.scale);
82 inches = zeros(num wells,allocation.scale);
83 acres = zeros(num wells,allocation.scale);
84 dryland = zeros(num wells,allocation.scale);
85
86
87 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
88 %
89 % Loop over specified wells
90 %
91 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
92
93 for j=1:num wells
94
95 counter.j = j;
96
97 site.id well = wells{1}(j); %well id
98 site.id owner = wells{22}(j); %owner id
99 site.id county = wells{19}(j);
100 site.area = wells{2}(j); %intended irrigation area
101 site.longitude = wells{7}(j);
102 site.latitude= wells{6}(j);
103 site.lift = wells{53}(j);% pumping lift
104 site.pumprate = wells{21}(j);%Well yield >0
105
106 counter.k = 0;
107
108 for k = allocation.min:allocation.step:allocation.max
109
110 counter.k = counter.k + 1;
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111
112 if allocation.min == 0 && k == allocation.min
113
114 site.allocation = 0.0001;
115 % Note use 0.001 or similar if you want to simulate zero allocation
116 % (fix initial value problem for fmincon)
117
118 else
119
120 site.allocation = k;
121
122 end
123
124 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
125 % Set up allocation−specific parameters and constraints
126
127 crop parameters 1 15 09;
128
129 %Pull out numbers of irrigated and dryland crops
130 s.i = size([p.p],2);
131 s.d = size([pd.p],2);
132
133 % set up bounds, lb≤x≤ub
134 lb = zeros(1,2*s.i + s.d);
135 ub = [[p.Im] ones(1,s.i+s.d).*site.area];
136
137 % set up land constraint A.x≤b
138 A = [zeros(1,s.i) ones(1,s.i+s.d)];
139 b = [site.area];
140
141 corn.irrig.guess = min(site.allocation,p(1).Im);
142 corn.ac.guess = min(site.area,site.allocation*site.area/p(1).Im);
143 wheatdry.ac.guess = site.area−corn.ac.guess;
144
145 % Set up initial guess that irrigate as much as you can with corn, rest
146 % dryland wheat
147 x0 = [zeros(1,2*s.i+s.d)];
148 x0(1) = corn.irrig.guess;
149 x0(s.i+1)=corn.ac.guess;
150 x0(2*s.i+4)=wheatdry.ac.guess;
151
152 % Initial guess; want to make sure initial water use guess is less than Im
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153 %x0 = [ones(1,s.i)*site.allocation/10 site.area*ones(1,s.i+s.d)./(s.i+s.d)];
154
155 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
156
157 [u,fval,exitflag,grad] =
158 fmincon(@(u) profit 11 26(u,p,pd,s),x0,A,b,[],[],lb,ub,@(u)...
159 total water(u,site.area*site.allocation,s),options);
160
161 choice = find(round(u(s.i+1:2*s.i+s.d))>0);
162
163 %matrix of profits at any water allocation
164 value(j,counter.k)=−fval;
165
166 %matrix of irrigation water applied and acreage applied on
167 %[u(s.i+choice(i)) u(choice(i))]
168
169 % Print crop choices, water use, and profits for well given allocation
170 %disp([char(9) num2str(k) ' inches,' num2str(round(−fval)) ' profits']);
171
172 for i = 1:size(choice,2)
173
174 if choice(i)≤s.i
175
176 %disp([char(9) char(9) num2str(p(choice(i)).name) ', '...
177 %num2str(roundn(u(s.i+choice(i)),−2)) ' acres, ' ...
178 %num2str(u(choice(i))) ' acre−inches applied']);
179 %num2str(roundn(u(choice(i)),−2)) ' acre−inches applied, '...
180 %num2str(p(choice(i)).Im) ' acre−inches unconstrained max']);
181
182 %matrix of irrigated acreages and inches per acre applied at any alloction
183 acres(j,counter.k)= u(s.i+choice(i));
184 inches(j,counter.k) = u(choice(i));
185
186
187 elseif choice(i)>s.i
188
189 %disp([char(9) char(9) num2str(pd(choice(i)−s.i).name) ', '...
190 % num2str(roundn(u(s.i+choice(i)),−2)) ' acres dryland']);
191
192 %matrix of dryland acreages at any alloction
193
194 dryland(j,counter.k)= u(s.i+choice(i));
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195
196
197 end
198
199 end
200
201 %if site.allocation == allocation.max
202
203 %disp([' '])
204
205 % end
206
207 end
208
209 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
210 %
211 % End of loop over specified allocations
212 %
213 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
214
215 %allocation.iteration = allocation.iteration + 1;
216
217 %fclose(fid);
218
219 end
220
221
222 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
223 %
224 % End of loop over specified allocations
225 %
226 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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Cost of Water Equation and Model Parameters
Cost of Water
The cost of water is deﬁned as
cw =
k · hp · 452.54
r
+
cl · hl
(3− (i · 1.5)) · A¯ +
(
9× 10−6 · (PWL + 2.308p)2)
− (2.4× 10−3 · (PWL + 2.308p)) + 2.9137
where,
A¯ total area available
PWL pumping water level, lift
p pressure
k cost of energy
Kf energy conversion
e units of energy required to run system for one hour
hp hours of pumping required
hl hours of labor required
cl cost of labor
w water allocation
r well yield
i =
{
1 if center pivot irrigation system
0 if gravity irrigation system
Model Parameters
1 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2 % Site parameters
3 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
4
5 site.fine = 1;
6 site.medium = 0;
7 site.coarse = 0;
8 site.pivot = 1; % other option is gravity; code as site.pivot = 0
9 site.energy = 'diesel';
10 % other options are diesel, electric, gasoline, propane, natural gas
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11
12 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
13 % Pumping cost parameters
14 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
15
16 site.pressure = 45;
17 site.Lh = 5;
18 site.Cl = 10;
19 %(site.pivot*site.ehours*3.64)=pivot (site.pivot*site.ehours*1.79)= gravity
20
21 % might be related to the PWL, needs to be looked at again
22 site.energyrqrd = 5;
23 site.ehours = (site.area*site.allocation)*(7.48*43560/12)/(60*site.pumprate);
24
25 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
26 % Crop parameters
27 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
28
29 % simple calculations
30
31 sources = ['d'; 'e'; 'g'; 'p'; 'n'];
32 Kf = 12.5./[1; 14.12; 1.443; 1.814; 0.2604];
33 site.k = Kf(sources == site.energy(1));
34
35 sources = ['d'; 'e'; 'g'; 'p'; 'n'];
36 Cf = [2.70; 0.07; 3.00; 1.10; 8.19];
37 site.c = Cf(sources == site.energy(1));
38
39 %Note: (site.lift+2.308*site.pressure=TDH) (total dynamic head)
40
41 %note that we haven't rounded the efficiency of the pump
42
43
44 %depreciation term (last term) assumes use of diesel motor and pivot system
45 %depreciation term uses (2.31) not (2.308)
46
47 site.cw = (site.c*(site.ehours*site.energyrqrd))/((site.allocation*site.area))+ ...
48 (site.Lh*site.Cl)/((3−site.pivot*1.5)*site.area)+ ...
49 (0.000009*(site.lift+2.31*site.pressure)ˆ2 ...
50 − 0.0024*(site.lift+2.31*site.pressure)+ 2.9137);
51
52 %cw = 11.4*(site.lift+2.308*site.pressure)*(site.c/...
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53 % (site.k*((((11.4*(site.lift+2.308*site.pressure))/site.energyrqrd)/site.k)*...
54 % ((site.allocation*site.area)/site.ehours)))) +...
55 % (site.Lh/((3−site.pivot*1.5)*site.area))*site.Cl + ...
56 %((site.allocation*site.area)*(0.000009*(site.lift+2.31*site.pressure)ˆ2 ...
57 % − 0.0024*(site.lift+2.31*site.pressure)+ 2.9137))/(site.allocation*site.area);
58
59 % Invariant parameters
60 % Based on the Water Optimizer v12−1−07
61 %p(:).name = crop name
62 %p(:).p = market price in dollars/bu, dollars/ton, dollars/lbs
63 %P(:).cw = cw (cost of water, solved above)
64 %p(:).Ym = fully irrigated yield
65 %p(:).t = transport cost/yield dependent costs(dollars/bu, dollars/ton, dollars/lbs)
66 %p(:).B = beta (0.75)
67 %p(:).F = fixed costs dollars/acre(note: those crops [fixed costs − misc. rev])
68
69 %Yield/ET info
70 % 31 et alfalfa
71 % 32 et corn
72 % 33 et beans
73 % 34 et sorghum
74 % 35 et soybeans
75 % 36 et beets
76 % 37 et wheat
77 % 38 yd ym alfalfa
78 % 39 yd ym corn
79 % 40 yd ym beans
80 % 41 yd ym sorghum
81 % 42 yd ym soybeans
82 % 43 yd ym beets
83 % 44 yd ym wheat
84 % 45 yd default corn
85 % 46 yd default sorghum
86 % 47 yd default soybeans
87 % 48 yd default wheat
88 % 49 ym default corn
89 % 50 ym default sorghum
90 % 51 ym default soybeans
91 % 52 ym default wheat
92
93 % alfalfa
94 %p(9).name = 'Alfalfa';
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95 %p(9).p = 93.00;
96 %p(9).cw = cw;
97 %p(9).Ym = 5.36;
98 %p(9).t = 11.5;
99 %p(9).B = 0.75;
100 %p(9).F = 51.27;
101 %p(9).Im = wells{31}(j)./p(9).B;
102
103 % Corn
104 p(1).name = 'Corn';
105 p(1).p = 4.07;
106 p(1).cw = site.cw;
107 p(1).t = 0.08;
108 p(1).B = 0.75;
109 p(1).F = 139.72−5;
110 p(1).Yd = wells{45}(j);
111 p(1).Ym = p(1).Yd./wells{39}(j);
112 p(1).Im = wells{32}(j)./p(1).B;
113
114 % Sorghum
115 p(2).name = 'Sorghum';
116 p(2).p = 3.46;
117 p(2).cw = site.cw;
118 p(2).Ym = 140;
119 p(2).t = 0.08;
120 p(2).B = 0.75;
121 p(2).F = 87.11−3;
122 p(2).Yd = wells{46}(j);
123 p(2).Ym = p(2).Yd./wells{41}(j);
124 p(2).Im = wells{34}(j)./p(2).B;
125
126 % Soybeans
127 p(3).name = 'Soybeans';
128 p(3).p = 9.99;
129 p(3).cw = site.cw;
130 p(3).Ym = 64;
131 p(3).t = 0.06;
132 p(3).B = 0.75;
133 p(3).F = 87.59;
134 p(3).Yd = wells{47}(j);
135 p(3).Ym = p(3).Yd./wells{42}(j);
136 p(3).Im = wells{35}(j)./p(3).B;
90
137
138 % Wheat
139 p(4).name = 'Wheat';
140 p(4).p = 7.39;
141 p(4).cw = site.cw;
142 p(4).Ym = 75;
143 p(4).t = 0.06;
144 p(4).B = 0.75;
145 p(4).F = 74.92;
146 p(4).Yd = wells{48}(j);
147 p(4).Ym = p(4).Yd./wells{44}(j);
148 p(4).Im = wells{37}(j)./p(4).B;
149
150 % Sunflower
151 %p(6).name = 'Sunflower';
152 %p(6).p = 0.17;
153 %p(6).cw = cw;
154 %p(6).Ym = 2400;
155 %p(6).t = 0.0014;
156 %p(6).B = 0.75;
157 %p(6).F = 63.16;
158 %p(6).Im = wells{}(j)./p(1).B;
159
160 % Beans
161 %p(7).name = 'Beans';
162 %p(7).p = 0.31;
163 %p(7).cw = cw;
164 %p(7).Ym = 1800;
165 %p(7).t = 0.0014;
166 %p(7).B = 0.75;
167 %p(7).F = 126.87;
168 %p(7).Im = wells{34}(j)./p(1).B;
169
170 % Sugar Beets
171 %p(8).name = 'Sugar Beets';
172 %p(8).p = 40.00;
173 %p(8).cw = cw;
174 %p(8).Ym = 20; %need fully water yield data
175 %p(8).t = 3.00;
176 %p(8).B = 0.75;
177 %p(8).F = 191.08;
178 %p(8).Im = wells{37}(j)./p(1).B;
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179
180 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
181 %Dryland crops
182 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
183
184 % % Alfalfa (no dryland default yield)
185 % pd(9).name = 'Alfalfa';
186 % pd(9).p = 0.31;
187 % pd(9).Yd = p(9).Yd;
188 % pd(9).t = 9.47; %different than irrigated alfalfa
189 % pd(9).B = 0.75;
190 % pd(9).F = 33.95; %different than irrigated alfalfa
191
192
193 % Corn
194 pd(1).name = 'Corn';
195 pd(1).p = 4.07;
196 pd(1).Yd = p(1).Yd;
197 pd(1).t = 0.08;
198 pd(1).B = 0.75;
199 pd(1).F = 103.21−5; %different than irrigated corn
200
201
202 % Sorghum
203 pd(2).name = 'Sorghum';
204 pd(2).p = 3.46;
205 pd(2).Yd = p(2).Yd;
206 pd(2).t = 0.08;
207 pd(2).B = 0.75;
208 pd(2).F = 82.47−3; %different than irrigated sorghum
209
210 % Soybeans
211 pd(3).name = 'Soybeans';
212 pd(3).p = 9.99;
213 pd(3).Yd = p(4).Yd;
214 pd(3).t = 0.06;
215 pd(3).B = 0.75;
216 pd(3).F = 91.82; %different than irrigated soybeans
217
218 % Wheat
219 pd(4).name = 'Wheat';
220 pd(4).p = 7.39;
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221 pd(4).Yd = p(4).Yd;
222 pd(4).t = 0.06;
223 pd(4).B = 0.75;
224 pd(4).F = 49.06; %different than irrigated wheat
225
226 % % Sunflower
227 % pd(6).name = 'Sunflower';
228 % pd(6).p = 0.17;
229 % pd(6).Yd = p(6).Yd;
230 % pd(6).t = 0.0014;
231 % pd(6).B = 0.75;
232 % pd(6).F = 64.72; %different than irrigated sunflower
233 %
234 % % Beans
235 % pd(7).name = 'Beans';
236 % pd(7).p = 0.31;
237 % pd(7).Yd = p(7).Yd;
238 % pd(7).t = 0.0014;
239 % pd(7).B = 0.75;
240 % pd(7).F = 126.87;
241
242 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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Summary Statistics of Well Database Information and Model
Results
1 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2 %%%% Summary stats on the well database
3 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
4
5 upper=(wells{17}==21);
6 lower=(wells{17}==23);
7 middle=(wells{17}==22);
8 tri basin=(wells{17}==24);
9
10 tri basin kearney=(wells{19}==50);
11 tri basin gosper=(wells{19}==37);
12 tri basin phelps=(wells{19}==69);
13
14
15 upper wells=wells{1}(upper);
16 lower wells=wells{1}(lower);
17 middle wells=wells{1}(middle);
18 tri basin wells=wells{1}(tri basin);
19
20 tri basin kearney wells=wells{1}(tri basin kearney);
21 tri basin gosper wells=wells{1}(tri basin gosper);
22 tri basin phelps wells=wells{1}(tri basin phelps);
23
24 for i=1:size(upper wells,1)
25 upper value(i,:)=value(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:);
26 upper inches(i,:)=inches(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:);
27 upper acres irrg(i,:)=acres(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:);
28 upper acres(i,:)=...
29 acres(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:)+dryland(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:);
30 upper well id(i,:)=well id(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:);
31 upper dist stream(i,:)=dist stream(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:);
32 upper dist wells(i,:)=dist well(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:);
33 upper yield(i,:)=yield(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:);
34 upper lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:);
35 upper soil(i,:)=soil(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:);
36 end
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37
38 for i=1:size(upper wells,1)
39 upper county(i,1)=county(wells{1}==upper wells(i));
40 upper township(i,1)=township(wells{1}==upper wells(i));
41 upper range(i,1)=range(wells{1}==upper wells(i));
42 end
43
44
45 for i=1:size(middle wells,1)
46 middle value(i,:)=value(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
47 middle inches(i,:)=inches(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
48 middle acres irrg(i,:)=acres(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
49 middle acres(i,:)=...
50 acres(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:)+dryland(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
51 middle well id(i,:)=well id(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
52 middle dist stream(i,:)=dist stream(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
53 middle dist wells(i,:)=dist well(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
54 middle yield(i,:)=yield(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
55 middle lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
56 end
57
58 for i=1:size(middle wells,1)
59 middle county(i,1)=county(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
60 middle township(i,1)=township(wells{1}==middle wells(i));
61 middle range(i,1)=range(wells{1}==middle wells(i));
62 end
63
64 for i=1:size(lower wells,1)
65 lower value(i,:)=value(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
66 lower inches(i,:)=inches(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
67 lower acres irrg(i,:)=acres(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
68 lower acres(i,:)=...
69 acres(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:)+dryland(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
70 lower acres dry(i,:)=dryland(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
71 lower well id(i,:)=well id(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
72 lower dist stream(i,:)=dist stream(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
73 lower dist wells(i,:)=dist well(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
74 lower yield(i,:)=yield(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
75 lower lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
76 end
77
78 for i=1:size(lower wells,1)
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79 lower county(i,1)=county(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
80 lower township(i,1)=township(wells{1}==lower wells(i));
81 lower range(i,1)=range(wells{1}==lower wells(i));
82 end
83
84 for i=1:size(tri basin wells,1)
85 tri basin value(i,:)=value(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
86 tri basin inches(i,:)=inches(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
87 tri basin acres irrg(i,:)=acres(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
88 tri basin acres(i,:)=...
89 acres(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:)...
90 +dryland(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
91 tri basin well id(i,:)=well id(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
92 tri basin dist stream(i,:)=dist stream(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
93 tri basin dist wells(i,:)=dist well(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
94 tri basin yield(i,:)=yield(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
95 tri basin lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
96 end
97
98 for i=1:size(tri basin wells,1)
99 tri basin county(i,1)=county(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
100 tri basin township(i,1)=township(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i));
101 tri basin range(i,1)=range(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i));
102 end
103
104 for i=1:size(tri basin kearney wells,1)
105 tri basin kearney value(i,:)=value(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
106 tri basin kearney inches(i,:)=inches(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
107 tri basin kearney acres irrg(i,:)=acres(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
108 tri basin kearney acres(i,:)=...
109 acres(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:)...
110 +dryland(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
111 tri basin kearney well id(i,:)=well id(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
112 tri basin kearney dist stream(i,:)=dist stream(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
113 tri basin kearney dist wells(i,:)=dist well(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
114 tri basin kearney yield(i,:)=yield(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
115 tri basin kearney lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
116 end
117
118
119 for i=1:size(tri basin gosper wells,1)
120 tri basin gosper value(i,:)=value(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
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121 tri basin gosper inches(i,:)=inches(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
122 tri basin gosper acres irrg(i,:)=acres(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
123 tri basin gosper acres(i,:)=...
124 acres(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:)...
125 +dryland(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
126 tri basin gosper well id(i,:)=well id(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
127 tri basin gosper dist stream(i,:)=dist stream(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
128 tri basin gosper dist wells(i,:)=dist well(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
129 tri basin gosper yield(i,:)=yield(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
130 tri basin gosper lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
131 end
132
133 for i=1:size(tri basin phelps wells,1)
134 tri basin phelps value(i,:)=value(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
135 tri basin phelps inches(i,:)=inches(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
136 tri basin phelps acres irrg(i,:)=acres(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
137 tri basin phelps acres(i,:)=...
138 acres(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:)...
139 +dryland(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
140 tri basin phelps well id(i,:)=well id(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
141 tri basin phelps dist stream(i,:)=dist stream(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
142 tri basin phelps dist wells(i,:)=dist well(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
143 tri basin phelps yield(i,:)=yield(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
144 tri basin phelps lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
145 end
146
147 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
148 %%%AREA%%%%%
149
150 cert acres=wells{2};
151
152 upper=(wells{17}==21);
153 lower=(wells{17}==23);
154 middle=(wells{17}==22);
155 tri basin=(wells{17}==24);
156
157 tri basin kearney=(wells{19}==50);
158 tri basin gosper=(wells{19}==37);
159 tri basin phelps=(wells{19}==69);
160
161
162 upper wells=wells{1}(upper);
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163 lower wells=wells{1}(lower);
164 middle wells=wells{1}(middle);
165 tri basin wells=wells{1}(tri basin);
166
167 tri basin kearney wells=wells{1}(tri basin kearney);
168 tri basin gosper wells=wells{1}(tri basin gosper);
169 tri basin phelps wells=wells{1}(tri basin phelps);
170
171 for i=1:size(upper wells,1)
172 upper cert acres(i)= cert acres(wells{1}==upper wells(i));
173
174 end
175
176 for i=1:size(middle wells,1)
177 middle cert acres(i,:)=cert acres(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
178
179 end
180
181 for i=1:size(lower wells,1)
182 lower cert acres(i,:)=cert acres(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
183
184 end
185
186 for i=1:size(tri basin wells,1)
187 tri basin cert acres(i,:)=cert acres(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
188
189 end
190
191 for i=1:size(tri basin kearney wells,1)
192 tri basin kearney cert acres(i,:)=cert acres(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
193
194 end
195
196 for i=1:size(tri basin gosper wells,1)
197 tri basin gosper cert acres(i,:)=cert acres(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
198
199 end
200
201 for i=1:size(tri basin phelps wells,1)
202 tri basin phelps cert acres(i,:)=cert acres(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
203
204 end
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205
206 stats.upper.cert acres=...
207 [mean(upper cert acres) median(upper cert acres) std(upper cert acres)...
208 max(upper cert acres) min(upper cert acres)]
209
210 stats.lower.cert acres=...
211 [mean(lower cert acres) median(lower cert acres) std(lower cert acres)...
212 max(lower cert acres) min(lower cert acres)]
213
214 stats.middle.cert acre=...
215 [mean(middle cert acres) median(middle cert acres) std(middle cert acres)...
216 max(middle cert acres) min(middle cert acres)]
217
218 stats.tri basin.cert acres=...
219 [mean(tri basin cert acres) median(tri basin cert acres)...
220 std(tri basin cert acres) max(tri basin cert acres) min(tri basin cert acres)]
221
222 stats.tri basin kearney.cert acres=...
223 [mean(tri basin kearney cert acres)...
224 median(tri basin kearney cert acres)...
225 std(tri basin kearney cert acres)...
226 max(tri basin kearney cert acres)...
227 min(tri basin cert acres)]
228
229 stats.tri basin gosper.cert acres=...
230 [mean(tri basin gosper cert acres)...
231 median(tri basin gosper cert acres)...
232 std(tri basin gosper cert acres)...
233 max(tri basin gosper cert acres)...
234 min(tri basin gosper cert acres)]
235
236 stats.tri basin phelps.cert acres=...
237 [mean(tri basin phelps cert acres)...
238 median(tri basin phelps cert acres)...
239 std(tri basin phelps cert acres)...
240 max(tri basin phelps cert acres)...
241 min(tri basin phelps cert acres)]
242
243 stats.basin.cert acres=...
244 [mean(cert acres) median(cert acres) std(cert acres) max(cert acres) min(cert acres)]
245
246 stats.sums.cert acres=...
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247 [sum(upper cert acres) sum(lower cert acres) sum(middle cert acres)...
248 sum(tri basin kearney cert acres) sum(tri basin gosper cert acres)...
249 sum(tri basin phelps cert acres) sum(cert acres)]
250
251
252 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
253 %%%%LIFT%%%%
254
255 lift=wells{53};
256
257 upper=(wells{17}==21);
258 lower=(wells{17}==23);
259 middle=(wells{17}==22);
260 tri basin=(wells{17}==24);
261
262 tri basin kearney=(wells{19}==50);
263 tri basin gosper=(wells{19}==37);
264 tri basin phelps=(wells{19}==69);
265
266 upper wells=wells{1}(upper);
267 lower wells=wells{1}(lower);
268 middle wells=wells{1}(middle);
269 tri basin wells=wells{1}(tri basin);
270
271 tri basin kearney wells=wells{1}(tri basin kearney);
272 tri basin gosper wells=wells{1}(tri basin gosper);
273 tri basin phelps wells=wells{1}(tri basin phelps);
274
275 for i=1:size(upper wells,1)
276 upper lift(i)= lift(wells{1}==upper wells(i));
277
278 end
279
280 for i=1:size(middle wells,1)
281 middle lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
282
283 end
284
285 for i=1:size(lower wells,1)
286 lower lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
287
288 end
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289
290 for i=1:size(tri basin wells,1)
291 tri basin lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
292
293 end
294
295 for i=1:size(tri basin kearney wells,1)
296 tri basin kearney lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
297
298 end
299
300 for i=1:size(tri basin gosper wells,1)
301 tri basin gosper lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
302
303 end
304
305 for i=1:size(tri basin phelps wells,1)
306 tri basin phelps lift(i,:)=lift(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
307
308 end
309
310 stats.upper.lift =
311 [mean(upper lift)...
312 median(upper lift)...
313 std(upper lift)...
314 max(upper lift)...
315 min(upper lift)]
316
317 stats.lower.lift =
318 [mean(lower lift)...
319 median(lower lift)...
320 std(lower lift)...
321 max(lower lift)...
322 min(lower lift)]
323
324 stats.middle.lift =
325 [mean(middle lift)...
326 median(middle lift)...
327 std(middle lift)...
328 max(middle lift)...
329 min(middle lift)]
330
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331 stats.tri basin.lift =
332 [mean(tri basin lift)...
333 median(tri basin lift)...
334 std(tri basin lift)...
335 max(tri basin lift)...
336 min(tri basin lift)]
337
338 stats.tri basin kearney.lift =
339 [mean(tri basin kearney lift)...
340 median(tri basin kearney lift)...
341 std(tri basin kearney lift)...
342 max(tri basin kearney lift)..
343 min(tri basin lift)]
344
345 stats.tri basin gosper.lift =
346 [mean(tri basin gosper lift)...
347 median(tri basin gosper lift)...
348 std(tri basin gosper lift)...
349 max(tri basin gosper lift)...
350 min(tri basin gosper lift)]
351
352 stats.tri basin phelps.lift =
353 [mean(tri basin phelps lift)...
354 median(tri basin phelps lift)...
355 std(tri basin phelps lift)...
356 max(tri basin phelps lift)...
357 min(tri basin phelps lift)]
358
359 stats.basin.lift =
360 [mean(lift)...
361 median(lift)...
362 std(lift)...
363 max(lift)...
364 min(lift)]
365 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
366
367 %%%%PUMPRATE%%%%
368
369 pump yield=wells{21};
370
371 upper=(wells{17}==21);
372 lower=(wells{17}==23);
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373 middle=(wells{17}==22);
374 tri basin=(wells{17}==24);
375
376 tri basin kearney=(wells{19}==50);
377 tri basin gosper=(wells{19}==37);
378 tri basin phelps=(wells{19}==69);
379
380 upper wells=wells{1}(upper);
381 lower wells=wells{1}(lower);
382 middle wells=wells{1}(middle);
383 tri basin wells=wells{1}(tri basin);
384
385 tri basin kearney wells=wells{1}(tri basin kearney);
386 tri basin gosper wells=wells{1}(tri basin gosper);
387 tri basin phelps wells=wells{1}(tri basin phelps);
388
389 for i=1:size(upper wells,1)
390 upper pump yield(i)= pump yield(wells{1}==upper wells(i));
391 end
392
393 for i=1:size(middle wells,1)
394 middle pump yield(i,:)=pump yield(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
395 end
396
397 for i=1:size(lower wells,1)
398 lower pump yield(i,:)=pump yield(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
399 end
400
401 for i=1:size(tri basin wells,1)
402 tri basin pump yield(i,:)=pump yield(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
403 end
404
405
406 for i=1:size(tri basin kearney wells,1)
407 tri basin kearney pump yield(i,:)=pump yield(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
408 end
409
410 for i=1:size(tri basin gosper wells,1)
411 tri basin gosper pump yield(i,:)=pump yield(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
412 end
413
414 for i=1:size(tri basin phelps wells,1)
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415 tri basin phelps pump yield(i,:)=pump yield(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
416 end
417
418 stats.upper.pump yield =
419 [mean(upper pump yield)...
420 median(upper pump yield)...
421 std(upper pump yield)...
422 max(upper pump yield)...
423 min(upper pump yield)]
424
425 stats.lower.pump yield =
426 [mean(lower pump yield)...
427 median(lower pump yield)...
428 std(lower pump yield)...
429 max(lower pump yield)...
430 min(lower pump yield)]
431
432 stats.middle.pump yield =
433 [mean(middle pump yield)...
434 median(middle pump yield)...
435 std(middle pump yield)...
436 max(middle pump yield)...
437 min(middle pump yield)]
438
439 stats.tri basin.pump yield =
440 [mean(tri basin pump yield)...
441 median(tri basin pump yield)...
442 std(tri basin pump yield)...
443 max(tri basin pump yield)...
444 min(tri basin pump yield)]
445
446 stats.tri basin kearney.pump yield =
447 [mean(tri basin kearney pump yield)...
448 median(tri basin kearney pump yield)...
449 std(tri basin kearney pump yield)...
450 max(tri basin kearney pump yield)..
451 min(tri basin pump yield)]
452
453 stats.tri basin gosper.pump yield =
454 [mean(tri basin gosper pump yield)...
455 median(tri basin gosper pump yield)...
456 std(tri basin gosper pump yield)...
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457 max(tri basin gosper pump yield)...
458 min(tri basin gosper pump yield)]
459
460 stats.tri basin phelps.pump yield =
461 [mean(tri basin phelps pump yield)...
462 median(tri basin phelps pump yield)...
463 std(tri basin phelps pump yield)...
464 max(tri basin phelps pump yield)...
465 min(tri basin phelps pump yield)]
466
467 stats.basin.pump yield =
468 [mean(pump yield)...
469 median(pump yield)...
470 std(pump yield)...
471 max(pump yield)...
472 min(pump yield)]
473
474 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
475 %%%%SOIL TYPE%%%%
476
477 soil types=wells{11};
478
479 upper=(wells{17}==21);
480 lower=(wells{17}==23);
481 middle=(wells{17}==22);
482 tri basin=(wells{17}==24);
483
484 tri basin kearney=(wells{19}==50);
485 tri basin gosper=(wells{19}==37);
486 tri basin phelps=(wells{19}==69);
487
488 upper wells=wells{1}(upper);
489 lower wells=wells{1}(lower);
490 middle wells=wells{1}(middle);
491 tri basin wells=wells{1}(tri basin);
492
493 tri basin kearney wells=wells{1}(tri basin kearney);
494 tri basin gosper wells=wells{1}(tri basin gosper);
495 tri basin phelps wells=wells{1}(tri basin phelps);
496
497 for i=1:size(upper wells,1)
498 upper soil types(i)= soil types(wells{1}==upper wells(i));
105
499 end
500
501 for i=1:size(middle wells,1)
502 middle soil types(i,:)=soil types(wells{1}==middle wells(i),:);
503 end
504
505 for i=1:size(lower wells,1)
506 lower soil types(i,:)=soil types(wells{1}==lower wells(i),:);
507 end
508
509 for i=1:size(tri basin wells,1)
510 tri basin soil types(i,:)=soil types(wells{1}==tri basin wells(i),:);
511 end
512
513 for i=1:size(tri basin kearney wells,1)
514 tri basin kearney soil types(i,:)=soil types(wells{1}==tri basin kearney wells(i),:);
515 end
516
517 for i=1:size(tri basin gosper wells,1)
518 tri basin gosper soil types(i,:)=soil types(wells{1}==tri basin gosper wells(i),:);
519 end
520
521 for i=1:size(tri basin phelps wells,1)
522 tri basin phelps soil types(i,:)=soil types(wells{1}==tri basin phelps wells(i),:);
523 end
524
525 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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Trading Analysis: Trading Basin-Wide
Use this code to generate the basin-wide trading analysis, including the abatement under NRD
allocations, marginal abatement costs per well, permit price for the basin, acre-inches traded and
welfare gains from trading.
1 %calculate marginal abatement costs and quantities
2 q = (allocation.min−.5):allocation.step:(allocation.max);
3
4 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
5 for i=1:num wells
6
7 if acres(i,39)>0
8
9 %vector of allocations
10 a.q.basin(i,:) = ...
11 ((allocation.max)−linspace(q(1),q(size(q,2)),size(q,2)));
12
13 %marginal cost of abatement
14 a.p.basin(i,:) =...
15 gradient((value(i,:)), wells{2}(i).*...
16 (allocation.max−allocation.min)./allocation.scale);
17
18 %for wells in the model estimates should be in dryland
19 elseif acres(i,39)≤ 0
20
21 a.q.basin(i,:) =...
22 ((allocation.max)−linspace(q(1),q(size(q,2)),size(q,2)));
23 a.p.basin(i,size(value,2)) = 0;
24 a.p.basin(i,1:39)= 0;
25
26 end
27
28 end
29
30
31 %code to begin fixing the mac curves
32 for i=1:num wells
33
34 p2.basin(i,:)=wrev(a.p.basin(i,:)); %reverse the marginal value matrix
35 q2.basin(i,:)=wrev(a.q.basin(i,:)); %reverse the inches abated matrix
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36
37 %current allocation = wells{54}(:);
38 %total acres = wells{2}(:);
39
40 %acre inches abated under NRD allocations
41 initial abate.basin(i)=...
42 max(inches(i,39)−current allocation(i),0)*total acres(i);
43 %inches per acre abated under NRD allocations
44 initial abate inches.basin(i)= max(inches(i,39)−current allocation(i),0);
45
46 end
47
48 for i=1:num wells
49 current use.basin(i)=min(current allocation(i),inches(i,39));
50 free ride.basin(i)=current allocation(i)−current use.basin(i);
51 free ride.basin(find(inches(:,39)==0))=0;
52
53 end
54
55 %to clean the MAC to work in pchip
56
57 for i=1:num wells
58
59 if p2.basin(i,40)>0
60
61 %last zero value
62 loc.start=...
63 find(p2.basin(i,:)>0.0001,1,'first')−1;
64
65 %first zero gradient
66 loc.end=...
67 (find(p2.basin(i,:)>0.0001 & gradient(p2.basin(i,:))<0.1,1,'first')−1);
68
69 %find baseline for normalization
70 q0=q2.basin(i,loc.start);
71
72 %pull out relevant points
73 q temp=q2.basin(i,loc.start:loc.end);
74
75 %normalize to origin
76 q temp=[q temp−ones(size(q temp)).*q0 inches(i,39) inches(i,39)+.00001];
77
108
78 %adjust for slack constraints and initial water use
79 q temp=q temp+ones(size(q temp)).*free ride.basin(i);
80
81 p temp=[p2.basin(i,loc.start:loc.end) p2.basin(i,loc.end) 100];
82
83 %figure(1)
84 %hold on
85 %plot(q temp,p temp),axis([0 20 0 20])
86 %hold off
87
88 %figure(2)
89 %hold on
90 %plot(q2(i,:),p2(i,:)),axis([0 20 0 20])
91 %hold off
92
93 %q i(i,:)=linspace(min(q temp),max(13.5,upper inches(i,39))+.1,50);
94
95
96 q junk.basin(i,:)=...
97 linspace(min(q temp),max(q temp)− 0.01001,48);
98
99 p i.basin(i,:)=...
100 [pchip(q temp,p temp,q junk.basin(i,:)) p2.basin(i,loc.end) 100];
101
102 q i.basin(i,:)=...
103 [q junk.basin(i,:) max(inches(i,39),current allocation(i))...
104 max(inches(i,39),current allocation(i))+0.0001];
105
106 %Fix distinct sites problem of pchip
107 p i.basin(i,:) = p i.basin(i,:) + linspace(0,1e−6,size(p i.basin(i,:),2));
108
109 % figure(2)
110 % hold on
111 % plot(q i(i,:),p i(i,:),'k−',q temp,p temp,'ro'),axis([0 20 0 20])
112 % hold off
113
114 elseif p2.basin(i,40)≤0
115
116 p i.basin(i,:)= zeros(1,50);
117 p i.basin(i,1)= 1e10;
118
119
109
120 end
121
122
123 end
124
125
126
127 %find the mac (tax) where inches abated equals abatement under NRD allocations
128 tax.basin =...
129 fzero(@(u) sum(pigou(u,num wells,p i.basin,q i.basin,total acres))...
130 −sum(initial abate.basin),10);
131
132 mac.tax.basin = tax.basin*ones(num wells,1); %vector of macs
133
134 for i=1:num wells
135
136
137 if p i.basin(i,50)>0
138 %find acre inches reduced under equalized mac
139 reduced allocation.basin(i) =...
140 pchip(p i.basin(i,:),q i.basin(i,:),mac.tax.basin(i))*total acres(i);
141
142 %find inches per acre reduced under equalized mac
143 reduced allocation inches.basin(i)=...
144 pchip(p i.basin(i,:),q i.basin(i,:),mac.tax.basin(i));
145
146 elseif p i.basin(i,50)≤0
147
148 reduced allocation.basin(i) =0; %for dryland wells
149
150 reduced allocation inches.basin(i)= 0; %for dryland wells
151
152 end
153
154 acreinches traded.basin(i)=reduced allocation.basin(i)−initial abate.basin(i);
155
156 inches traded.basin(i)=reduced allocation inches.basin(i)−initial abate inches.basin(i);
157
158 end
159
160
161
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162 for i=1:num wells
163
164 if q i.basin(i,50)>0
165 q tc interp.basin(i,:)=linspace(min(q i.basin(i,:)),max(q i.basin(i,:)),101);
166
167 tc interp.basin(i,:) =...
168 pchip(q i.basin(i,:),p i.basin(i,:),q tc interp.basin(i,:))*...
169 triu(ones(101))/100*(max(q i.basin(i,:))−min(q i.basin(i,:)));
170
171
172
173 if q tc interp.basin(i,1)>0
174
175 tc.abate.basin(i)=0;
176 mac.abate.basin(i)=0;
177
178 else
179 tc.abate.basin(i)=pchip(q tc interp.basin(i,:),...
180 [tc interp.basin(i,1:find(q tc interp.basin(i,:)<...
181 max(q tc interp.basin(i,:)),1,'last'))...
182 tc interp.basin(i,find(q tc interp.basin(i,:)<...
183 max(q tc interp.basin(i,:)),1,'last'))+.00001],initial abate inches.basin(i));
184
185 mac.abate.basin(i)=...
186 pchip(q i.basin(i,:),p i.basin(i,:),initial abate inches.basin(i));
187
188 end
189
190
191 tc.trade.basin(i)=pchip(q tc interp.basin(i,:),...
192 [tc interp.basin(i,1:find(q tc interp.basin(i,:)<...
193 max(q tc interp.basin(i,:)),1,'last'))...
194 tc interp.basin(i,find(q tc interp.basin(i,:)<...
195 max(q tc interp.basin(i,:)),1,'last'))+.00001],reduced allocation inches.basin(i));
196
197 else
198 tc.abate.basin(i)=0;
199 tc.trade.basin(i)=0;
200 mac.abate.basin(i)=0;
201 end
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Trading Analysis: Trading by NRD
Use this code to generate the NRD-wide trading analysis, including the abatement under NRD
allocations, marginal abatement costs per well, permit price for the NRD, acre-inches traded and
welfare gains from trading. To use this code with other NRD trading units replace “upper” with
“middle, lower, or tri basin.”
1
2
3
4 for i=1:size(upper wells,1)
5
6
7 %reverse the marginal value matrix
8 p2.upper(i,:)=wrev(a.p.basin(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:));
9
10 %reverse the inches abated matrix
11 q2.upper(i,:)=wrev(a.q.basin(wells{1}==upper wells(i),:));
12
13 %acre inches abated under NRD allocations
14 initial abate.upper(i)=...
15 max(upper inches(i,39)−current allocation(wells{1}==upper wells(i)),0)*upper acres(i,39);
16
17 %inches per acre abated under NRD allocations
18 initial abate inches.upper(i)=...
19 max(upper inches(i,39)−current allocation(wells{1}==upper wells(i)),0);
20
21
22 temp wells.upper = size(upper wells,1); %number of wells in tax area
23
24 %find current water use under NRD allocations
25 current use.upper(i)=...
26 min(current allocation(wells{1}==upper wells(i)),upper inches(i,39));
27
28 %find slack allocation
29 free ride.upper(i)=...
30 current allocation(wells{1}==upper wells(i))−current use.upper(i);
31
32 %remove the dryland wells from slack allocation
33 free ride.upper(find(upper inches(:,39)==0))=0;
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34
35 %acres for each well in NRD
36 upper acres i=upper acres(:,39);
37
38 end
39
40
41
42
43 for i=1:size(upper wells,1)
44
45 if p2.upper(i,40)>0
46
47 %last zero value
48 loc.start=find(p2.upper(i,:)>0.0001,1,'first')−1;
49
50 %first zero gradient
51 loc.end=(find(p2.upper(i,:)>0.0001 & gradient(p2.upper(i,:))<0.1,1,'first')−1);
52
53 q0=q2.upper(i,loc.start);%find baseline for normalization
54
55 q temp=q2.upper(i,loc.start:loc.end);%pull out relevant points
56
57 %normalize to origin
58 q temp=...
59 [q temp−ones(size(q temp)).*q0 upper inches(i,39) upper inches(i,39)+.00001];
60
61 %adjust for slack constraints and initial water use
62 q temp=...
63 q temp+ones(size(q temp)).*free ride.upper(i);
64
65 p temp=[p2.upper(i,loc.start:loc.end) p2.upper(i,loc.end) 100];
66
67
68 q junk.upper(i,:)=linspace(min(q temp),max(q temp)− 0.01001,48);
69
70 p i.upper(i,:)=[pchip(q temp,p temp,q junk.upper(i,:)) p2.upper(i,loc.end) 100];
71
72 q i.upper(i,:)=...
73 [q junk.upper(i,:) max(upper inches(i,39),current allocation(wells{1}==upper wells(i)))...
74 max(upper inches(i,39),current allocation(wells{1}==upper wells(i)))+0.0001];
75
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76 %Fix distinct sites problem of pchip
77 p i.upper(i,:) = p i.upper(i,:) + linspace(0,1e−6,size(p i.upper(i,:),2));
78
79 elseif p2.upper(i,40)≤0
80
81 p i.upper(i,:)= zeros(1,50);
82 p i.upper(i,1)= 1e10;
83
84
85 end
86
87
88 end
89
90
91
92 %find the mac (tax) where inches abated equals abatement under NRD allocations
93 tax.upper =...
94 fzero(@(u) sum(pigou(u,temp wells.upper,p i.upper,q i.upper,upper acres i))...
95 −sum(initial abate.upper),10);
96
97
98
99
100
101 mac.tax.upper = tax.upper*ones(size(upper wells,1),1); %vector of macs
102
103 for i=1:size(upper wells,1)
104
105
106 if p i.upper(i,50)>0
107
108 %find acre inches reduced under equalized mac
109 reduced allocation.upper(i) =...
110 pchip(p i.upper(i,:),q i.upper(i,:),mac.tax.upper(i))*upper acres(i,39);
111
112 %find inches per acre reduced under equalized mac
113 reduced allocation inches.upper(i)=...
114 pchip(p i.upper(i,:),q i.upper(i,:),mac.tax.upper(i));
115
116 elseif p i.upper(i,50)≤0
117
114
118 reduced allocation.upper(i) =0; %for dryland wells
119
120 reduced allocation inches.upper(i)= 0; %for dryland wells
121
122 end
123
124 acreinches traded.upper(i)=reduced allocation.upper(i)−initial abate.upper(i);
125
126 temp free.upper(i)=free ride.upper(i)*upper acres(i,39);
127
128 inches traded.upper(i)=reduced allocation inches.upper(i)−initial abate inches.upper(i);
129
130 end
131
132
133
134
135
136 for i=1:size(upper wells,1)
137
138 if q i.upper(i,50)>0
139 q tc interp.upper(i,:)=linspace(min(q i.upper(i,:)),max(q i.upper(i,:)),101);
140
141 tc interp.upper(i,:) =...
142 pchip(q i.upper(i,:),p i.upper(i,:),q tc interp.upper(i,:))*...
143 triu(ones(101))/100*(max(q i.upper(i,:))−min(q i.upper(i,:)));
144
145
146
147 if q tc interp.upper(i,1)>0
148
149 tc.abate.upper(i)=0;
150 mac.abate.upper(i)=0;
151
152 else
153 tc.abate.upper(i)=pchip(q tc interp.upper(i,:),...
154 [tc interp.upper(i,1:find(q tc interp.upper(i,:)<...
155 max(q tc interp.upper(i,:)),1,'last'))...
156 tc interp.upper(i,find(q tc interp.upper(i,:)<...
157 max(q tc interp.upper(i,:)),1,'last'))+.00001],initial abate inches.upper(i));
158
159 mac.abate.upper(i)=pchip(q i.upper(i,:),p i.upper(i,:),initial abate inches.upper(i));
115
160
161 end
162
163
164 tc.trade.upper(i)=pchip(q tc interp.upper(i,:),...
165 [tc interp.upper(i,1:find(q tc interp.upper(i,:)<...
166 max(q tc interp.upper(i,:)),1,'last'))...
167 tc interp.upper(i,find(q tc interp.upper(i,:)<...
168 max(q tc interp.upper(i,:)),1,'last'))+.00001],reduced allocation inches.upper(i));
169
170 else
171 tc.abate.upper(i)=0;
172 tc.trade.upper(i)=0;
173
174 end
175
176
177 market cost trade.upper(i)= inches traded.upper(i)*mac.tax.upper(i);
178
179 welfare gain.upper(i) =...
180 (tc.abate.upper(i)− tc.trade.upper(i) + market cost trade.upper(i))*upper acres(i,39);
181
182 if welfare gain.upper(i)<0
183
184 welfare gain.upper(i)=0;
185 end
186
187
188 end
189
190 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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Trading Analysis: Trading by County
Use this code to generate the county trading analysis, including the abatement under NRD al-
locations, marginal abatement costs per well, permit price for each county, acre-inches traded and
welfare gains from trading. To change code for each county, search and replace “upper” with “middle,
lower, or tri basin”, “upper county==15” with “nrd county==number”, “15” with “number”, and
“upper chase” with “nrd county.”
1
2 % Upper
3 % 15 | Chase County
4 % 29 | Dundy County
5 % 68 | Perkins County
6 %
7 % Middle
8 % 32 | Frontier County
9 % 43 | Hayes County
10 % 44 | Hitchcock County
11 % 56 | Lincoln County
12 % 73 | Red Willow County
13 %
14 % Lower
15 % 31 | Franklin County
16 % 33 | Furnas County
17 % 42 | Harlan County
18 % 65 | Nuckolls County
19 % 91 | Webster County
20 %
21 % Tri−Basin
22 % 37 | Gosper County
23 % 69 | Phelps County
24 % 50 | Kearney County
25 %
26
27
28
29 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
30 p upper chase = p2.upper(upper county==15,:); %p2.upper is defined from NRD trading
31 q upper chase = q2.upper(upper county==15,:); %q2.upper is defined from NRD trading
32
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33
34 initial abate.upper chase=...
35 max(upper inches(upper county==15,39)−current allocation(wells{19}==15),0).*...
36 upper acres(upper county==15,39); %acre inches abated under NRD allocations
37 initial abate inches.upper chase= max(upper inches(upper county==15,39)−....
38 current allocation(wells{19}==15),0); %inches per acre abated under NRD allocations
39
40 upper chase inches=upper inches(upper county==15,39);
41 upper chase acres=upper acres(upper county==15,39);
42 temp wells.chase = size(p upper chase,1); %number of wells in tax area
43
44 current use.upper chase=...
45 min(current allocation(wells{19}==15),upper inches(upper county==15,39));
46 free ride.upper chase=...
47 current allocation(wells{1}==upper wells(i))−current use.upper chase;
48
49
50
51
52 for i=1:size(p upper chase,1)
53
54 if p2.upper chase(i,40)>0
55
56 loc.start=find(p2.upper chase(i,:)>0.0001,1,'first')−1;%last zero value
57
58 %first zero gradient
59 loc.end=...
60 (find(p2.upper chase(i,:)>0.0001 & gradient(p2.upper chase(i,:))<0.1,1,'first')−1);
61
62 q0=q2.upper chase(i,loc.start);%find baseline for normalization
63
64 q temp=q2.upper chase(i,loc.start:loc.end);%pull out relevant points
65
66 %normalize to origin
67 q temp=...
68 [q temp−ones(size(q temp)).*q0 upper chase inches(i,39)...
69 upper chase inches(i,39)+.00001];
70
71 %adjust for slack constraints and initial water us
72 q temp=...
73 q temp+ones(size(q temp)).*free ride.upper chase(i);e
74
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75 p temp=[p2.upper chase(i,loc.start:loc.end) p2.upper chase(i,loc.end) 100];
76
77
78 q junk.upper chase(i,:)=linspace(min(q temp),max(q temp)− 0.01001,48);
79
80 p i.upper chase(i,:)=...
81 [pchip(q temp,p temp,q junk.upper chase(i,:)) p2.upper chase(i,loc.end) 100];
82
83 q i.upper chase(i,:)=...
84 [q junk.upper chase(i,:) max(upper chase inches(i,39),...
85 current allocation(wells{19}==15)) max(upper chase inches(i,39),...
86 current allocation(wells{19}==15))+0.0001];
87
88 %Fix distinct sites problem of pchip
89 p i.upper chase(i,:) =...
90 p i.upper chase(i,:) + linspace(0,1e−6,size(p i.upper chase(i,:),2));
91
92
93 elseif p2.upper chase(i,40)≤0
94
95 p i.upper chase(i,:)= zeros(1,50);
96 p i.upper chase(i,1)= 1e10;
97
98
99 end
100
101 end
102
103 %find the mac (tax) where inches abated equals abatement under NRD allocations
104 tax.upper chase =...
105 fzero(@(u) sum(pigou(u,temp wells.upper chase,p i.upper chase,q i.upper chase,...
106 upper chase acres i))−sum(initial abate.upper chase),10);
107
108
109 mac.tax.upper chase = tax.upper chase*ones(size(upper chase wells,1),1); %vector of macs
110
111 for i=1:size(p upper chase,1)
112
113
114 if p i.upper chase(i,50)>0
115
116 %find acre inches reduced under equalized mac
119
117 reduced allocation.upper chase(i) =...
118 pchip(p i.upper chase(i,:),q i.upper chase(i,:),mac.tax.upper chase(i))*...
119 upper chase acres(i,39);
120
121 %find inches per acre reduced under equalized mac
122 reduced allocation inches.upper chase(i)=...
123 pchip(p i.upper chase(i,:),q i.upper chase(i,:),mac.tax.upper chase(i));
124
125 elseif p i.upper chase(i,50)≤0
126
127 reduced allocation.upper chase(i) =0; %for dryland wells
128
129 reduced allocation inches.upper chase(i)= 0; %for dryland wells
130
131 end
132
133 acreinches traded.upper chase(i)=...
134 educed allocation.upper chase(i)−initial abate.upper chase(i);
135
136 inches traded.upper chase(i)=...
137 reduced allocation inches.upper chase(i)−initial abate inches.upper chase(i);
138
139 end
140
141 for i=1:size(p upper chase,1)
142
143 if q i.upper chase(i,50)>0
144 q tc interp.upper chase(i,:)=...
145 linspace(min(q i.upper chase(i,:)),max(q i.upper chase(i,:)),101);
146
147 tc interp.upper chase(i,:)=...
148 pchip(q i.upper chase(i,:),p i.upper chase(i,:),q tc interp.upper chase(i,:))*...
149 triu(ones(101))/100*(max(q i.upper chase(i,:))−min(q i.upper chase(i,:)));
150
151 if q tc interp.upper chase(i,1)>0
152
153 tc.abate.upper chase(i)=0;
154 mac.abate.upper chase(i)=0;
155
156 else
157 tc.abate.upper chase(i)=pchip(q tc interp.upper chase(i,:),...
158 [tc interp.upper chase(i,1:find(q tc interp.upper chase(i,:)<...
120
159 max(q tc interp.upper chase(i,:)),1,'last'))...
160 tc interp.upper chase(i,find(q tc interp.upper chase(i,:)<...
161 max(q tc interp.upper chase(i,:)),1,'last'))+.00001],...
162 initial abate inches.upper chase(i));
163
164 mac.abate.upper chase(i)=...
165 pchip(q i.upper chase(i,:),p i.upper chase(i,:),initial abate inches.upper chase(i));
166
167 end
168
169 tc.trade.upper chase(i)=pchip(q tc interp.upper chase(i,:),...
170 [tc interp.upper chase(i,1:find(q tc interp.upper chase(i,:)<...
171 max(q tc interp.upper chase(i,:)),1,'last'))...
172 tc interp.upper chase(i,find(q tc interp.upper chase(i,:)<...
173 max(q tc interp.upper chase(i,:)),1,'last'))+.00001],...
174 reduced allocation inches.upper chase(i));
175
176 else
177 tc.abate.upper chase(i)=0;
178 tc.trade.upper chase(i)=0;
179
180 end
181
182 market cost trade.upper chase(i)=...
183 inches traded.upper chase(i)*mac.tax.upper chase(i);
184
185 welfare gain.upper chase(i) =...
186 (tc.abate.upper chase(i)−tc.trade.upper chase(i)+...
187 market cost trade.upper chase(i))*upper chase acres(i,39);
188
189 if welfare gain.upper chase(i)<0
190
191 welfare gain.upper chase(i)=0;
192 end
193
194 end
195
196 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
197 %to compare to welfare of counties at the NRD level
198
199 %Upper
200 welfare gain.chase county = welfare gain.upper(find(upper county==15))';
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201
202 welfare gain.dundy county = welfare gain.upper(find(upper county==29))';
203
204 welfare gain.perkins county = welfare gain.upper(find(upper county==68))';
205
206
207 %Middle
208 welfare gain per acre.frontier county =...
209 welfare gain.middle(find(middle county==32))'./middle acres(find(middle county==32));
210
211 welfare gain per acre.hayes county =...
212 welfare gain.middle(find(middle county==43))'./middle acres(find(middle county==43));
213
214 welfare gain per acre.hitchcock county =...
215 welfare gain.middle(find(middle county==44))'./middle acres(find(middle county==44));
216
217 welfare gain per acre.lincoln county =...
218 welfare gain.middle(find(middle county==56))'./middle acres(find(middle county==56));
219
220 welfare gain per acre.red willow county =...
221 welfare gain.middle(find(middle county==73))'./middle acres(find(middle county==73));
222
223 %Lower
224 welfare gain per acre.franklin county =...
225 welfare gain.lower(find(lower county==31))'./lower acres(find(lower county==31));
226
227 welfare gain per acre.furnas county =...
228 welfare gain.lower(find(lower county==33))'./lower acres(find(lower county==33));
229
230 welfare gain per acre.harlan county =...
231 welfare gain.lower(find(lower county==42))'./lower acres(find(lower county==42));
232
233 welfare gain per acre.nuckolls county =...
234 welfare gain.lower(find(lower county==65))'./lower acres(find(lower county==65));
235
236 welfare gain per acre.webster county =...
237 welfare gain.lower(find(lower county==91))'./lower acres(find(lower county==91));
238
239 %put the county data (NRD trading) into a matrix
240 info counties(:,1)= [sum(welfare gain.chase county);sum(welfare gain.dundy county);...
241 sum(welfare gain.perkins county);sum(welfare gain.frontier county);...
242 sum(welfare gain.hayes county);sum(welfare gain.hitchcock county);....
122
243 sum(welfare gain.lincoln county);sum(welfare gain.red willow county);...
244 sum(welfare gain.franklin county);sum(welfare gain.furnas county);...
245 sum(welfare gain.harlan county);sum(welfare gain.nuckolls county);...
246 sum(welfare gain.webster county);sum(welfare gain.phelps county);...
247 sum(welfare gain.gosper county);sum(welfare gain.kearney county)];
248
249 %put the county data (county trading) into a matrix
250 info counties(:,4)= [sum(welfare gain.upper chase);sum(welfare gain.upper dundy);...
251 sum(welfare gain.upper perkins);sum(welfare gain.middle frontier);...
252 sum(welfare gain.middle hayes);sum(welfare gain.middle hitchcock);....
253 sum(welfare gain.middle lincoln);sum(welfare gain.middle red willow);...
254 sum(welfare gain.lower franklin);sum(welfare gain.lower furnas);...
255 sum(welfare gain.lower harlan);sum(welfare gain.lower nuckolls);...
256 sum(welfare gain.lower webster);sum(welfare gain.tri basin phelps);...
257 sum(welfare gain.tri basin gosper);sum(welfare gain.tri basin kearney)]';
258
259 %put the permit prices (county trading) into a matrix
260 info counties(:,6)= [tax.upper chase;tax.upper dundy;....
261 tax.upper perkins;tax.middle frontier;...
262 tax.middle hayes;tax.middle hitchcock;...
263 tax.middle lincoln;tax.middle red willow;...
264 tax.lower franklin;tax.lower furnas;...
265 tax.lower harlan;tax.lower nuckolls;...
266 tax.lower webster;tax.tri basin phelps;...
267 tax.tri basin gosper;tax.tri basin kearney]';
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Trading Analysis: Trading by Stream Zone
To use this code with other NRD trading units and stream units replace “upper” with “middle,
lower, or tri basin” Replace “13” with the NRD allocation and “1600” with the stream distance. Use
“ﬁnd(upper dist stream<=3200 & upper dist stream>1600)”to make zones between two distances.
1 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2 p upper near stream = p2.upper(upper dist stream≤1600,:);
3 q upper near stream = q2.upper(upper dist stream≤1600,:);
4 upper near stream= upper dist stream(find(upper dist stream≤1600));
5
6 %acre inches abated under NRD allocations
7 initial abate inches.upper near stream=...
8 max(upper inches(upper dist stream≤1600,39)−13,0).*upper acres(upper dist stream≤1600,39);
9
10 %inches per acre abated under NRD allocations
11 initial abate.upper near stream=...
12 max(upper inches(upper dist stream≤1600,39)−13,0);
13
14 upper near stream inches=upper inches(upper dist stream≤1600,39);
15
16 upper near stream acres=upper acres(upper dist stream≤1600,39);
17
18 temp wells.upper near stream = size(p upper near stream,1); %number of wells in tax area
19
20 current use.upper near stream=min(13,upper inches(upper dist stream≤1600,39));
21
22 free ride.upper near stream=13−current use.upper near stream;
23
24 for i=1:size(upper near stream wells,1)
25
26 if p2.upper near stream(i,40)>0
27
28 loc.start=find(p2.upper near stream(i,:)>0.0001,1,'first')−1;%last zero value
29
30 %first zero gradient
31 loc.end=...
32 (find(p2.upper near stream(i,:)>0.0001 &...
33 gradient(p2.upper near stream(i,:))<0.1,1,'first')−1);
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34
35 q0=q2.upper near stream(i,loc.start);%find baseline for normalization
36
37 q temp=q2.upper near stream(i,loc.start:loc.end);%pull out relevant points
38
39 %normalize to origin
40 q temp=...
41 [q temp−ones(size(q temp)).*q0 upper near stream inches(i,39)...
42 upper near stream inches(i,39)+.00001];
43
44 %adjust for slack constraints and initial water use
45 q temp=...
46 q temp+ones(size(q temp)).*free ride.upper near stream(i);
47
48 p temp=...
49 [p2.upper near stream(i,loc.start:loc.end) p2.upper near stream(i,loc.end) 100];
50
51 q junk.upper near stream(i,:)=...
52 linspace(min(q temp),max(q temp)− 0.01001,48);
53
54 p i.upper near stream(i,:)=...
55 [pchip(q temp,p temp,q junk.upper near stream(i,:)) p2.upper near stream(i,loc.end) 100];
56
57 q i.upper near stream(i,:)=...
58 [q junk.upper near stream(i,:)...
59 max(upper near stream inches(i,39),...
60 current allocation(wells{1}==upper near stream wells(i)))...
61 max(upper near stream inches(i,39),...
62 current allocation(wells{1}==upper near stream wells(i)))+0.0001];
63
64 %Fix distinct sites problem of pchip
65 p i.upper near stream(i,:) =...
66 p i.upper near stream(i,:) + linspace(0,1e−6,size(p i.upper near stream(i,:),2));
67
68 elseif p2.upper near stream(i,40)≤0
69
70 p i.upper near stream(i,:)= zeros(1,50);
71 p i.upper near stream(i,1)= 1e10;
72
73
74 end
75
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76
77 end
78
79
80
81 %find the mac (tax) where inches abated equals abatement under NRD allocations
82 tax.upper near stream =...
83 fzero(@(u) sum(pigou(u,temp wells.upper near stream,...
84 p i.upper near stream,q i.upper near stream,...
85 upper near stream acres i))−sum(initial abate.upper near stream),10);
86
87 %vector of macs
88 mac.tax.upper near stream =...
89 tax.upper near stream*ones(size(upper near stream wells,1),1);
90
91 for i=1:size(upper near stream wells,1)
92
93
94 if p i.upper near stream(i,50)>0
95
96 %find acre inches reduced under equalized mac
97 reduced allocation.upper near stream(i) =...
98 pchip(p i.upper near stream(i,:),q i.upper near stream(i,:),...
99 mac.tax.upper near stream(i))*upper near stream acres(i,39);
100
101 %find inches per acre reduced under equalized mac
102 reduced allocation inches.upper near stream(i)=...
103 pchip(p i.upper near stream(i,:),q i.upper near stream(i,:),...
104 mac.tax.upper near stream(i));
105
106 elseif p i.upper near stream(i,50)≤0
107
108 reduced allocation.upper near stream(i) =0; %for dryland wells
109
110 reduced allocation inches.upper near stream(i)= 0; %for dryland wells
111
112 end
113
114 acreinches traded.upper near stream(i)=...
115 reduced allocation.upper near stream(i)−initial abate.upper near stream(i);
116
117 temp free.upper near stream(i)=...
126
118 free ride.upper near stream(i)*upper near stream acres(i,39);
119
120 inches traded.upper near stream(i)=...
121 reduced allocation inches.upper near stream(i)−...
122 initial abate inches.upper near stream(i);
123
124 end
125
126 for i=1:size(upper near stream wells,1)
127
128 if q i.upper near stream(i,50)>0
129 q tc interp.upper near stream(i,:)=...
130 linspace(min(q i.upper near stream(i,:)),max(q i.upper near stream(i,:)),101);
131
132 tc interp.upper near stream(i,:)=...
133 pchip(q i.upper near stream(i,:),p i.upper near stream(i,:),...
134 q tc interp.upper near stream(i,:))*...
135 triu(ones(101))/100*(max(q i.upper near stream(i,:))−...
136 min(q i.upper near stream(i,:)));
137
138 if q tc interp.upper near stream(i,1)>0
139
140 tc.abate.upper near stream(i)=0;
141 mac.abate.upper near stream(i)=0;
142
143 else
144 tc.abate.upper near stream(i)=...
145 pchip(q tc interp.upper near stream(i,:),...
146 [tc interp.upper near stream(i,1:find(q tc interp.upper near stream(i,:)<...
147 max(q tc interp.upper near stream(i,:)),1,'last'))...
148 tc interp.upper near stream(i,find(q tc interp.upper near stream(i,:)<...
149 max(q tc interp.upper near stream(i,:)),1,'last'))+.00001],...
150 initial abate inches.upper near stream(i));
151
152 mac.abate.upper near stream(i)=...
153 pchip(q i.upper near stream(i,:),p i.upper near stream(i,:),...
154 initial abate inches.upper near stream(i));
155
156 end
157
158
159 tc.trade.upper near stream(i)=...
127
160 pchip(q tc interp.upper near stream(i,:),...
161 [tc interp.upper near stream(i,1:find(q tc interp.upper near stream(i,:)<...
162 max(q tc interp.upper near stream(i,:)),1,'last'))...
163 tc interp.upper near stream(i,find(q tc interp.upper near stream(i,:)<...
164 max(q tc interp.upper near stream(i,:)),1,'last'))+.00001],...
165 reduced allocation inches.upper near stream(i));
166
167 else
168 tc.abate.upper near stream(i)=0;
169 tc.trade.upper near stream(i)=0;
170
171 end
172
173
174 market cost trade.upper near stream(i)=...
175 inches traded.upper near stream(i)*mac.tax.upper near stream(i);
176
177 welfare gain.upper near stream(i) =...
178 (tc.abate.upper near stream(i)−tc.trade.upper near stream(i)+...
179 market cost trade.upper near stream(i))*upper near stream acres(i,39);
180
181 if welfare gain.upper near stream(i)<0
182
183 welfare gain.upper near stream(i)=0;
184 end
185 end
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Abatement Costs Information
Use this code to generate the information for the abatement cost tables.
1 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2 %Generate information for tables−cost of abatement information
3 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
4
5
6 %find mean tc of abatement per acre%
7 mean(tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0))
8
9 mean(tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0))
10
11 mean(tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0))
12
13 mean(tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0))
14
15 mean(tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0))
16
17 mean(tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))
18
19
20 std(tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0))
21
22 std(tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0))
23
24 std(tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0))
25
26 std(tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0))
27
28 std(tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0))
29
30 std(tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))
31
32
33 max(tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0))
34
35 max(tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0))
36
37 max(tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0))
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38
39 max(tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0))
40
41 max(tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0))
42
43 max(tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))
44
45
46 sum(tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)'.*upper acres(upper inches(:,39)>0))
47
48 sum(tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)'.*middle acres(middle inches(:,39)>0))
49
50 sum(tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)'.*lower acres(lower inches(:,39)>0))
51
52 sum(tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
53 tri basin gosper acres(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0))
54
55 sum(tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
56 tri basin phelps acres(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0))
57
58 sum(tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
59 tri basin kearney acres(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))
60
61
62
63 mean([tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)';...
64 tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)';...
65 tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)';...
66 tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)';...
67 tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)';...
68 tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'])
69
70 std([tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)';...
71 tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)';...
72 tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)';...
73 tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)';...
74 tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)';...
75 tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'])
76
77 max([tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)';...
78 tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)';...
79 tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)';...
130
80 tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)';...
81 tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)';...
82 tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'])
83
84
85 sum(tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)'.*upper acres(upper inches(:,39)>0))+...
86 sum(tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)'.*middle acres(middle inches(:,39)>0))+...
87 sum(tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)'.*lower acres(lower inches(:,39)>0))+...
88 sum(tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
89 tri basin gosper acres(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0))+...
90 sum(tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
91 tri basin phelps acres(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0))+...
92 sum(tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
93 tri basin kearney acres(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))
94
95 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
96 %find total cost of abatement per well, without trading
97 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
98
99 [mean(tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
100 upper acres(upper inches(:,39)>0)),
101
102 mean(tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
103 middle acres(middle inches(:,39)>0)),
104
105 mean(tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
106 lower acres(lower inches(:,39)>0)),
107
108 mean(tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
109 tri basin gosper acres(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)),
110
111 mean(tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
112 tri basin phelps acres(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)),
113
114 mean(tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
115 tri basin kearney acres(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))]
116
117
118 [median(tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
119 upper acres(upper inches(:,39)>0)),
120
121 median(tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
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122 middle acres(middle inches(:,39)>0)),
123
124 median(tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
125 lower acres(lower inches(:,39)>0)),
126
127 median(tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
128 tri basin gosper acres(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)),
129
130 median(tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
131 tri basin phelps acres(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)),
132
133 median(tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
134 tri basin kearney acres(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))]
135
136
137
138 [std(tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
139 upper acres(upper inches(:,39)>0)),
140
141 std(tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
142 middle acres(middle inches(:,39)>0)),
143
144 std(tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
145 lower acres(lower inches(:,39)>0)),
146
147 std(tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
148 tri basin gosper acres(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)),
149
150 std(tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
151 tri basin phelps acres(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)),
152
153 std(tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
154 tri basin kearney acres(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))]
155
156
157 [max(tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
158 upper acres(upper inches(:,39)>0)),
159
160 max(tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
161 middle acres(middle inches(:,39)>0)),
162
163 max(tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
132
164 lower acres(lower inches(:,39)>0)),
165
166 max(tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
167 tri basin gosper acres(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)),
168
169 max(tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
170 tri basin phelps acres(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)),
171
172 max(tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
173 tri basin kearney acres(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))]
174
175
176 mean([(tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
177 upper acres(upper inches(:,39)>0));...
178 (tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
179 middle acres(middle inches(:,39)>0));...
180 (tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
181 lower acres(lower inches(:,39)>0));...
182 (tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
183 tri basin gosper acres(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0));...
184 (tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
185 tri basin phelps acres(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0));...
186 (tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
187 tri basin kearney acres(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))])
188
189
190 std([(tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
191 upper acres(upper inches(:,39)>0));...
192 (tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
193 middle acres(middle inches(:,39)>0));...
194 (tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
195 lower acres(lower inches(:,39)>0));...
196 (tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
197 tri basin gosper acres(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0));...
198 (tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
199 tri basin phelps acres(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0));...
200 (tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
201 tri basin kearney acres(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))])
202
203 max([(tc.abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
204 upper acres(upper inches(:,39)>0));...
205 (tc.abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
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206 middle acres(middle inches(:,39)>0));...
207 (tc.abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
208 lower acres(lower inches(:,39)>0));...
209 (tc.abate.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
210 tri basin gosper acres(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0));...
211 (tc.abate.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
212 tri basin phelps acres(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0));...
213 (tc.abate.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
214 tri basin kearney acres(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))])
215
216 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
217 %%% Per well Costs, when trading is allowed
218 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
219
220 [mean(tc.trade.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
221 upper acres(upper inches(:,39)>0)),
222
223 mean(tc.trade.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
224 middle acres(middle inches(:,39)>0)),
225
226 mean(tc.trade.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
227 lower acres(lower inches(:,39)>0)),
228
229 mean(tc.trade.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
230 tri basin gosper acres(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)),
231
232 mean(tc.trade.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
233 tri basin phelps acres(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)),
234
235 mean(tc.trade.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)'.*...
236 tri basin kearney acres(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0))]
237
238
239 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
240 %NRD INFO
241
242 info nrd(:,1)=[sum(welfare gain.upper);...
243 sum(welfare gain.middle);...
244 sum(welfare gain.lower);...
245 sum(sum(welfare gain.tri basin kearney)+...
246 sum(welfare gain.tri basin phelps)+...
247 sum(welfare gain.tri basin gosper))];
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248
249 info nrd(:,2)=[mean(welfare gain.upper);...
250 mean(welfare gain.middle);..
251 mean(welfare gain.lower);...
252 mean(mean(welfare gain.tri basin kearney)+...
253 mean(welfare gain.tri basin phelps)+...
254 mean(welfare gain.tri basin gosper))];
255
256 info nrd(:,3)=[tax.upper;...
257 tax.middle;...
258 tax.lower;...
259 ((tax.tri basin kearney+...
260 tax.tri basin phelps+...
261 tax.tri basin gosper)/3)];
262
263
264 info upper id(:,1)=[upper wells];
265
266 info upper(:,1)=[acreinches traded.upper];
267
268 info upper(:,2)=[inches traded.upper];
269
270 info upper(:,3)=[initial abate inches.upper];
271
272 info upper(:,4)=[welfare gain.upper];
273
274 info upper(:,5)=[welfare gain.upper'./upper acres(:,39)];
275
276 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
277 info middle id(:,1)=[middle wells];
278
279 info middle(:,1)=[acreinches traded.middle];
280
281 info middle(:,2)=[inches traded.middle];
282
283 info middle(:,3)=[initial abate inches.middle];
284
285 info middle(:,4)=[welfare gain.middle];
286
287 info middle(:,5)=[welfare gain.middle'./middle acres(:,39)];
288
289
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290 info lower id(:,1)=[lower wells];
291
292 info lower(:,1)=[acreinches traded.lower];
293
294 info lower(:,2)=[inches traded.lower];
295
296 info lower(:,3)=[initial abate inches.lower];
297
298 info lower(:,4)=[welfare gain.lower];
299
300 info lower(:,5)=[welfare gain.lower'./lower acres(:,39)];
301
302
303
304 info tri basin id(:,1)=[tri basin wells];
305
306 info tri basin(:,1)=[acreinches traded.tri basin];
307
308 info tri basin(:,2)=[inches traded.tri basin];
309
310 info tri basin(:,3)=[initial abate inches.tri basin];
311
312 info tri basin(:,4)=[welfare gain.tri basin];
313
314 info tri basin(:,5)=[welfare gain.tri basin'./tri basin acres(:,39)];
315
316
317
318 info tri basin kearney id(:,1)=[tri basin kearney wells];
319
320 info tri basin kearney(:,1)=[acreinches traded.tri basin kearney];
321
322 info tri basin kearney(:,2)=[inches traded.tri basin kearney];
323
324 info tri basin kearney(:,3)=[initial abate inches.tri basin kearney];
325
326 info tri basin kearney(:,4)=[welfare gain.tri basin kearney];
327
328 info tri basin kearney(:,5)=...
329 [(welfare gain.tri basin kearney'./tri basin kearney acres(:,39))];
330
331
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332 info tri basin gosper id(:,1)=[tri basin gosper wells];
333
334 info tri basin gosper(:,1)=[acreinches traded.tri basin gosper];
335
336 info tri basin gosper(:,2)=[inches traded.tri basin gosper];
337
338 info tri basin gosper(:,3)=[initial abate inches.tri basin gosper];
339
340 info tri basin gosper(:,4)=[welfare gain.tri basin gosper];
341
342 info tri basin gosper(:,5)=...
343 [(welfare gain.tri basin gosper'./tri basin gosper acres(:,39))];
344
345
346 info tri basin phelps id(:,1)=[tri basin phelps wells];
347
348 info tri basin phelps(:,1)=[acreinches traded.tri basin phelps];
349
350 info tri basin phelps(:,2)=[inches traded.tri basin phelps];
351
352 info tri basin phelps(:,3)=[initial abate inches.tri basin phelps];
353
354 info tri basin phelps(:,4)=[welfare gain.tri basin phelps];
355
356 info tri basin phelps(:,5)=...
357 [(welfare gain.tri basin phelps'./tri basin phelps acres(:,39))];
358
359
360
361 %find the sum stats on inches reduced
362 mean(info upper(upper inches(:,39)>0,3))
363 std(info upper(upper inches(:,39)>0,3))
364 max(info upper(upper inches(:,39)>0,3))
365 sum(initial abate.upper)
366
367 mean(info middle(middle inches(:,39)>0,3))
368 std(info middle(middle inches(:,39)>0,3))
369 max(info middle(middle inches(:,39)>0,3))
370 sum(initial abate.middle)
371
372 mean(info lower(lower inches(:,39)>0,3))
373 std(info lower(lower inches(:,39)>0,3))
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374 max(info lower(lower inches(:,39)>0,3))
375 sum(initial abate.lower)
376
377 mean(info tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0,3))
378 std(info tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0,3))
379 max(info tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0,3))
380 sum(initial abate.tri basin gosper)
381
382 mean(info tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0,3))
383 std(info tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0,3))
384 max(info tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0,3))
385 sum(initial abate.tri basin phelps)
386
387 mean(info tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0,3))
388 std(info tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0,3))
389 max(info tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0,3))
390 sum(initial abate.tri basin kearney)
391
392 mean(initial abate inches.basin(inches(:,39)>0))
393 std(initial abate inches.basin(inches(:,39)>0))
394 max(initial abate inches.basin(inches(:,39)>0))
395 sum(initial abate.basin)
396
397 %percent of wells constrained
398 sum(initial abate.upper(upper inches(:,39)>0)>0)/sum(upper inches(:,39)>0)
399 sum(initial abate.middle(middle inches(:,39)>0)>0)/sum(middle inches(:,39)>0)
400 sum(initial abate.lower(lower inches(:,39)>0)>0)/sum(lower inches(:,39)>0)
401 sum(initial abate.tri basin gosper...
402 (tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)>0)/sum(tri basin gosper inches(:,39)>0)
403 sum(initial abate.tri basin phelps...
404 (tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)>0)/sum(tri basin phelps inches(:,39)>0)
405 sum(initial abate.tri basin kearney...
406 (tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)>0)/sum(tri basin kearney inches(:,39)>0)
407 sum(initial abate.basin(inches(:,39)>0)>0)/sum(inches(:,39)>0)
408
409 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
410 %%%%%%%%% Stream trading info
411 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
412
413 %total welfare gain
414 sum(welfare gain.upper near stream)+...
415 sum(welfare gain.upper near stream 2)+...
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416 sum(welfare gain.upper near stream 3)+...
417 sum(welfare gain.upper near stream 4)
418
419 %summary stats of permit price
420 mean([tax.upper near stream;tax.upper near stream 2;...
421 tax.upper near stream 3;tax.upper near stream 4])
422 min([tax.upper near stream;tax.upper near stream 2;...
423 tax.upper near stream 3;tax.upper near stream 4])
424 max([tax.upper near stream;tax.upper near stream 2;...
425 tax.upper near stream 3;tax.upper near stream 4])
426
427 %mean distance of sellers
428 sum(upper dist stream(inches traded.upper>0)'.*...
429 acreinches traded.upper(inches traded.upper>0))/...
430 sum(acreinches traded.upper(inches traded.upper>0))
431
432 sum(middle dist stream(inches traded.middle>0)'.*...
433 acreinches traded.middle(inches traded.middle>0))/...
434 sum(acreinches traded.middle(inches traded.middle>0))
435
436 sum(lower dist stream(inches traded.lower>0)'.*...
437 acreinches traded.lower(inches traded.lower>0))/...
438 sum(acreinches traded.lower(inches traded.lower>0))
439
440
441 %mean distance of buyers
442 sum(upper dist stream(inches traded.upper<0)'.*...
443 acreinches traded.upper(inches traded.upper<0))/...
444 sum(acreinches traded.upper(inches traded.upper<0))
445
446 sum(middle dist stream(inches traded.middle<0)'.*...
447 acreinches traded.middle(inches traded.middle<0))/...
448 sum(acreinches traded.middle(inches traded.middle<0))
449
450 sum(lower dist stream(inches traded.lower<0)'.*...
451 acreinches traded.lower(inches traded.lower<0))/...
452 sum(acreinches traded.lower(inches traded.lower<0))
453
454 %under stream zone
455 sum(upper near stream(inches traded.upper near stream>0)'.*...
456 acreinches traded.upper near stream(inches traded.upper near stream>0))/...
457 sum(acreinches traded.upper near stream(inches traded.upper near stream>0))
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458
459 sum(upper near stream(inches traded.upper near stream<0)'.*...
460 acreinches traded.upper near stream(inches traded.upper near stream<0))/...
461 sum(acreinches traded.upper near stream(inches traded.upper near stream<0))
462
463
464 sum(upper near stream 2(inches traded.upper near stream 2>0)'.*...
465 acreinches traded.upper near stream 2(inches traded.upper near stream 2>0))/...
466 sum(acreinches traded.upper near stream 2(inches traded.upper near stream 2>0))
467
468 sum(upper near stream 2(inches traded.upper near stream 2<0)'.*...
469 acreinches traded.upper near stream 2(inches traded.upper near stream 2<0))/...
470 sum(acreinches traded.upper near stream 2(inches traded.upper near stream 2<0))
471
472 sum(upper near stream 3(inches traded.upper near stream 3>0)'.*...
473 acreinches traded.upper near stream 3(inches traded.upper near stream 3>0))/...
474 sum(acreinches traded.upper near stream 3(inches traded.upper near stream 3>0))
475
476 sum(upper near stream 3(inches traded.upper near stream 3<0)'.*...
477 acreinches traded.upper near stream 3(inches traded.upper near stream 3<0))/...
478 sum(acreinches traded.upper near stream 3(inches traded.upper near stream 3<0))
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Trading Information
Use this code to generate information about trading, such as numbers of buyers and sellers, average
permit prices and average acre-inches traded.
1 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2 %%% Generate information for tables
3 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
4
5 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
6 %summary stats for unconstrained water use
7 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
8 mean(upper inches(:,39))
9 median(upper inches(:,39))
10 std(upper inches(:,39))
11 max(upper inches(:,39))
12 sum(upper inches(:,39).*upper acres(:,39))
13
14
15 mean(middle inches(:,39))
16 median(middle inches(:,39))
17 std(middle inches(:,39))
18 max(middle inches(:,39))
19 sum(middle inches(:,39).*middle acres(:,39))
20
21
22 mean(lower inches(:,39))
23 median(lower inches(:,39))
24 std(lower inches(:,39))
25 max(lower inches(:,39))
26 sum(lower inches(:,39).*lower acres(:,39))
27
28 mean(tri basin gosper inches(:,39))
29 median(tri basin gosper inches(:,39))
30 std(tri basin gosper inches(:,39))
31 max(tri basin gosper inches(:,39))
32 sum(tri basin gosper inches(:,39).*tri basin gosper acres(:,39))
33
34
35 mean(tri basin phelps inches(:,39))
36 median(tri basin phelps inches(:,39))
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37 std(tri basin phelps inches(:,39))
38 max(tri basin phelps inches(:,39))
39 sum(tri basin phelps inches(:,39).*tri basin phelps acres(:,39))
40
41
42 mean(tri basin kearney inches(:,39))
43 median(tri basin kearney inches(:,39))
44 std(tri basin kearney inches(:,39))
45 max(tri basin kearney inches(:,39))
46 sum(tri basin kearney inches(:,39).*tri basin kearney acres(:,39))
47
48
49 mean(inches(:,39))
50 median(inches(:,39))
51 std(inches(:,39))
52 max(inches(:,39))
53 sum(inches(:,39).*acres(:,39))
54
55 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
56
57 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
58 %summary stats for profits at unconstrained water use
59 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
60 mean(upper value(:,39)./upper acres(:,39))
61 median(upper value(:,39)./upper acres(:,39))
62 std(upper value(:,39)./upper acres(:,39))
63 max(upper value(:,39)./upper acres(:,39))
64 sum(upper value(:,39)./upper acres(:,39))
65
66
67 mean(middle value(:,39))
68 median(middle value(:,39))
69 std(middle value(:,39))
70 max(middle value(:,39))
71 sum(middle value(:,39).*middle acres(:,39))
72
73
74 mean(lower value(:,39))
75 median(lower value(:,39))
76 std(lower value(:,39))
77 max(lower value(:,39))
78 sum(lower value(:,39).*lower acres(:,39))
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79
80 mean(tri basin gosper value(:,39))
81 median(tri basin gosper value(:,39))
82 std(tri basin gosper value(:,39))
83 max(tri basin gosper value(:,39))
84 sum(tri basin gosper value(:,39).*tri basin gosper acres(:,39))
85
86
87 mean(tri basin phelps value(:,39))
88 median(tri basin phelps value(:,39))
89 std(tri basin phelps value(:,39))
90 max(tri basin phelps value(:,39))
91 sum(tri basin phelps value(:,39).*tri basin phelps acres(:,39))
92
93
94 mean(tri basin kearney value(:,39))
95 median(tri basin kearney value(:,39))
96 std(tri basin kearney value(:,39))
97 max(tri basin kearney value(:,39))
98 sum(tri basin kearney value(:,39).*tri basin kearney acres(:,39))
99
100
101 mean(value(:,39))
102 median(value(:,39))
103 std(value(:,39))
104 max(value(:,39))
105 sum(value(:,39).*acres(:,39))
106
107 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
108 % Upper
109 %buyers and sellers information
110 sum(inches traded.upper>0)
111 sum(inches traded.upper<0)
112 %proportion of slack that trades in market
113 sum(free ride.upper(inches traded.upper>0)'.*...
114 upper acres(inches traded.upper>0,39))
115 sum(free ride.upper(inches traded.upper>0).*...
116 upper acres(inches traded.upper>0,39))/sum(acreinches traded.upper(inches traded.upper>0))
117 %stream trading
118 sum(inches traded.upper near stream>0)+...
119 sum(inches traded.upper near stream 2>0)+...
120 sum(inches traded.upper near stream 3>0)+...
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121 sum(inches traded.upper near stream 4>0)
122
123 sum(inches traded.upper near stream<0)+...
124 sum(inches traded.upper near stream 2<0)+...
125 sum(inches traded.upper near stream 3<0)+...
126 sum(inches traded.upper near stream 4<0)
127 %county
128 sum(inches traded.upper chase>0)+...
129 sum(inches traded.upper dundy>0)+...
130 sum(inches traded.upper perkins>0)
131 sum(inches traded.upper chase<0)+...
132 sum(inches traded.upper dundy<0)+...
133 sum(inches traded.upper perkins<0)
134 %township
135 sum(buy sell.upper townships(:,1))
136 sum(buy sell.upper townships(:,2))
137
138
139 %permit prices at trading schemes
140 tax.upper
141 mean([tax.upper near stream;...
142 tax.upper near stream 2;...
143 tax.upper near stream 3;...
144 tax.upper near stream 4])
145 mean([tax.upper chase;tax.upper perkins;tax.upper dundy])
146 min([tax.upper chase;tax.upper perkins;tax.upper dundy])
147 max([tax.upper chase;tax.upper perkins;tax.upper dundy])
148 mean(tax.upper townships)
149 min(tax.upper townships)
150 max(tax.upper townships)
151
152 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
153
154 % Middle
155
156 %buyers and sellers information
157 sum(inches traded.middle<0)
158 sum(inches traded.middle>0)
159 %proportion of slack that trades
160 sum(free ride.middle(inches traded.middle>0)'.*...
161 middle acres(inches traded.middle>0))
162 sum(free ride.middle(inches traded.middle>0).*...
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163 middle acres(inches traded.middle>0,39))/...
164 sum(acreinches traded.middle(inches traded.middle>0))
165 %stream trading
166 sum(inches traded.middle near stream>0)+...
167 sum(inches traded.middle near stream 2>0)+...
168 sum(inches traded.middle near stream 3>0)+...
169 sum(inches traded.middle near stream 4>0)
170
171 sum(inches traded.middle near stream<0)+...
172 sum(inches traded.middle near stream 2<0)+...
173 sum(inches traded.middle near stream 3<0)+...
174 sum(inches traded.middle near stream 4<0)
175 %County trading
176 sum(inches traded.middle frontier>0)+...
177 sum(inches traded.middle hayes>0)+...
178 sum(inches traded.middle hitchcock>0)+...
179 sum(inches traded.middle lincoln>0)+...
180 sum(inches traded.middle red willow>0)
181
182 sum(inches traded.middle frontier<0)+...
183 sum(inches traded.middle hayes<0)+...
184 sum(inches traded.middle hitchcock>0)+...
185 sum(inches traded.middle lincoln<0)+...
186 sum(inches traded.middle red willow<0)
187 %township
188 sum(buy sell.middle townships(:,1))
189 sum(buy sell.middle townships(:,2))
190
191
192 %permit prices at trading schemes
193 tax.middle
194 mean([tax.middle near stream;...
195 tax.middle near stream 2;...
196 tax.middle near stream 3;...
197 tax.middle near stream 4])
198
199 mean([tax.middle frontier;...
200 tax.middle hayes;...
201 tax.middle hitchcock;...
202 tax.middle lincoln;...
203 tax.middle red willow])
204
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205 min([tax.middle frontier;...
206 tax.middle hayes;...
207 tax.middle hitchcock;...
208 tax.middle lincoln;...
209 tax.middle red willow])
210 max([tax.middle frontier;...
211 tax.middle hayes;...
212 tax.middle hitchcock;...
213 tax.middle lincoln;...
214 tax.middle red willow])
215 mean(tax.middle townships)
216 min(tax.middle townships)
217 max(tax.middle townships)
218
219
220 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
221
222 % Lower
223
224
225 %buyers and sellers information
226 sum(inches traded.lower<0)
227 sum(inches traded.lower>0)
228 %slack that trades
229 sum(free ride.lower(inches traded.lower>0).*...
230 lower acres(inches traded.lower>0,39))/...
231 sum(acreinches traded.lower(inches traded.lower>0))
232 %stream trading
233 sum(inches traded.lower near stream>0)+...
234 sum(inches traded.lower near stream 2>0)+...
235 sum(inches traded.lower near stream 3>0)+...
236 sum(inches traded.lower near stream 4>0)
237
238 sum(inches traded.lower near stream<0)+...
239 sum(inches traded.lower near stream 2<0)+...
240 sum(inches traded.lower near stream 3<0)+...
241 sum(inches traded.lower near stream 4<0)
242 %county trading
243 sum(inches traded.lower harlan>0)+...
244 sum(inches traded.lower furnas>0)+...
245 sum(inches traded.lower franklin>0)+...
246 sum(inches traded.lower webster>0)+...
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247 sum(inches traded.lower nuckolls>0)
248
249 sum(inches traded.lower harlan<0)+...
250 sum(inches traded.lower furnas<0)+...
251 sum(inches traded.lower franklin<0)+..
252 sum(inches traded.lower webster<0)+...
253 sum(inches traded.lower nuckolls<0)
254 %township
255 sum(buy sell.lower townships(:,1))
256 sum(buy sell.lower townships(:,2))
257
258
259 %permit prices at trading schemes
260 tax.lower
261 mean([tax.lower near stream;...
262 tax.lower near stream 2;...
263 tax.lower near stream 3;...
264 tax.lower near stream 4])
265
266 mean([tax.lower harlan;...
267 tax.lower furnas;...
268 tax.lower franklin;...
269 tax.lower webster;...
270 tax.lower nuckolls])
271
272 min([tax.lower harlan;...
273 tax.lower furnas;...
274 tax.lower franklin;...
275 tax.lower webster;...
276 tax.lower nuckolls])
277 max([tax.lower harlan;...
278 tax.lower furnas;...
279 tax.lower franklin;...
280 tax.lower webster;...
281 tax.lower nuckolls])
282
283 mean(tax.lower townships)
284 min(tax.lower townships)
285 max(tax.lower townships)
286
287 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
288
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289 %find gains between buyers and sellers
290
291
292 sum(welfare gain.upper(inches traded.upper>0))
293 sum(welfare gain.upper(inches traded.upper<0))
294
295 sum(welfare gain.middle(inches traded.middle>0))
296 sum(welfare gain.middle(inches traded.middle<0))
297
298 sum(welfare gain.lower(inches traded.lower>0))
299 sum(welfare gain.lower(inches traded.lower<0))
300
301 mean(welfare gain.upper(inches traded.upper>0))
302 mean(welfare gain.upper(inches traded.upper<0))
303
304 mean(welfare gain.middle(inches traded.middle>0))
305 mean(welfare gain.middle(inches traded.middle<0))
306
307 mean(welfare gain.lower(inches traded.lower>0))
308 mean(welfare gain.lower(inches traded.lower<0))
309
310
311 mean(welfare gain.upper(inches traded.upper>0)'./...
312 upper acres(inches traded.upper>0,39))
313 mean(welfare gain.upper(inches traded.upper<0)'./...
314 upper acres(inches traded.upper<0,39))
315
316 mean(welfare gain.middle(inches traded.middle>0)'./...
317 middle acres(inches traded.middle>0,39))
318 mean(welfare gain.middle(inches traded.middle<0)'./...
319 middle acres(inches traded.middle<0,39))
320
321 mean(welfare gain.lower(inches traded.lower>0)'./...
322 lower acres(inches traded.lower>0,39))
323 mean(welfare gain.lower(inches traded.lower<0)'./...
324 lower acres(inches traded.lower<0,39))
325
326 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
327 %find all participants in the stream trading zones
328 size(upper near stream,1)−sum(inches traded.upper near stream==0)
329 size(upper near stream 2,1)−sum(inches traded.upper near stream 2==0)
330 size(upper near stream 3,1)−sum(inches traded.upper near stream 3==0)
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331 size(upper near stream 4,1)−sum(inches traded.upper near stream 4==0)
332
333
334 size(middle near stream,1)−sum(inches traded.middle near stream==0)
335 size(middle near stream 2,1)−sum(inches traded.middle near stream 2==0)
336 size(middle near stream 3,1)−sum(inches traded.middle near stream 3==0)
337 size(middle near stream 4,1)−sum(inches traded.middle near stream 4==0)
338
339
340 size(lower near stream,1)−sum(inches traded.lower near stream==0)
341 size(lower near stream 2,1)−sum(inches traded.lower near stream 2==0)
342 size(lower near stream 3,1)−sum(inches traded.lower near stream 3==0)
343 size(lower near stream 4,1)−sum(inches traded.lower near stream 4==0)
344
345 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
346 % welfare gains by trading
347 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
348
349
350 % Upper
351
352 sum(welfare gain.upper)
353 %by stream
354 sum(welfare gain.upper near stream)+...
355 sum(welfare gain.upper near stream 2)+...
356 sum(welfare gain.upper near stream 3)+...
357 sum(welfare gain.upper near stream 4)
358
359 (sum(welfare gain.upper near stream)+...
360 sum(welfare gain.upper near stream 2)+...
361 sum(welfare gain.upper near stream 3)+...
362 sum(welfare gain.upper near stream 4))/sum(welfare gain.upper)
363 %by county
364 sum(welfare gain.upper chase)+...
365 sum(welfare gain.upper dundy)+...
366 sum(welfare gain.upper perkins)
367
368 (sum(welfare gain.upper chase)+...
369 sum(welfare gain.upper dundy)+...
370 sum(welfare gain.upper perkins))/sum(welfare gain.upper)
371 %by township
372 sum(total welfare.upper townships(:,1))
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373 sum(total welfare.upper townships(:,1))/sum(welfare gain.upper)
374
375
376 % Middle
377
378 sum(welfare gain.middle)
379 %by stream
380 sum(welfare gain.middle near stream)+...
381 sum(welfare gain.middle near stream 2)+...
382 sum(welfare gain.middle near stream 3)+...
383 sum(welfare gain.middle near stream 4)
384
385 (sum(welfare gain.middle near stream)+...
386 sum(welfare gain.middle near stream 2)+...
387 sum(welfare gain.middle near stream 3)+...
388 sum(welfare gain.middle near stream 4))/sum(welfare gain.middle)
389 %by county
390 sum(welfare gain.middle frontier)+...
391 sum(welfare gain.middle hayes)+...
392 sum(welfare gain.middle hitchcock)+...
393 sum(welfare gain.middle lincoln)+...
394 sum(welfare gain.middle red willow)
395
396 (sum(welfare gain.middle frontier)+...
397 sum(welfare gain.middle hayes)+...
398 sum(welfare gain.middle hitchcock)+...
399 sum(welfare gain.middle lincoln)+...
400 sum(welfare gain.middle red willow))/sum(welfare gain.middle)
401 %by township
402 sum(total welfare.middle townships(:,1))
403 sum(total welfare.middle townships(:,1))/sum(welfare gain.middle)
404
405
406 % Lower
407
408 sum(welfare gain.lower)
409 %by stream
410 sum(welfare gain.lower near stream)+...
411 sum(welfare gain.lower near stream 2)+...
412 sum(welfare gain.lower near stream 3)+...
413 sum(welfare gain.lower near stream 4)
414
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415 (sum(welfare gain.lower near stream)+...
416 sum(welfare gain.lower near stream 2)+...
417 sum(welfare gain.lower near stream 3)...
418 +sum(welfare gain.lower near stream 4))/sum(welfare gain.lower)
419 %by county
420 sum(welfare gain.lower franklin)+...
421 sum(welfare gain.lower furnas)+...
422 sum(welfare gain.lower harlan)+...
423 sum(welfare gain.lower nuckolls)+...
424 sum(welfare gain.lower webster)
425
426 (sum(welfare gain.lower franklin)+...
427 sum(welfare gain.lower furnas)+...
428 sum(welfare gain.lower harlan)+...
429 sum(welfare gain.lower nuckolls)+...
430 sum(welfare gain.lower webster))/sum(welfare gain.lower)
431 %by township
432 sum(total welfare.lower townships(:,1))
433 sum(total welfare.lower townships(:,1))/sum(welfare gain.lower)
434
435 % Tri−Basin
436
437 sum(welfare gain.tri basin)
438
439 %by county
440
441 sum(welfare gain.tri basin gosper)+...
442 sum(welfare gain.tri basin phelps)+...
443 sum(welfare gain.tri basin phelps)
444
445
446 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
447
448 %to find out how many acre inches are sold by each type of seller
449
450 %selling all permits
451 sum(acreinches traded.upper(inches traded.upper>12))+...
452 sum(acreinches traded.middle(inches traded.middle>11.5))+...
453 sum(acreinches traded.lower(inches traded.lower>8.5))+...
454 sum(acreinches traded.tri basin kearney(inches traded.tri basin kearney>8.5))+...
455 sum(acreinches traded.tri basin gosper(inches traded.tri basin gosper>10.5))+...
456 sum(acreinches traded.tri basin phelps(inches traded.tri basin phelps>9.5))
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457
458 %buying permits
459 sum(acreinches traded.upper(inches traded.upper>0))+...
460 sum(acreinches traded.middle(inches traded.middle>0))+...
461 sum(acreinches traded.lower(inches traded.lower>0))+...
462 sum(acreinches traded.tri basin kearney(inches traded.tri basin kearney>0))+...
463 sum(acreinches traded.tri basin gosper(inches traded.tri basin gosper>0))+...
464 sum(acreinches traded.tri basin phelps(inches traded.tri basin phelps>0))
465
466 %selling permits but still irrigating
467 sum(acreinches traded.upper(upper inches(inches traded.upper>0,39)<13.5...
468 & upper inches(inches traded.upper>0,39)>0))+...
469 sum(acreinches traded.middle(middle inches(inches traded.middle>0,39)<12...
470 & middle inches(inches traded.middle>0,39)>0))+...
471 sum(acreinches traded.lower(lower inches(inches traded.lower>0,39)<9...
472 & lower inches(inches traded.lower>0,39)>0))+...
473 sum(acreinches traded.tri basin gosper(tri basin gosper inches...
474 (inches traded.tri basin gosper>0,39)<11...
475 & tri basin gosper inches(inches traded.tri basin gosper>0,39)>0))+...
476 sum(acreinches traded.tri basin phelps(tri basin phelps inches...
477 (inches traded.tri basin phelps>0,39)<10...
478 & tri basin phelps inches(inches traded.tri basin phelps>0,39)>0))+...
479 sum(acreinches traded.tri basin kearney(tri basin kearney inches...
480 (inches traded.tri basin kearney>0,39)<9...
481 & tri basin kearney inches(inches traded.tri basin kearney>0,39)>0))
482
483 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
484
485 %how many producers in the basin are sellers
486 sum(inches traded.upper<0)+...
487 sum(inches traded.middle<0)+...
488 sum(inches traded.lower<0)+...
489 sum(inches traded.tri basin kearney<0)+...
490 sum(inches traded.tri basin gosper<0)+...
491 sum(inches traded.tri basin phelps<0)
492
493
494 %how many producers in the basin are full allocation sellers
495 sum(inches traded.upper>12)+...
496 sum(inches traded.middle>11.5)+...
497 sum(inches traded.lower>8.5)+...
498 sum(inches traded.tri basin kearney>8.5)+...
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499 sum(inches traded.tri basin gosper>10.5)+...
500 sum(inches traded.tri basin phelps>9.5)
501
502 %how many producers in the basin are buyers
503 sum(inches traded.upper>0)+...
504 sum(inches traded.middle>0)+...
505 sum(inches traded.lower>0)+...
506 sum(inches traded.tri basin kearney>0)+...
507 sum(inches traded.tri basin gosper>0)+...
508 sum(inches traded.tri basin phelps>0)
509
510 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
511
512 %how many producers in the basin are buyers no tri−basin
513 sum(inches traded.upper<0)+sum(inches traded.middle<0)...
514 +sum(inches traded.lower<0)
515
516 %how many producers in the basin are sellers no tri−basin
517 sum(inches traded.upper>0)+sum(inches traded.middle>0)...
518 +sum(inches traded.lower>0)
519
520
521 %matrix of all NRD buyers
522 [sum(inches traded.upper<0);sum(inches traded.middle<0)...
523 ;sum(inches traded.lower<0);sum(inches traded.tri basin kearney<0)...
524 ;sum(inches traded.tri basin gosper<0);sum(inches traded.tri basin phelps<0)]
525
526 %matrix of all NRD sellers
527 [sum(inches traded.upper>0);sum(inches traded.middle>0)...
528 ;sum(inches traded.lower>0);sum(inches traded.tri basin kearney>0)...
529 ;sum(inches traded.tri basin gosper>0);sum(inches traded.tri basin phelps>0)]
530
531 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
532
533 % total acre inches of sellers not going completely into dryland
534
535 sum(acreinches traded.upper...
536 (upper inches(inches traded.upper>0,39)<13.5...
537 & upper inches(inches traded.upper>0,39)>0))+...
538 sum(acreinches traded.middle...
539 (middle inches(inches traded.middle>0,39)<12...
540 & middle inches(inches traded.middle>0,39)>0))+...
153
541 sum(acreinches traded.lower...
542 (lower inches(inches traded.lower>0,39)<9...
543 & lower inches(inches traded.lower>0,39)>0))+...
544 sum(acreinches traded.tri basin gosper...
545 (tri basin gosper inches(inches traded.tri basin gosper>0,39)<11...
546 & tri basin gosper inches(inches traded.tri basin gosper>0,39)>0))+...
547 sum(acreinches traded.tri basin phelps...
548 (tri basin phelps inches(inches traded.tri basin phelps>0,39)<10 ...
549 & tri basin phelps inches(inches traded.tri basin phelps>0,39)>0))+...
550 sum(acreinches traded.tri basin kearney...
551 (tri basin kearney inches(inches traded.tri basin kearney>0,39)<9...
552 & tri basin kearney inches(inches traded.tri basin kearney>0,39)>0))
553
554 %total acre inches of sellers going completely into dryland
555
556 sum(acreinches traded.upper...
557 (upper inches(inches traded.upper>0,39)<13.5...
558 & upper inches(inches traded.upper>0,39)>0))+...
559 sum(acreinches traded.middle...
560 (middle inches(inches traded.middle>0,39)<12...
561 & middle inches(inches traded.middle>0,39)>0))+...
562 sum(acreinches traded.lower...
563 (lower inches(inches traded.lower>0,39)<9...
564 & lower inches(inches traded.lower>0,39)>0))
565
566 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
567
568
569 %t tests to see if means of well yield are different
570 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
571 ttest2(upper yield(inches traded.upper>12),...
572 upper yield(inches traded.upper<12 & inches traded.upper>0))
573
574 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
575 ttest2(upper yield(inches traded.upper<0),...
576 upper yield(inches traded.upper>0))
577
578 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
579 ttest2(middle yield(inches traded.middle>11.5),...
580 middle yield(inches traded.middle<11.5 & inches traded.middle>0))
581
582 [h,p,ci,stats]=ttest2(middle yield(inches traded.middle<0),...
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583 middle yield(inches traded.middle>0))
584
585 [h,p,ci,stats]=ttest2(lower yield(inches traded.lower>8.5),...
586 lower yield(inches traded.lower<8.5 & inches traded.lower>0))
587
588 [h,p,ci,stats]=ttest2(lower yield(inches traded.lower<0),...
589 lower yield(inches traded.lower>0))
590
591 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
592 ttest2(tri basin gosper yield(inches traded.tri basin gosper>10.5),...
593 tri basin gosper yield(inches traded.tri basin gosper<10.5...
594 & inches traded.tri basin gosper>0))
595
596 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
597 ttest2(tri basin gosper yield(inches traded.tri basin gosper<0),...
598 tri basin gosper yield(inches traded.tri basin gosper>0))
599
600 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
601 ttest2(tri basin phelps yield(inches traded.tri basin phelps>9.5),...
602 tri basin phelps yield(inches traded.tri basin phelps<9.5...
603 & inches traded.tri basin phelps>0))
604
605 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
606 ttest2(tri basin phelps yield(inches traded.tri basin phelps<0),...
607 tri basin phelps yield(inches traded.tri basin phelps>0))
608
609 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
610 ttest2(tri basin kearney yield(inches traded.tri basin kearney>8.5),...
611 tri basin kearney yield(inches traded.tri basin kearney<8.5...
612 & inches traded.tri basin kearney>0))
613
614 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
615 ttest2(tri basin kearney yield(inches traded.tri basin kearney<0),...
616 tri basin kearney yield(inches traded.tri basin kearney>0))
617
618 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
619
620 basinwellid=...
621 [upper wells;...
622 middle wells;...
623 lower wells;...
624 tri basin gosper wells;...
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625 tri basin phelps wells;...
626 tri basin kearney wells];
627
628 mac.abate.basin=...
629 [mac.abate.upper';...
630 mac.abate.middle';...
631 mac.abate.lower';...
632 mac.abate.tri basin gosper';...
633 mac.abate.tri basin phelps';...
634 mac.abate.tri basin kearney']
635
636 %t tests: well yields of intial dryland different from initial irrigated users
637 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
638 ttest2(upper yield(upper inches(:,39)>0),...
639 upper yield(upper inches(:,39)==0))
640
641 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
642 ttest2(middle yield(middle inches(:,39)>0),...
643 middle yield(middle inches(:,39)==0))
644
645 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
646 ttest2(lower yield(lower inches(:,39)>0),...
647 lower yield(lower inches(:,39)==0))
648
649 [h,p,ci,stats]=...
650 ttest2(tri basin yield(tri basin inches(:,39)>0),...
651 tri basin yield(tri basin inches(:,39)==0))
652
653 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
654 %generate histograms of acre inches traded
655
656 subplot(2,2,1)
657 hist([acreinches traded.upper(acreinches traded.upper>0)';...
658 acreinches traded.upper(acreinches traded.upper<0)'],100)
659 xlabel('Upper Republican NRD: Acre−Inches Traded')
660 ylabel('Frequency')
661 axis([−2000 3000 0 650])
662 subplot(2,2,2)
663 hist([acreinches traded.middle(acreinches traded.middle>0)';...
664 acreinches traded.middle(acreinches traded.middle<0)'],100)
665 xlabel('Middle Republican NRD: Acre−Inches Traded')
666 ylabel('Frequency')
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667 axis([−2000 3000 0 200 ])
668
669 subplot(2,2,3)
670 hist([acreinches traded.lower(acreinches traded.lower>0)';...
671 acreinches traded.lower(acreinches traded.lower<0)'],100)
672 xlabel('Lower Republican NRD: Acre−Inches Traded')
673 ylabel('Frequency')
674 axis([−2000 3000 0 400])
675
676 %prints eps file in color
677 print −dpsc2 hist acreinches nrd.eps
678
679 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
680
681
682 %generate scatter plots of total acre inches traded buyers are black sellers are red
683
684
685 subplot(2,2,1)
686 %figure(2)
687 hold on
688 plot(acreinches traded.upper(inches traded.upper>0),...
689 welfare gain.upper(inches traded.upper>0),'r.')
690 plot(acreinches traded.upper(inches traded.upper<0),...
691 welfare gain.upper(inches traded.upper<0),'k.')
692 xlabel('Upper Republican NRD: Acre Inches Traded Per Well')
693 ylabel('Welfare Gain Per Well')
694 axis([−2000 3000 0 25000])
695 hold off
696
697 subplot(2,2,2)
698 hold on
699 plot(acreinches traded.middle(inches traded.middle>0),...
700 welfare gain.middle(inches traded.middle>0),'r.')
701 plot(acreinches traded.middle(inches traded.middle<0),...
702 welfare gain.middle(inches traded.middle<0),'k.')
703 xlabel('Middle Republican NRD: Acre Inches Traded Per Well')
704 ylabel('Welfare Gain Per Well')
705 axis([−2000 3000 0 25000])
706 hold off
707
708
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709 subplot(2,2,3)
710 hold on
711 plot(acreinches traded.lower(inches traded.lower>0),...
712 welfare gain.lower(inches traded.lower>0),'r.')
713 plot(acreinches traded.lower(inches traded.lower<0),...
714 welfare gain.lower(inches traded.lower<0),'k.')
715 xlabel('Lower Republican NRD: Acre Inches Traded Per Well')
716 ylabel('Welfare Gain Per Well')
717 axis([−2000 3000 0 25000])
718 hold off
719
720 print −dpsc2 gains acreinches nrd.eps
721
722
723
724 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
725
726 %generate scatter plots of inches per acre traded buyers are black sellers are red
727
728 subplot(2,2,1)
729 hold on
730 plot(inches traded.upper(inches traded.upper>0),...
731 welfare gain.upper(inches traded.upper>0)'./upper acres(inches traded.upper>0,39),'r.')
732 plot(inches traded.upper(inches traded.upper<0),...
733 welfare gain.upper(inches traded.upper<0)'./upper acres(inches traded.upper<0,39),'k.')
734 mean(welfare gain.upper(inches traded.upper>0)'./upper acres(inches traded.upper>0,39))
735 mean(welfare gain.upper(inches traded.upper<0)'./upper acres(inches traded.upper<0,39))
736 axis([−5 14 0 50])
737 xlabel('Upper Republican NRD: Inches Per Acre Traded')
738 ylabel('Welfare Gain Per Acre')
739 hold off
740
741
742
743 subplot(2,2,2)
744 hold on
745 plot(inches traded.middle(inches traded.middle>0),...
746 welfare gain.middle(inches traded.middle>0)'./...
747 middle acres(inches traded.middle>0,39),'r.')
748 plot(inches traded.middle(inches traded.middle<0),...
749 welfare gain.middle(inches traded.middle<0)'./...
750 middle acres(inches traded.middle<0,39),'k.')
158
751 mean(welfare gain.middle(inches traded.middle>0)'./...
752 middle acres(inches traded.middle>0,39))
753 mean(welfare gain.middle(inches traded.middle<0)'./...
754 middle acres(inches traded.middle<0,39))
755 axis([−5 14 0 50])
756 xlabel('Middle Republican NRD: Inches Per Acre Traded')
757 ylabel('Welfare Gain Per Acre')
758 hold off
759
760
761
762
763 subplot(2,2,3)
764 hold on
765 plot(inches traded.lower(inches traded.lower>0),...
766 welfare gain.lower(inches traded.lower>0)'./lower acres(inches traded.lower>0,39),'r.')
767 plot(inches traded.lower(inches traded.lower<0),...
768 welfare gain.lower(inches traded.lower<0)'./lower acres(inches traded.lower<0,39),'k.')
769 mean(welfare gain.lower(inches traded.lower>0)'./lower acres(inches traded.lower>0,39))
770 mean(welfare gain.lower(inches traded.lower<0)'./lower acres(inches traded.lower<0,39))
771 axis([−5 14 0 50])
772 xlabel('Lower Republican NRD: Inches Per Acre Traded')
773 ylabel('Welfare Gain Per Acre')
774 hold off
775
776 print −dpsc2 gains inches nrd.eps
777 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
778
779 %generage histograms of unconstrained water use
780
781 subplot(2,2,1)
782 hist(upper inches(upper inches(:,39)>0,39),100)
783 hold on
784 plot([13 13],[0 200], 'k:','LineWidth',1.5)
785 axis([8 20 0 200])
786 xlabel('Upper Republican NRD: Inches Per Acre')
787 ylabel('Frequency')
788
789 subplot(2,2,2)
790 hist(middle inches(middle inches(:,39)>0,39),100)
791 hold on
792 plot([12 12],[0 100], 'k:','LineWidth',1.5)
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793 axis([8 20 0 100])
794 xlabel('Middle Republican NRD: Inches Per Acre')
795 ylabel('Frequency')
796
797
798 subplot(2,2,3)
799 hist(lower inches(lower inches(:,39)>0,39),100)
800 hold on
801 plot([9 9],[0 150], 'k:','LineWidth',1.5)
802 axis([8 20 0 150])
803 xlabel('Lower Republican NRD: Inches Per Acre')
804 ylabel('Frequency')
805
806 subplot(2,2,4)
807 hist(tri basin inches(tri basin inches(:,39)>0,39),100)
808 hold on
809 plot([11 11],[0 100], 'k:','LineWidth',1.5)
810 plot([10 10],[0 100], 'k−.','LineWidth',1.5)
811 plot([9 9],[0 100], 'k','LineWidth',1.5)
812 axis([8 20 0 100])
813 xlabel('Tri−Basin NRD: Inches Per Acre')
814 ylabel('Frequency')
815
816 print −dpsc2 water use basin.eps
817 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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